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Abstract 
Dominated by a number of humanities-based disciplines and influenced by 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and French poststructuralism, queer theory 
emerged in the early 1990s as a critical project that problematised the 
theorisation of sexuality and its relation to lesbian and gay politics. Its 
emergence was marked in part by problematising theoretical formulations 
on sexuality put forward by White gay male historiographers and 
sociologists in the 1970s and '80s. Arguing against a stable and unified 
notion of homosexuality, queer theory broadly claimed that: (1) sexual 
identity is normative and exclusionary; (2) sexual identity is not stable and 
unified but variable and multiple insofar as it is an intersection of gender, 
race, class, ethnicity, and nationality; and (3) homosexuality should not be 
studied in and of itself or vis-ä-vis heterosexuality but as the product of a 
'modern regime of sexuality, ' which organises society into heterosexuals 
and homosexuals. 
Although queer theory has made gestures towards a social analysis of 
sexuality and sociologists have attempted to engage with queer theory, 
their relationship has been mainly unproductive. On the one hand, 
sociology has largely failed to read queer theory carefully and critically by 
conflating it with a queer subject or a set of misinterpreted theoretical 
formulations, with the effect of misconstruing the project. On the other 
hand, queer theory has largely failed to acknowledge and engage with 
sociology both theoretically and methodologically, despite having critiqued 
the discourse of White gay male historiography and sociology. This 
relationship has resulted in the crystallisation of disciplinary alliances, 
stalling movement towards disciplinary cross-fertilisation between the two. 
The purpose of the thesis is to have a discursive conversation 
between queer theory and sociology. I want to consider the current 
unproductive relationship between the two. From both a queer and 
sociological perspective, I will examine, problematise, and rework 
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sociology's uncritical reading of queer theory and queer theory's general 
failure to acknowledge and engage with sociology, with the intent to move 
them towards disciplinary cross-fertilisation. I will argue that disciplinary 
cross-fertilisation can only happen if sociology reads queer theory carefully 
and critically and queer theory and sociology facilitate and promote 
discursive spaces that are theoretically and methodologically integrated. 
In considering their relationship, I will draw upon a number of diverse 
theoretical perspectives, for example: social-historical construction ism, 
symbolic interactionism, poststructuralism, and feminist theory. I will also 
draw upon my ethnographic work on gay male male-to-female drag that 
took place in the United States between September 1995 and June 1997, 
with a brief revisit in February 1999. I will finally conclude by proposing 
that an 'outsider-within perspective' serve as a basis for future 
engagement between queer theory and sociology. It is my opinion that the 
facilitation and promotion of queer and sociological perspectives that are 
neither full outsiders nor full insiders to their disciplinary domain would 
generate the conditions for disciplinary cross-fertilisation. 
Introduction 
On a Discursive Conversation between Queer Theory and Sociology 
Nothing that God ever made is the same thing to more than 
one person. That is natural. There is no single face in nature 
because every eye that looks upon it sees it from its own 
angle. So every man's spice-box seasons his own food. 
Naturally, I picked up the reflections of life around me with my 
own instruments, and absorbed what I gathered according to 
my inside juices. 
-Zora Neale Hurston, Dust Tracks on a Road 
(quoted in Hernandez 1995, pp. 155-56) 
By Wäy of Introduction 
The following narrative shall be my point of departure, which I believe is 
symptomatic of the general relationship that currently exists between 
queer theory and sociology. It also elucidates the driving force that 
motivated me to seriously consider the relationship, which has mainly 
been unproductive. No-one who has been caught up in it has been 
untouched by its disciplinary undertow, to say the very least. 
During the summer of 1995, before enrolling in my third year of 
undergraduate studies in sociology/anthropology and gender studies at 
Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon, United States, I began work 
on a self-designed independent study course, which focused on sexuality 
in a social, cultural, and historical perspective. It later spiralled into two 
additional self-designed independent study courses, which delved deeper 
into the topic over two semesters. The divine Diane was my course 
instructor/mentor/interlocutor/co-conspirator. Her fractured identity: a 
poststructuralist cyborg masquerading as an anthropologist who liked to 
remain faithful to her anthropological roots from time to time. In addition to 
spawning my ethnographic work on gay male male-to-female drag, which I 
discuss in Chapter Four, the course, along with Diane's unequivocal talent 
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of persuasion, introduced me to and subsequently inculcated me into the 
still-evolving multidisciplinary project of queer theory. While I was drawing 
up the reading list for the course, Diane suggested that I balance my 
emphasis on the work of White gay male historiographers and sociologists 
of the 1970s and '80s with work by more contemporary theorists of 
sexuality, particularly those who played within queer domains. ' I ran with 
her suggestion. 
Throughout the semester-long course, I read and engaged with them 
alongside each other. However, I did not engage with them in parallel to 
each other. Although I did have a certain respect for their varied histories, 
disciplinary locations, methodologies, and theoretical formulations, I did 
not strictly treat them as two separate registers of thought that could not 
be in conversation with one another. Engagement was much more active 
and critical. I had them continually cross paths, whether they were in 
congruence with each other from different angles or were in radical 
disagreement with the other. Radical disagreement was not a bad thing, 
however. It was not something to be lamented. Rather, it was very 
productive. I was interested in how the insights of one project flagged up 
gaps in the other. I was particularly interested in how such insights 
enabled me to work through such gaps and further close them in. Their 
subject matter was diverse, for example: the (lesbian and gay) subject, 
identity politics, discourse, social roles, scripts and scripting, norms, social 
structure, and representation. 
However, when I began intellectual pursuits in sociology on this side of 
the Atlantic, my queer leanings did not encounter a warm reception. I not 
only encountered ill sentiments and resistance but outright rejection as 
well. I was made to feel as though I should just walk right back on the 
plane that I disembarked from and keep my ideas on the other side of the 
Atlantic. I encountered this reception from both my own disciplinary 
location and ones that I thought would have been sympathetic or, at the 
very least, tolerant (for example, English literature, theatre studies, and 
film studies). Several instances vividly come to mind, which occurred 
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while I was scouting universities to enroll in for my doctorate degree (They 
shall remain nameless. ). In one instance, upon arriving at a senior 
lecturer's office, the senior lecturer disclosed that she had heard within the 
'corridors of the department' that I was a 'Butlerian. ' She proceeded with 
laughter and indicated that "Butler's thought was not welcome over here. " 
According to her, I would struggle to find like-minded people. This 
exchange took place before she even properly introduced herself to mel 
Once another senior lecturer in the same department learned of my queer 
leanings, he accused me of working against the study of sexuality. He 
prematurely presupposed that I would deny an 'objective reality' and 
experience of it, the agency of the lesbian and gay subject, and the 
existence of a subject who could represent lesbian and gay folk. In 
another instance, a postgraduate co-ordinator asked me what was 
currently on my reading list. I indicated that I was rereading Judith Butler's 
Bodies That Matter (1993) alongside Michel Foucault's Discipline and 
Punish (1977). He replied: "Butler gets off the ground, but she never really 
lands. " 
This distaste towards queer theory continued when I began my 
degree. Disciplinary walls and boundaries were usually thrown up in front 
of me when I attempted to work across and between queer theory and 
sociology. I was warned by some 'Marxists' and 'Weberians' within my 
academic institution and other ones that I should not divert my attention 
away from classical theorists of sociology (for example, in addition to Karl 
Marx and Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, George Herbert Mead, and Georg 
Simmel). I was continually reminded that they are, after all, the building 
blocks of sociology. My interest in a poststructuralist discourse was 
viewed as mere philosophical play far removed from 'real matters' that 
sociologists preoccupied themselves with. This springing up of 
disciplinary walls and boundaries only intensified and solidified as I 
progressed through my first year of study. I found it increasingly difficult to 
have any conversations between queer theory and sociology that did not 
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involve pulling me in one direction: sociology. I was told by some that this 
was for my own benefit. 
Prone to resisting discipline and revelling in my unruliness, I began 
questioning and examining why there were currents in sociology that 
resisted any investments in queer theory (on both sides of the Atlantic). 
This led me to initially question and examine the general relationship 
between queer theory and sociology. I quickly discovered that disciplinary 
alliances were deep-seated within both queer theory and sociology, 
whether spoken or unspoken, and that those alliances worked in different 
ways to stall movement towards some good, productive disciplinary cross- 
fertilisation. I then realised that a challenge was being presented to me: to 
problematise those disciplinary alliances. As anyone who knows me can 
attest, I have never been known to refuse a challenge that I think is 
worthwhile, so, in the words of Zora Neale Hurston, "I picked up the 
reflections of life around me with my own instruments, and absorbed what 
I gathered according to my inside juices" (quoted in Hernandez 1995, pp. 
155-56). 
Purpose 
From the beginning, queer theory is linked to sociology. Queer theory's 
emergence on the critical scene as a troublemaking, interrogatory project 
in the early 1990s was marked in part by the problematisation of 
theoretical formulations on sexuality made by White gay male 
historiographers and sociologists in the 1970s and '80s, particularly social- 
historical constructionist accounts of sexuality. 2,3 
As I will reiterate and expand upon in later chapters, social-historical 
constructionist accounts of sexuality contended that sexuality is a product 
of culture, society, and history. In line with homosexual affirmative politics 
of the late 1960s and 70s on both sides of the Atlantic, the 'modern' 
Homosexual was central to social-historical construction ism. Although 
sexuality was understood to be a variable construction, a stable and 
unified figure of homosexuality dominated their formulations. This figure 
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was usually male, White, and Western. It was understood to act as a 
representative foundation for homosexuals (lesbians and gays) to rally 
around within dominant political discourses and to contest the violence 
waged against them by heteronormativity. 
Dominated by a number of humanities-based disciplines (for example, 
English literature, the history of consciousness, art history, film studies, 
and cultural studies) and heavily influenced by French poststructuralism 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis, queer theorists took issue with this figure of 
homosexuality and its relation to homosexual politics in three main 
respects. In the first instance, queer theorists maintained that the 
homosexual subject does not strictly represent lesbian and gay folk though 
an identity category because identity categories are not merely 
descriptive, simply reporting on some perceived homogenous 
constituency. They are also and mainly normative and exclusionary. 
Queer theorists argued that we need to inquire into what the subject and 
identity category authorise and exclude and to safeguard those exclusions 
for possible future uses. In the second instance, which is an extension of 
the first objection, queer theorists contended that sexual identity is not 
stable and unified. Drawing upon the work of lesbians and gay men of 
colour (for example, Alarcon et al. 1993; Anzaldüa 1987; Chung et al. 
1987; Delany 1985,1987,1991; Lorde 1982; Moraga 1986; Trujillo 1991), 
queer theorists formulated a claim that sexual identity is variable and 
multiple. It is variable and multiple insofar as it is not just a question of 
sexuality but is also one of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and nationality. 
Sexuality is an intersection of these markers of identity/difference, whether 
they converge with or diverge from one another. This is the theoretical 
thrust behind Teresa de Lauretis' introduction of the identity term 'queer' in 
place of the identity formula 'lesbian and gay' (1991b, p. ii). In the third 
instance, queer theorists argued that historiographers' and sociologists' 
emphasis on the homosexual subject reproduces and reinforces the 
hetero/homosexual binary, that 'modern regime of sexuality' that 
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"perpetuates the heterosexualization of society" (Seidman 1996a, p. 12). 
Steven Seidman captures queer theory's objection very well: 
Modern Western affirmative homosexual theory may naturalize or 
normalize the gay subject or even register it as an agent of social 
liberation, but it has the effect of consolidating heterosexuality and 
homosexuality as master categories of sexual and social identity; it 
reinforces the modern regime of sexuality (1996a, p. 12). 
Queer theorists maintained that homosexuality should not be studied in 
and of itself or vis-ä-vis heterosexuality. Rather, it should be the study of 
"those knowledges and social practices that organise 'society' as a whole 
by sexualizing-heterosexualizing or homosexualizing-bodies, desires, 
acts, identities, social relations, knowledges, culture, and social 
institutions" (Seidman 1996a, p. 13). This is the bold thesis of Sedgwick's 
queer project Epistemology of the Closet (1990): 
Epistemology of the Closet proposes that many of the major nodes 
of thought and knowledge in twentieth-century Western culture as 
a whole are structured-indeed, fractured-by a chronic, now 
endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual definition, indicatively male, 
dating from the end of the nineteenth century.... 
In arguing that homo/heterosexual definition has been a presiding 
master term of the past century, one that has the same, primary 
importance for all modern Western identity and social organization 
(and not merely for homosexual identity and culture) as do the 
more traditionally visible cruxes of gender, class, and race, I'll 
argue that the now chronic modern crisis of homo/heterosexual 
definition has affected our culture through its ineffaceable marking 
particularly of the categories secrecy/disclosure, 
knowledge/ignorance, private/public, masculine/feminine, 
majority/minority... (pp. 1,11). 
Within sociological discourse, Seidman has remarked that 
"[s]ociologists have both much to learn from [q]ueer theory and the 
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opportunity to make a serious contribution" (1996a, p. 13). Although queer 
theory has made gestures towards a general social analysis of sexuality 
and sociologists have made moves to open dialogue and engage with 
queer theory (namely Beemyn and Eliason 1996 and Seidman 1996b), the 
relationship between them has mainly been unproductive. The fault does 
not strictly lie at the front door of either queer theory or sociology. Both 
disciplinary locations can be held accountable. On the one hand, social 
critiques of queer theory (both sociological and general ones) have largely 
failed to read the multidisciplinary project carefully and critically (for 
example, Edwards 1998; Gamson 1996; Goldman 1996; Namaste 1996; 
Wolfe and Penelope 1993). This has had the damaging effect of 
producing very contestable, yet uncontested versions of queer theory, 
which have permeated and (mis)informed sociological discussions on the 
project. For example, Ki Namaste (1996) claims that queer theory's 
discursive analysis of transgender subjectivity ignores and subsequently 
distorts the social realities of transgendered people. However, a lot of 
work on transgender subjectivity within queer quarters has incorporated 
the social realities of transgendered people (for example, Bornstein 1992; 
Ekins and King 1996; Feinberg 1993,1996; Ferris 1993). On the other 
hand, although queer theory felt licensed to problematise theoretical 
formulations on sexuality made by White gay male historiographers and 
sociologists, it has rarely, if never, acknowledged and actively engaged 
with sociology since problematising them, both theoretically and 
methodologically (for example, Butler 1993; Butler and Rubin 1997 [1994]; 
de Lauretis 1991 a; Fuss 1991b, 1991c; Sedgwick 1990). For example, a 
surface review of Diana Fuss' edited anthology Inside/Out (1991b) 
demonstrates that queer theory's investment in textualism has largely 
overshadowed sociological ways of methodologically approaching a 
subject/object of study. This has even been the case when queer 
theorists have made social gestures about their subjects/objects of study, 
as well as when opportunities to engage with sociological discourse have 
been presented to them. 
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There has been an unproductive disciplinary undertow to sociology's 
uncritical readings of queer theory and queer theory's general failure to 
acknowledge and actively engage with sociology. In their own way, they 
have acted as a means to erect disciplinary walls and boundaries and stall 
movement towards disciplinary cross-fertilisation. This has resulted in a 
crystallisation of disciplinary alliances across discursive arenas for 
engagement, subjects/objects of study, theoretical toolkits, and 
methodological approaches. 
What I want to do within this thesis, then, is to have a discursive 
conversation between queer theory and sociology. More specifically, I will 
examine, problematise, and rework the current unproductive relationship 
between the two, from both a queer and sociological perspective, with a 
view to move the relationship in the direction of good, productive 
disciplinary cross-fertilisation. I also want to propose, at least initially, how 
queer theory and sociology might move in this direction. It is my strong 
belief that queer theory and sociology cannot learn from each other and 
make a 'serious contribution' to each other's debates and formulations on 
sexuality (as well as other subjects/objects of study) until their current 
relationship is first examined, problematised, and reworked. 
The Trajectory öf the Thesis 
The theoretical perspectives that (in)form the focus of the thesis are 
diverse. Quite a few of them do not sit nicely next to each other. On the 
other hand, some of them have formed alliances or have been in 
conversation with one another on occasion, which makes it very difficult to 
neatly separate and pigeonhole them. Of course, each perspective has its 
own internal differences as well, which complicates matters even more. 
They include: social-historical constructionism, discourse analysis, 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, symbolic interactionist theory, the labeling 
approach, sex role theory, poststructuralism, and feminist theory. 
Although the theoretical perspectives of the thesis are diverse, there is a 
thread that holds the thesis together (which also threatens to pull it apart 
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at the same time): the disciplinary undertow that has permeated the 
current relationship between queer theory and sociology. 
Chapters One and Two are an extension of each other and are 
respectively titled "For a More Careful, Critical Reading I and ll. "4 From a 
queer perspective, I consider the failure of social critiques of queer theory 
(both sociological and general ones) to read the multidisciplinary project 
carefully and critically. In particular, I examine, problematise, and rework 
the tendency of social critiques to conflate queer theory primarily with one 
queer thinker or a set of misinterpreted theoretical formulations. The 
subject matter of the conflations include: transgender subjectivity via 
Judith Butler (1990,1993); the analysis of race and other markers of 
identity/difference via Bad Object-Choices (1991) and Teresa de Lauretis 
(1991 a); discourse; the deconstruction of the lesbian and gay subject; the 
identity term 'queer'; and the analytic separation of gender and sexuality. I 
argue and demonstrate that these conflations have produced contestable 
versions of queer theory. They have not only erased queer theory's 
variegated depths but have also usually acted as a means to erect 
disciplinary walls and boundaries. I propose that disciplinary cross- 
fertilisation can only happen if sociology reads queer theory carefully and 
critically. Chapter One focuses on the mechanics of conflating queer 
theory, whereas Chapter Two focuses on what a careful, critical reading 
entails. Judith Butler's (1992 [1991]) examination of the question of 
postmodernism informs my analysis of conflating queer theory, and Michel 
Foucault's (1980) thoughts on local criticism inform what I mean by a 
careful, critical reading. Within each chapter, I then set out to productively 
rework some conflations of queer theory by performing and offering 
careful, critical readings. The primary aim of these readings is to bring to 
the surface some of queer theory's variegated depths and move sociology 
in the direction of disciplinary cross-fertilisation. 
I shift the grounds of belonging in Chapter Three, "Some Critical 
Citations. " From a sociological perspective, I use the presupposition of a 
queer theorist as a springboard to consider a general failure on the part of 
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queer theory. I examine and problematise the significance of Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick's presupposition that sexuality-centred terms of 
analysis were underdeveloped at the time she conceived her project 
Epistemology of the Closet (1990). Her presupposition analytically 
excludes, through erasure, a set of sociological terms for analysing 
sexuality that predated her project (for example, the labeling approach, 
symbolic interactionist theory, and social-historical constructionism). I 
propose that Sedgwick's presupposition is 'significant' insofar as it is in 
line with queer theory's general failure to acknowledge and actively 
engage with sociology. I argue and demonstrate that this failure has 
primarily taken place through the conflation of Michel Foucault with social- 
historical construction ism. This conflation has not only operated to erase 
sociological social-historical constructionist accounts of sexuality from 
queer readings and writings but has also acted as a means to preclude 
engagement with sociological inquiry in general. In the second section of 
the chapter, I set out to productively rework this exclusion by bringing to 
the forefront a number of sociological essays and texts that shaped social- 
historical constructionist perspectives, namely: Mary Mcintosh's classic 
and widely-cited essay "The Homosexual Role" (1968) and John H. 
Gagnon's and William S. Simon's essay "Introduction: Deviant Behavior 
and Sexual Deviance" (1967a) and text Sexual Conduct (1973b). The 
primary aim of these readings is to partly acknowledge a set of 
sociological terms that contributed to the theorisation of sexuality. In 
addition, these readings demonstrate that well-cultivated terms for 
analysing sexuality predated Sedgwick's Epistemology of the Closet 
(1990). The third section of the chapter then interweaves queer theory 
with sociological inquiry to illustrate that there is room for disciplinary 
cross-fertilisation. In order to move them in this direction, I then initially 
propose that queer theory and sociology develop and establish discursive 
spaces within which there is an integration of both queer and sociological 
terms of analysis. This is recurrent in the next chapter, and I formally 
formulate it as a way forward in the concluding one. I specifically turn to 
On a Discursive Conversation between Queer Theory and Sociology 11 
the work of Gagnon and Simon (1986) on 'cultural sexual scripts, ' 
Sedgwick (1990) on a set of mutual contradictions that have been central 
to twentieth-century understandings of homo/heterosexual definition, and 
Butler (1993,1995) on the subject and agency. 
Whereas Chapter Three focuses on theory, Chapter Four focuses on 
methodology, which is reflected in its title: "A Question of Methodology. " I 
use the methodological preoccupation of Judith Butler as a springboard to 
examine and problematise queer theory's broad methodological approach 
to investigating its subjects/objects of study: textualism. In the first section 
of the chapter, I argue and demonstrate that Butler's choice of textualism 
over a methodological approach that is based within social life not only 
inhibits her form performing a more developed social analysis of drag in 
Bodies That Matter (1993) but is also in line with queer theory's 
investment in textualism. This investment has acted as a means to erect 
disciplinary walls and boundaries and ward off actively engaging with 
sociology. In relation to how Butler's methodology constrains her analysis 
of drag, I draw upon some work that employs or incorporates 
methodological approaches that are based within social life (for example, 
face-to-face interviews, observation, and questionnaires). I particularly 
draw upon the work of Esther Newton (1972) on normative gay male male- 
to-female drag subject positions and their regulation. In relation to how 
queer theory's investment in textualism has erected disciplinary walls and 
boundaries, I conduct a brief, surface review of a couple key queer texts: 
Teresa de Lauretis' specially-edited issue of the journal differences, 
"Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities" (1991a), and Diana Fuss' 
edited anthology Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories (1991b). In 
a similar fashion to the previous chapter and in an effort to move queer 
theory and sociology in the direction of disciplinary cross-fertilisation, I 
argue for the creation of discursive spaces within which queer and 
sociological methodological approaches are integrated. In the second 
section of the chapter, I offer such a discursive space. This takes place by 
integrating and reengaging Butler's textualist analysis of drag with 
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ethnographic fieldwork that I conducted on gay male male-to-female drag 
in the United States. My focus will be Butler's analysis of the centrality of 
a 'morphological ideal' in respect to subjectivity and the production of 
dominant subject positions. 
Chapter Four is longer in length than the other chapters. Whereas the 
first two chapters are an extension of each other and are just over the 
same length as the third one, 50 pages, Chapter Four is 100 pages. The 
chapter is significantly longer because I included my fieldwork on drag. It 
is my belief that a conversation on methodology between queer theory and 
sociology would not have been as productive if I had approached it by 
simply incorporating the fieldwork of other social researchers. To a certain 
degree, I would have been just as guilty as queer theory for studying a 
subject from a distance. 
In the concluding chapter, "Coda, " I consider how my relation to my 
fieldwork as neither a full outsider nor a full insider generated a distinctive 
perspective, drawing upon Patricia Hill Collins' (1990) notion of the 
'outsider-within perspective. ' I propose that this angle of vision serve as a 
basis for future conversations and work between queer theory and 
sociology, with the belief that it will move the two in the direction of 
disciplinary cross-fertilisation. 
Chapter One 
For a More Careful, Critical Reading (I): 
Problematising the Subject of Queer Theory 
Do all these theories have the same structure (a comforting 
notion to the critic who would dispense with them all at once)? 
Is the effort to colonize and domesticate these theories under 
the sign of the same, to group them synthetically and 
masterfully under a single rubric, a simple refusal to grant the 
specificity of these positions, an excuse not to read, and not to 
read closely? ... 
In a sense, this gesture of conceptual mastery that groups 
together a set of positions ... enacts a certain self- 
congratulatory ruse of power. 
-Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations" 
(1992 [1991], p. 5) 
Intröd'66 on and Pürpöse 
In an effort to begin to shift the grounds of belonging, I want to focus, 
within the next two chapters, on the failure of social critiques of queer 
theory (both sociological and general ones) to read the multidisciplinary 
project carefully and critically. At this juncture, I want to examine, 
problematise, and rework the tendency of social critiques to conflate queer 
theory primarily with one queer subject. ' Recent social critiques of queer 
theory have been founded upon an underlying presupposition: there is a 
'subject' of queer theory who is fully representative of the disciplinary 
location and for whom all of it can be critiqued (for example, Edwards 
1998; Goldman 1996; Namaste 1996; Zita 1994). Judging by some of the 
literature, we know who this subject usually is: Judith Butler. Although this 
subject is partially constituted within the project of queer theory (she 
straddles several disciplinary locations) and, furthermore, rightly or 
For a More Careful, Critical Reading (I) 14 
wrongly, has been equated with the project by queer and non-queer 
theorists alike, she cannot be made to stand masterfully in for the whole of 
it as though she is somehow fully representative of it. She has even 
publicly disavowed this reduction (Butler 1991). The same can be said for 
any other thinker who toils within queer domains. There are just as many 
internal wranglings and differences within queer theory as there are 
alliances and similarities. For example, whereas Judith Butler's Gender 
Trouble (1990) conceptualises gender and sexuality as inseparable, Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick does not treat them as the same question in 
Epistemology of the Closet (1990). Further, different queer theoretical 
formulations are culturally, socially, and historically specific. For example, 
they are informed by a range of humanities- and, to a lesser degree, social 
sciences-based disciplinary locations and interests, which also have their 
own specificity and internal differences (for example, the history of 
consciousness, English literature, film studies, and art history). 
Nonetheless, queer theory's variegated depths cannot exist within a social 
critique that conflates it with a queer subject because the internal logic of 
the conflation presumes that the subject is fully representative of it. 
Subsequently, queer theory's variegated depths are erased from the very 
beginning. In these respects, then, the queer subject who is conflated with 
queer theory is not 'the' representative of it but is a restricted, forced 
substitution who produces a certain version of it. Having said this, I 
believe that the labour and economics of this synthetic production is more 
serious than we may first believe. 
Indeed, the conflation of queer theory with a queer subject does not 
simply produce an exclusionary version of queer theory. At the same 
time, I would like to suggest that it is usually a means for social critiques to 
erect disciplinary walls and boundaries. Therefore, what I want to 
problematise is far from a modest intervention. In addition to 
demonstrating how the conflation is an exclusionary production, I want to 
use it as a springboard to challenge its disciplinary undertow. It is not until 
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sociology facilitates and promotes a more careful, critical reading that it 
can then move towards disciplinary cross-fertilisation. 
My objective, to begin with, is to explore the labour and economics of 
the synthetic production I have begun to outline. This will take place by 
critically examining a couple social critiques of queer theory: Ki Namaste's 
(1996) contention that queer theory has conventionally distorted 
transgender subjectivity by ignoring the social realities of transgendered 
people and Ruth Goldman's (1996) argument that queer theory is largely a 
product of White academics that has failed to integrate a sustained 
analysis of race (in addition to other markers of identity/difference such as 
class and bisexuality). I will sketch the outlines of their arguments, 
examine how their arguments conflate queer theory primarily with one 
queer subject, chart how the conflation operates, and suggest that it is a 
means to erect disciplinary walls and boundaries. Butler's (1992 [1991]) 
examination of the question of postmodernism will largely support my 
analysis and arguments in this first section. 
The second section of the chapter will then set out to productively 
rework the labour and economics of this conflation. In other words, I want 
to bring to the forefront and demonstrate some of queer theory's 
variegated depths. This will take place by offering a brief reading of a 
methodological/theoretical contention between Butler (1997a [1994]) and 
the editors of the anthology The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader 
(Abelove et al. 1993), to which she is paradoxically a contributor. More 
specifically, Butler problematises an analogy that is made by the editors to 
illuminate the kind of issues that resonate in lesbian and gay studies and 
argues against the demarcation of proper research objects that it 
engenders. The primary aim of this reading is to practically do what 
sociology has failed to do by and large: carefully and critically read queer 
theory. In addition, this careful, critical reading will demonstrate that queer 
theory cannot be strictly fabricated with one queer subject. By the time we 
have completed this reading, we will know only too well that such a 
fabrication is and always will be suspect. 
For a More Careful, Critical Reading (I) 16 
However, before I begin the above investigation, there are two issues 
that I want to briefly address so that my intentions are clearer and I might 
be able to quell any trepidations that you may have with what I have 
proposed so far. 
In the first instance, I want to briefly clarify my position on a queer 
subject representing queer theory and the issue of representation in 
general. Although I problematise representational gestures throughout the 
thesis, I am not suggesting that there are no subjects who constitute and 
represent queer theory. Queer subjects are not only constituted by queer 
theory but are also the very vehicles through which queer theory is further 
constituted. They are also the very vehicles that enable us to piece queer 
theory together (as well as dismantle it) in order that we may understand 
it, whether partially or more fully. In these respects, I do not always take 
issue with the representational gesture that represents queer theory 
through a queer subject, a theoretical formulation, or even a number of 
them. To a large degree, I make representational gestures about queer 
theory and sociology in this chapter and following ones. However, the 
representational gesture that represents queer theory through a queer 
subject or a theoretical formulation must understand and acknowledge that 
the representation that has been made is itself a construction, which is 
contingent upon and, hence, constitutive of the context within which it is 
being constructed. Furthermore, construction takes place through a set of 
exclusions that do not show once the representation has been 
established. Consequently, any representation of queer theory is and 
always will be partial. It is from this angle, as I have already begun to 
outline, that I take issue with the tendency of social critiques to conflate 
queer theory with a queer thinker. This will be expanded upon more fully 
in the first section of this chapter and will generally be recurrent in later 
ones, although from a different angle. 
In the second instance, I want to clarify my usage of Butler to 
productively rework the labour and economics of conflating queer theory, 
as well as my usage of her to make representational gestures about queer 
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theory in later chapters. Indeed, Butler is, to say the very least, 
commonplace throughout the thesis. She dominates both my critiques of 
sociology and of queer theory. In this light, the moderate critic might be 
suspicious of my usages of her and read them as performing the very 
same conflation that this chapter seeks to problematise and later ones 
thematically take up from a different angle. In other words, how can I, at 
the same time and nonetheless in this chapter, problematise the conflation 
of queer theory with Butler and use her to rework the conflation? 
Furthermore, as another example, how can I, at the same time and 
nonetheless in the third chapter, problematise the queer conflation of 
social-historical constructionism with Foucault and use Butler to 
demonstrate the conflation? Where is the logic in this contradictory use of 
Butler? Why not use other queer thinkers to perform these analyses? As 
a rejoinder, in the first instance and as I have just outlined, my usages of 
Butler must be understood as making general constructions of queer 
theory, which are always contextual and partial. I make this clear 
throughout the thesis, even when I produce general constructions that 
relate to neither Butler nor queer theory (for example, social-historical 
constructionism in Chapter Three). In the second instance, although 
Butler is commonplace throughout the thesis, she is not the only queer 
subject who I draw upon. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Teresa de Lauretis, 
Diana Fuss, Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David M. Halperin 
also inform the thesis, and this definitely does not take place from the 
sidelines. In the third instance, I perform a reading of Butler alongside 
other queer theorists in this chapter in order to demonstrate that she 
cannot masterfully stand in for the whole of queer theory. Lastly, my 
usages of Butler are motivated less by the desire to make general, partial 
constructions of queer theory and are motivated more by the pleasure 
produced for me in surveying her subject matter and theoretical 
formulations, whether or not I concur with her. Indeed, I make this clear at 
several points in the thesis, particularly in Chapter Four: 
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I must admit at this juncture that I am seductively drawn to Butler's 
analysis of drag, and, furthermore, I will not offer an apology to 
those who are offended by this open and frank admission. 
Throughout her discursive analysis of drag in Paris is Burning 
(1991), she traverses some tricky and sticky terrains (some more 
than others): the 'subject, ' identity, and agency are all topical in 
relation to sexuality, gender, race, and class. Her analysis is 
insightful and useful at both the intellectual and political levels. I 
strongly believe that the theoretical insights that arise out of her 
analysis are particularly useful for a broad-based queer politics 
that is not only critical of the matrices of power within which it is 
constituted and it opposes but is also critical of its own politics 
from within (p. 139). 
Section I: N_The'Conflation öf Qüeer Theory with a Queer, Subject 
i. The Queer Subject 
Namaste's essay, "'Tragic Misreadings"' (1996), is a critique of how 
transgender subjectivity has been examined and formulated within queer 
theory (pp. 183-84). 2 He begins his essay with the observation that there 
has been a 'veritable explosion' of work on transgender subjectivity within 
queer theory over the years. He cites some of this work: Judith Butler's 
Gender Trouble (1990) and Bodies That Matter (1993), Marjorie B. 
Garber's Vested Interests (1992), Carole-Anne Tyler's "Boys Will Be Girls" 
(1991), and Michael Moon's and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's "Divinity" 
(1990). Although Namaste characterises them as 'veritable' at first, he 
quickly contends the very opposite in the next sentence: "these works 
have shown very little concern for those who identify and live as drag 
queens, transsexuals, and/or transgenders" (1996, p. 183). Namaste is 
pointing out that transgendered people have been objects rather than 
subjects of study within queer theory, whereby the project has failed to 
inform their analyses of transgender subjectivity by incorporating the social 
realities of transgendered people. This has particularly taken place in 
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discussions on transgender subjectivity's violation of compulsory 
heterosexuality's binary sex/gender system. According to Namaste, 
critics in queer theory write page after page on the inherent 
liberation in the transgression of gender codes, but they have 
nothing to say about the precarious position of the transsexual 
woman who is battered, and who is unable to access a woman's 
shelter because she was not born a biological woman (1996, p. 
184). 
Namaste chooses to demonstrate the effects of this objectification by 
first examining the work of Butler, particularly her argument on gender 
performativity as set out in Gender Trouble (1990) (1996, pp. 185-86). 
This first takes place by Namaste justifying his point of departure: "It is 
useful to begin this discussion with the work of Judith Butler, since the 
publication of Gender Trouble [1990] played a tremendous role in the 
development of queer theory" (1996, p. 185). This justification is then 
followed by a general summary of Butler's argument. According to 
Namaste, Butler argues that drag reveals the imitative nature and 
structure of compulsory heterosexuality's imaginary sex/gender system. 
By miming the social category of 'woman, ' drag artists demonstrate that 
the social category is not the cultural interpretation of the female sex, 
whereby sex is understood as the pre-given, natural foundation of gender. 
This semblance and misnomer is only achieved through a process of 
'metalepsis'-the process by which "the effects of meaning [read: sex] are 
taken to be the cause of its [read: gender's] articulation" (Namaste 1996, 
p. 185). It is in this respect that gender is an imitation without an origin for 
Butler. 
Although Namaste acknowledges that Butler's argument is an 
'important one' and her work in general has been instrumental to the on- 
going development of queer theory as a trouble-making, interrogatory 
project, he takes issue with it (1996, p. 186). He maintains that Butler's 
failure to take account of the context (read: the social reality) within which 
drag artists' performances of gender usually occur distorts transgender 
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subjectivity. According to Namaste, although Butler rightly examines drag 
artists' gender performances in relation to compulsory heterosexuality, 
they usually occur in a social space that is the product of gay male culture, 
which has its "own complicated relations to gender and gender 
performance" (1996, p. 186). The production and regulation of gender 
within such a social space usually makes it very difficult for a drag artist to 
open up its terms on gender. For example, many gay male bars have 
drag artists perform on stage but deny entry to women, transvestites, and 
transsexuals. Furthermore, although drag artists in such bars are 
permitted to circulate, they remain peripheral to most activities of the social 
space, particularly ones that relate to the celebration of gay 
masculinity/maleness (for example, cruising in a darkroom). They are 
usually only permitted to circulate on the stage, and the only trace of 
femininity and femaleness is usually understood as nothing more than 
pure entertainment. In this light, for Namaste, transgender subjectivity is 
not as transgressive as Butler purports. 3 
Namaste continues to demonstrate queer theory's distortion of 
transgender subjectivity by turning to Butler's (1993, pp. 129-33) 
discursive analysis of the death of a character in the film Paris is Burning 
(1991), Venus Extravaganza (1996, pp. 188-89). This is topical in Chapter 
Four. The film documents the tragic fate of Venus, a pre-operative male- 
to-female transsexual drag artist and prostitute who is killed by one of 
his/her male clients. In short, Butler argues that Venus' death is a 
question of gender and not one of Venus' transsexual status. Conceived 
in this way, Namaste maintains that Butler denies violence against 
transsexuals. Namaste takes issue with Butler's argument because her 
failure to take account of the context (read: the social reality) within which 
Venus is killed distorts transgender subjectivity. According to Namaste, 
violence against transsexuals is very much a part of their subjecthood. He 
believes that Paris is Burning (1991) made this very clear. For example, 
Namaste cites a comment that is made in the film by one of Venus' friends 
shortly after his/her death: "That's part of being a transsexual and 
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surviving in New York City [read: violence against transsexuals]" (1996, p. 
188). In this light, according to Namaste, had Butler been more attentive 
to Venus' social reality, then she probably would have revised her analysis 
of Venus' death and more accurately represented transgender subjectivity. 
In conclusion, although Namaste clearly states that he does not want 
to reject queer theory's examination of transgender subjectivity outright, he 
does gesture that it is a framework that he would not rely on to capture 
transgender subjectivity: "Call me old-fashioned, but I believe in the 
elaboration of organic intellectual practices, in which academics create 
knowledge useful to activist communities and provide a productive 
translation of civil and political societies" (1996, p. 197). He would rather 
rely on anthropology and sociology: "Historically, the disciplines of 
sociology and anthropology have produced some of the most insightful 
work on transgender issues ... this scholarship has attained canonical 
status" (Namaste 1996, p. 193). 
In addition to queer and non-queer representations of transgender 
subjectivity, Namaste's critique is founded upon an underlying 
presupposition that is representational in nature. His critique presumes 
that there is a subject of queer theory who fully exemplifies how the project 
has examined transgender subjectivity. That subject is, without question, 
Butler. This is demonstrated at both the micro and macro levels of his 
critique. Take his critique at the micro level for example. Throughout 
Namaste's critique, there is a consistent gliding between queer theory 
(read: the signified) and Butler (read: the referent), whereby they are 
understood to be interchangeable or capture the other at once (italics my 
emphasis): "It is useful to begin this discussion with the work of Judith 
Butler, since the publication of Gender Trouble [1990] played a 
tremendous role in the development of queer theory" (1996, p. 185); "This 
proposition is surely an important one, and Butler's work has been 
instrumental in the advancement of queer theory ... " (1996, p. 186); 
"The 
violation of compulsory sex/gender relations is one of the topics most 
frequently addressed by critics in queer theory' (1996, p. 183); "critics in 
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queer theory write page after page on the inherent liberation in the 
transgression of gender codes... " (1996, p. 184); "Although Butler locates 
these spaces in relation to heterosexual hegemony, she refuses to 
examine this territory's own complicated relations to gender and gender 
performance" (1996, p. 186); "why is it that transgendered people are the 
chosen objects of the field of queer theory, and why does the presentation 
of these issues ignore the daily realities of transgendered people? " (1996, 
p. 184); "Butler's most recent work continues this distortion of transgender 
realities" (1996, p. 188); and "We need to challenge Butler's negation of 
transgender subjectivity" (1996, p. 188). Butler's status as the subject of 
queer theory is bolstered even more when Namaste's critique is examined 
at the macro level. Namaste's critique of queer theory is primarily, if not 
exclusively, informed by Butler. Although Garber (1992) and Tyler (1991) 
receive some airtime in Namaste's critique, there is no sustained 
examination of their work. Their airtime is not the same in either quantity 
or intensity as Butler. Further, even when Garber and Tyler are examined 
within Namaste's critique, they are examined within the framework of 
Butler's terms. Following the logic of Namaste's underlying 
presupposition, then, the whole of queer theory can be legitimately 
critiqued through Butler: if Butler is the champion of queer theory and how 
it has examined transgender subjectivity, then her shortfalls must be 
representative of it at the same time. Goldman's (1996) critique of queer 
theory is also founded upon the same underlying presupposition, although 
the queer subject is a different one. 
In brief, Goldman's essay, "Who is that Queer Queer? " (1996), is 
partly a critique of how race has been examined within queer theory (she 
also critiques how class and bisexuality have been examined) (pp. 169- 
70). For Goldman, the emergence of queer theory brought with it a sense 
of hope and a set of raised expectations. According to Goldman, when 
she stumbled across queer theory during its inception, she thought that 
she had finally found a productive framework within which she could 
potentially explore how representations of gender, race, class, and 
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sexuality (with an emphasis on bisexuality) intersected with one another in 
popular culture. She makes it quite clear that her attraction to the 
framework was not merely a professional one. It was also a personal one 
insofar as she thought that the framework might enable her to find her 
'queer' self, being a bisexual, a Jew, a feminist, an anti-capitalist, and an 
anti-racist herself. However, when she began to work within the 
framework, her hopes quickly faded and her expectations turned into 
misgivings: "I found that it was very difficult to apply existing queer theory 
to popular culture without collapsing some of the very nuances that I was 
trying to highlight. This led me to begin to consider some of the existing 
tensions and contradictions within and without queer theory. . ." (Goldman 
1996, p. 169). Goldman maintains that 'race' has been one of those 
nuances collapsed. According to Goldman, race has been at the far 
margins of queer theory. 
Goldman begins and ends her critique of how race has been 
examined within queer theory by turning to Teresa de Lauretis' co-edited 
anthology How Do I Look? (1991), which was the output of a conference in 
New York City in October 1989 on queer film and video and produced 
under the edited name of Bad Object-Choices (1996, pp. 172-73). She 
first justifies her point of departure. Goldman chose this piece of work 
because it was published alongside de Lauretis' (1991a) specially-edited 
queer theory issue of the journal differences and both have been cited by 
queer and non-queer theorists as founding texts that have been seminal to 
the production of queer knowledge. This justification is followed by a 
launch into how de Lauretis uses her editorial authority to put race at the 
margins of the anthology. Goldman maintains that although de Lauretis 
gives space to articles by and about queer people of different racial 
identities, the anthology largely promotes essays written by White lesbians 
and gay men and produces theories that either make abstractions of race 
or ignore questions of race altogether. In short, she produces a queer 
theory that is limited in the way that it thinks about queerness. For 
Goldman, de Lauretis' marginalisation of race brings to the forefront her 
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uneasiness with the way in which the identity term 'queer' has largely 
operated to erase differences within queer theory: "[U]nless we strive to 
elaborate its meaning whenever we use it in our theories, it becomes like 
theoretical tofu: it will simply absorb the meaning of whatever particular 
aspect or aspects of queerness we are addressing" (1996, p. 172). This 
analysis of de Lauretis' anthology is followed by a general characterisation 
of queer theory. Goldman insists that queer theory has largely been a 
product of Whiteness-its theorising subjects, its subjects/objects of study, 
and its theoretical formulations. She also maintains that queer theory's 
Whiteness has further distanced gay, lesbian, bisexual, and queer 
scholars of different racial identities from the academy, since the academy 
is already largely structured around Whiteness. This has had an 
unfortunate effect: "[A]s a result, many lesbian, bisexual, queer, and gay 
scholars [of different racial identities] ... choose to focus on 
issues of race 
and not issues of gender and sexuality" (Goldman 1996, p. 172). 
In this light, Goldman takes issue with de Lauretis' call for queer theory 
contributions from lesbians and gay men of different racial identities (1996, 
pp. 172-73). Goldman cites de Lauretis' call, which is made in her 
introduction to the specially-edited queer theory issue of differences 
(1991 b): 
The differences made by race in self-representation and identity 
argue for the necessity to examine, question, or contest the 
usefulness and/or the limitations of current discourses on lesbian 
and gay sexualities.... Those differences urge the reframing of 
the questions of queer theory from different perspectives, 
histories, experiences, and in different terms (1996, p. 173). 
For Goldman, a 'fundamental problem' underlies de Lauretis' call: "[I]t 
leaves the burden of dealing with difference on the people who are 
themselves different, while simultaneously allowing [W]hite academics to 
continue to construct a discourse of silence around race and other queer 
perspectives" (1996, p. 173). Goldman maintains that this burden only 
has the unfortunate consequence of pitting a minority group against itself 
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from within. Those working and writing from a different, 'other' queer 
perspective will always be setting themselves up in opposition to dominant 
queer theory discourses, "drawing attention to the ways in which certain 
parts of [themselves] ... are consistently being left out of the 
discourse" 
(Goldman 1996, p. 173). 
In conclusion, Goldman proposes that queer theory needs to broaden 
and deepen the ways in which it thinks about queerness (1996, pp. 179- 
80). This is not just a question of race for Goldman. It is also one of class 
and bisexuality. According to Goldman, this should not occur in the way 
that de Lauretis suggests: within the margins of dominant queer theory 
discourses by different, 'other' queer perspectives. Rather, this should 
take place across the board: "What I am suggesting is that we strive to 
continuously problematise that which we have created-that we identify 
the constructed silences within our work and transform them into 
meaningful discourses" (Goldman 1996, pp. 179-80). 5 
In line with Namaste, Goldman's critique is also founded upon the 
same underlying presupposition. Her critique presumes that there is a 
subject of queer theory who is fully representative of it. However, unlike 
Namaste, the subject of Goldman's critique is not Butler. de Lauretis is 
understood to be the subject who represents how queer theory has 
examined race. This is also demonstrated at both the micro and macro 
levels of her critique. Throughout Goldman's critique, there is a consistent 
gliding between queer theory and de Lauretis, as though one can be 
exchanged for the other or captures the other at the same time (italics my 
emphasis): "In 1991, Teresa de Lauretis introduced the term `queer 
theory'... " (1996, p. 171); "de Lauretis explains that the term `queer' was 
suggested to her by a 1989 conference whose proceedings were 
subsequently published in the book How Do I Look? Queer Film and 
Video [Bad Object-Choices 1991]" (1996, p. 172); "How Do I Look? Queer 
Film and Video [the editorial property of de Lauretis] does contain several 
articles by and about 'queer people of color, ' but. .. from the field's 
[queer 
theory's] inception. . ." (1996, p. 172); "All the anthologies on queer 
theory 
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include work by lesbians and gays of color, but we rarely find [W]hite 
lesbian or gay theorists discussing how intersections between anti- 
normative identities [for example, racial] inform or affect one's queer 
perspective" (1996, p. 172); "[I]t [queer theory] has been similarly 
structured around [W]hiteness" (1996, p. 172); and "Teresa de Lauretis 
calls for contributions to queer theory by other than [W]hite lesbians and 
gays.... The fundamental problem with this line of reasoning is that it ... 
simultaneously allow[s] [W]hite academics to continue to construct a 
discourse of silence around race and other queer perspectives" (1996, pp. 
172-73). Again, similar to Namaste's critique, de Lauretis' status as the 
subject of queer theory is bolstered even more when Goldman's critique is 
examined at the macro level. Her critique is not informed by a range of 
queer theorists but is solely based on the work of de Lauretis. Therefore, 
following the logic of Goldman's underlying presupposition, the whole of 
queer theory can be legitimately critiqued through de Lauretis: if de 
Lauretis is 'the' representative of how queer theory has examined race, 
then the gaps in her examination must be representative of it. 
ii. The Labour and Economics of the Queer Subject 
As I explained in the introduction of this chapter, there is, to a certain 
degree, a real, instrumental necessity for a subject of queer theory. 
Whether for the purpose of drawing upon queer theory to support an 
analysis, critiquing the same, or even both, a queer subject is a useful 
vehicle through which we can piece queer theory together in order to draw 
conclusions about it (for example, who speaks as a queer theorist and for 
queer theory, what constitutes its subjects/objects of study and 
methodological trajectory, where queer conversations take place, and 
what theoretical formulations underpin those conversations). In other 
words, a queer subject enables us to understand the stuff that queer 
theory is made up of. For Namaste, Butler is the queer subject who 
provides insight into how queer theory has examined transgender 
subjectivity. For Goldman, de Lauretis is the queer subject who provides 
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insight into how queer theory has examined race. Without a subject of 
queer theory, then, there would be no understanding of queer theory. 
However, paradoxically, Butler's (1992 [1991]) critical examination of the 
question of postmodernism promotes a very different understanding of the 
queer subject who is made to stand masterfully in for queer theory. The 
queer subject and the issue of representation take on a completely 
different meaning. 
Butler's "Contingent Foundations" (1992 [1991]) wastes no time in 
asking 'the' question, which is one of the central foci of her essay. It 
begins by asking 'the' question full frontally in its very first lines: "The 
question of postmodernism is surely a question, for is there, after all, 
something called postmodernism? " (Butler 1992 [1991], p. 3). Butler 
seems rather reluctant to answer the question herself. It raises more 
questions than definite answers for her. The question of postmodernism is 
followed by a set of questions for Butler, and these questions are probably 
not exhaustive for her: 
Is it an historical characterization, a certain kind of theoretical 
position, and what does it mean for a term that has described a 
certain aesthetic practice now to apply to social theory and to 
feminist social and political theory in particular? Who are these 
postmodernists? Is this a name that one takes on for oneself, or is 
it more often a name that one is called if and when one offers a 
critique of the subject, a discursive analysis, or questions the 
integrity or coherence of totalizing social descriptions (1992 
[1991], p. 3)? 
To a certain degree, Butler concedes in answering the question of 
postmodernism in the next paragraph. However, she is not interested in 
offering her own definitive definition. Rather, she offers a definition that 
underscores how the term has been used: 
I know the term from the way it is used, and it usually appears on 
my horizon embedded in the following critical formulations: 'if 
discourse is all there is. .. ,' or'if everything is a text. .. ,' or'if 
the 
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subject is dead. .. ,' or 'if real bodies do not exist. .. .' The 
sentence begins as a warning against an impending nihilism, for if 
the conjured content of these series of conditional clauses proves 
to be true, then, and there is always a then, some set of 
dangerous consequences will surely follow (Butler 1992 [1991], p. 
3). 
Butler's reluctance to offer a definitive definition sets the stage for her 
essay. Indeed, Butler's essay is not about answering the question of 
postmodernism in a conventional sense. Rather, the question of 
postmodernism is a question of convention for Butler. She is interested in 
critically examining how the term has been conventionally used and has 
conventionally operated in academic and political discourses (for example, 
Benhabib 1990) (Butler 1992 [1991], pp. 4-7). According to Butler, the 
term has been conventionally conflated with a number of theorising 
subjects and theoretical positions, whether rightly or wrongly: 
A number of positions are ascribed to postmodernism, as if it were 
the kind of thing that could be the bearer of a set of positions: 
discourse is all there is, as if discourse were some kind of monistic 
stuff out of which all things are composed; the subject is dead, I 
can never say 'I' again; there is no reality, only representations. 
These characterisations are variously imputed to postmodernism 
or poststructuralism, which are conflated with each other and 
sometimes conflated with deconstruction, and sometimes 
understood as an indiscriminate assemblage of French feminism, 
deconstruction, Lacanian psychoanalysis, Foucaultian analysis, 
Rorty's conversationalism, and cultural studies. On this side of the 
Atlantic and in recent discourse, the terms 'postmodernism' or 
'poststructuralism' settle the differences among those positions in 
a single stroke, providing a substantive, a noun, that includes 
those positions as so many of its modalities or permutations (1992 
[1991 ], p. 4). 
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Butler maintains that the conflation presumes that there is a congruence 
between the theorising subjects and theoretical positions who/that are 
understood to make up postmodernism. Therefore, according to the logic 
of this conflation, a theorising subject/theoretical position can be made to 
stand in for the whole of postmodernism. Furthermore, if the theorising 
subject/theoretical position is found to be problematical, then his/her/its 
shortfalls must be representative. 
Butler takes issue with this conflation because it erases 
postmodernism's differences (1992 [1991], pp. 4-5). It also wrongly 
ascribes a number of theorising subjects and theoretical positions to 
postmodernism who/that, otherwise, would not align themselves/be 
aligned under the sign. For example, according to Butler, Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in France 'officially' sets itself up against postmodernism; 
Kristeva condemns postmodernism; Foucauldians usually do not relate to 
Derrideans; Cixous and Irigaray are opposed to each other; the only link 
between French feminism and deconstruction is between Cixous and 
Derrida, and it is a 'tenuous' one; and there is only a 'certain affinity' in 
'textual practices' between Irigaray and Derrida. Furthermore, according 
to Butler, Biddy Martin (no reference provided by Butler) has rightly 
pointed out that most of French feminism subscribes to the notion of 'high 
modernism' and the 'avant-garde, ' and this subscription questions whether 
some or all of the aforementioned French feminists can be conveniently 
grouped under the sign of postmodernism. In this light, for Butler, 
although Jean-Francois Lyotard championed the term 'postmodernism, ' he 
cannot be made to stand in for the whole of it as though he is fully 
representative of what other purported postmodernists have been up to. 
For example, "Lyotard's work is ... seriously at odds with that of Derrida, 
who does not affirm the notion of 'the postmodern, ' and with others for 
whom Lyotard is made to stand" (Butler 1992 [1991], p. 5). 6 Therefore, 
according to Butler, if Lyotard is found to be problematical, then his 
shortfalls cannot be strictly understood as representative of 
postmodernism. In a strong sense, the erasure of postmodernism's 
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differences goes against Butler's understanding of postmodernism: "[I]f I 
understand part of the project of postmodernism, it is to call into question 
the ways in which such 'examples' and 'paradigms' serve to subordinate 
and erase that which they seek to explain" (1992 [1991], p. 5). 
For Butler, then, any one thinker or theoretical position who/that is 
made to stand in for the whole of postmodernism is far from a mere 
representation (1992 [1991], pp. 5-7). In other words, they are not merely 
vehicles through which we derive a notion of what postmodernism is. 
Butler maintains that they are also a restricted, forced substitution 
who/that produce a certain version of postmodernism: 
For the 'whole, ' the field of postmodernism in its supposed 
breadth, is effectively 'produced' by the example which is made to 
stand as a symptom and exemplar of the whole; in effect, if in the 
example of Lyotard we think we have a representative of 
postmodernism, we have then forced a substitution of the example 
for the entire field, effecting a violent reduction of the field to the 
one piece of text the critic is willing to read, a piece which, 
conveniently, uses the term 'postmodern' (1992 [1991], p. 5). 
It is only through this production for Butler that a thinker or theoretical 
position achieves the semblance and misnomer of being 'the' 
representative of postmodernism. It is paradoxical, for Butler, that those 
who conflate postmodernism usually want to, at the same time and 
nonetheless, "ward off the peril of political authoritarianism" (1992 [1991], 
P. 5)"7 
In closing, Butler does not in any way suggest that we should do away 
with representational foundations of postmodernism (as if we really could) 
or become antifoundationalists (1992 [1991], p. 7). They themselves are 
"different versions of foundationalism and the sceptical problematic it 
engenderes" (Butler 1992 [1991], p. 7). Rather, for Butler, "the task is to 
interrogate what the theoretical move that establishes foundations 
authorizes, and what precisely it excludes or forecloses" (1992 [1991], p. 
7, italics included in original). 
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Indeed, in line with Butler, I would argue that the social critique that 
conflates queer theory with a queer subject erases its variegated depths. 
Take for instance Goldman's (1996) critique of how queer theory has 
examined race. If Goldman's characterisation of queer theory through de 
Lauretis is further examined outside or, paradoxically, within her editorial 
reign (for example, de Lauretis 1991a), then a very different picture of 
queer theory is painted. Queer perspectives on race, as well as ones on 
class, ethnicity, and nationality, have been more central to the project than 
she purports. This is reflected in Sedgwick's understanding of the identity 
term 'queer' and her acknowledgement of important work done by 
academics/artists of different racial, ethnic, and national perspectives: 
[A] lot of the most exciting recent work around 'queer' spins the 
term outward along dimensions that can't be subsumed under 
gender and sexuality at all: the ways that race, ethnicity, 
postcolonial nationality criss-cross with these and other identity- 
constituting, identity-fracturing discourses, for example. 
Intellectuals and artists of color whose sexual self-definition 
includes 'queer'-I think of an Isaac Julien, a Gloria Anzaldüa, a 
Richard Fung-are using the leverage of 'queer' to do a new kind 
of justice to the fractal intricacies of language, skin, migration, 
state. Thereby, the gravity (I mean the gravitas, the meaning, but 
also the center of gravity) of the term 'queer' itself deepens and 
shifts (1993a [1993], pp. 8-9, italics included in original). 
Further, the task of examining questions of race, class, ethnicity, and 
nationality has not been a burden. It has not been the sole responsibility 
of different, 'other' perspectives. In addition to work by lesbians and gay 
men of colour that fundamentally informed the emergence and 
development of queer theory, 8 the work of academics who have been 
party to `dominant queer theory discourses' have further broadened and 
deepened the ways in which queer theory has thought about queerness 
across racial, class, ethnic, and national lines (for example, Bergmann and 
Smith 1995; Butler 1993; Butler and Martin 1994a, 1994b; Dorenkamp and 
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Henke 1995a, 1995b; Garber 1992; Parker et al. 1992; Sedgwick 1992). 
For example, this is the main aim of Butler's and Martin's specially-edited 
queer theory issue of the journal Diacritics: 
Diacritics graciously asked us to edit an issue on gay and lesbian 
studies [queer theory], and we took the occasion to broaden the 
scope of that request to include work that interrogates the problem 
of cross-identification within and across race and postcolonial 
studies, gender theory, and theories of sexuality. We chose to 
expand our emphasis in order to avoid static conceptions of 
identity and political alignment. 'Queer theory' has promised to 
complicate assumptions about routes of identification and desire. 
We wanted to test that promise by soliciting essays that analyze 
critical, even surprising, boundary crossings (1994b, p. 3). 
Nonetheless, because the internal logic of Goldman's conflation presumes 
that de Lauretis is fully representative of queer theory, queer perspectives 
on race cannot, at most, exist or, at the very least, be central to dominant 
queer theory discourses. Thus, they are summarily erased through de 
Lauretis. According to the broad logic of Goldman's essay, the same can 
be extended to queer perspectives on class, ethnicity, and nationality. 
The same can be said of Namaste's (1996) critique of queer theory. If 
Butler is construed as 'the' representative of how queer theory has 
examined transgender subjectivity, then a vast amount of investigations is 
erased through the representational gesture that has been made. A lot of 
work on drag, transgenderism, transsexualism, and transvestism within 
queer domains has incorporated the social realities of transgendered 
people, and the momentum of this work has increased since Namaste 
made her characterisation (for example, Alderson and Anderson 2000; 
Bornstein 1992,1998; Conner 2004; Ekins and King 1996; Feinberg 1993, 
1996; Ferris 1993; Garber 1989; Hausman 1995; Haynes and McKenna 
2001; Nestle et a!. 2002). For example, the autobiographical experiences 
of male-to-female transsexuals Jan Morris (1974) and Renee Richards 
(1983) inform Garber's (1989) analysis of how transsexuals paradoxically 
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seek to fix what they blur: sex and gender. The day-to-day experiences of 
transsexuals and transvestites are also included in Richard Ekins' and 
David King's (1996) edited anthology on the pathological limitations of the 
medical categories transsexualism, transvestism, and gender dysphoria, 
and their anthology locates those experiences within a social-historical 
context. 
I would therefore suggest that we read and understand Butler and de 
Lauretis as depicted in Namaste's and Goldman's critiques differently. In 
line with Butler's examination of the question of postmodernism, they are 
not 'the' representatives or mere representatives of queer theory who can 
stand in for the whole of it. Butler is not 'the' queer subject who provides 
the first and last insight into how queer theory has examined transgender 
subjectivity. de Lauretis is not 'the' queer subject who provides the first 
and last insight into how queer theory has examined race. Rather, they 
are a restricted, forced substitution who produce a certain version of queer 
theory. It is only by setting Butler and de Lauretis up as 'the' subjects of 
queer theory that they achieve this semblance and misnomer. 
However, there is usually more than just this immediate effect of 
producing an exclusionary version of queer theory. In line with Butler 
(1992 [1991]), I would suggest that there is usually a disciplinary undertow 
to conflating queer theory. In her examination of the question of 
postmodernism, Butler questions the motivation for producing a synthetic 
notion of postmodernism through Lyotard. She gestures that it is a means 
for those who do not subscribe to postmodernism to erect disciplinary 
walls and boundaries (as cited in the epigraph of the chapter): 
Do all these theories have the same structure (a comforting notion 
to the critic who would dispense with them at once)? Is the effort 
to colonize and domesticate these theories under the sign of the 
same, to group them synthetically and masterfully under a single 
rubric, a simple refusal to grant the specificity of these positions, 
an excuse not to read, and not to read closely? (Butler 1992 
[1991], p. 5, italics my emphasis). 
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Although Butler understands the conflation as a means to dismiss 
postmodernism in its entirety, there will be different degrees of erecting 
disciplinary walls and boundaries: from merely creating a distance to 
creating a distance and identifying with another disciplinary location to 
totally creating a distance and strictly identifying with another disciplinary 
location. In effect, Goldman's conflation appears to be on the lower end of 
the scale (as previously cited): "I found that it was very difficult to apply 
existing queer theory to popular culture without collapsing some of the 
very nuances that I was trying to highlight. This led me to begin to 
consider some of the existing tensions and contradictions within and 
without queer theory. . ." and "As I have illustrated in this essay, existing 
queer theory, despite attempts to avoid normativity, harbors a normative 
discourse around race, sexuality, and class. Those of us who fall outside 
of this normativity ... must position ourselves and our work in opposition 
to it" (pp. 170,179). Namaste's conflation also erects disciplinary walls 
and boundaries. However, he appears to be on the higher end of the 
scale (some of which was previously cited): "Call me old-fashioned, but I 
believe in the elaboration of organic intellectual practices, in which 
academics create knowledge useful to activist communities and provide a 
productive translation of civil and political societies" and "Were critics in 
queer theory to address these ... issues, the field as we know it would be 
radically displaced" (Namaste 1996, pp. 197-198). Namaste clearly states 
which disciplines he aligns himself with: "Historically, the disciplines of 
sociology and anthropology have produced some of the most insightful 
work on transgender issues ... this scholarship has attained canonical 
status" (1996, p. 193). 
It is paradoxical and unfortunate that Goldman herself, on the one 
hand, calls on queer theory to identify its 'constructed silences' and 
"transform them into meaningful discourses" (1996, pp. 179-80) and, on 
the other hand, does not perform such an analysis of her own critique. It 
is indeed the failure of social critiques like Namaste's (1996) and 
Goldman's (1996) to consider the constructed silences of their conflation 
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that is stalling them from producing more meaningful and productive 
discourses on queer theory. I particularly take issue with such 
readings/constructions of queer theory when they erect disciplinary walls 
and boundaries. If sociology wants to move in the direction of disciplinary 
cross-fertilisation, then it needs to bring to the surface the constructed 
silences that problematise the representational gesture that produces a 
synthetic notion of queer theory, transforming it into a more meaningful 
discourse on queer theory. In other words, sociology needs to bring to the 
surface queer theory's variegated depths by facilitating and promoting a 
more careful, critical reading. The following careful, critical reading is 
performed and offered in order to bring to the forefront and demonstrate 
some of queer theory's variegated depths. 
Section 11: eÄ Careful, Critical Reading of QueerTheory 
I. Against Proper Research Objects 
When Abelove's, Barale's, and Halperin's (1993) introduction to their 
edited anthology The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader is read alongside 
Butler's introductory essay, "Against Proper Objects" (1997a [1994]), to 
the second specially-edited queer theory issue of the journal differences 
(Weed and Schor 1994), it becomes very clear that there is no simple 'one 
size fits all' when it comes to representing queer theory. 9 In fact, the 
essays do not need to be read alongside each other in order to read their 
differences. Their differences are topical for Butler in part of her essay. 
Butler herself problematises what Abelove, Barale, and Halperin propose. 
In short, she problematises an analogy that is made by the editors to 
illuminate the kind of issues that resonate in lesbian and gay studies and 
argues against the demarcation of proper research objects that it 
engenders. 
The editors of The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader make an analogy 
with feminist inquiry to highlight the kinds of issues that lesbian and gay 
studies focuses on (Abelove et al. 1993, p. xv). With reference to an 
essay by the feminist historian Joan Kelly-Gadol (1976) on the 
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methodological implications of women's history, Abelove, Barale, and 
Halperin remark that 
women's history is not intended to be merely additive, its effect is 
not to introduce another sub-department of history into the 
traditional panoply of historical fields.... Rather, women's history 
seeks to establish the centrality of gender as a fundamental 
category of historical analysis and understanding-a category 
central, in other words, to each of those previously existing sub- 
departments of history (1993, p. xv, italics included in original). 
The editors then claim that lesbian and gay studies does the same but 
rather focuses on different research objects: "Lesbian/gay studies does for 
sex and sexuality approximately what women's studies does for gender" 
(Abelove et al. 1993, p. xv, italics included in original). 
Butler points out that the editor's analogy sets out the proper research 
object of feminist inquiry (1997a [1994], p. 4). According to the editors, 
feminist inquiry "includes any research that treats gender (whether female 
or male) as a central category of analysis" (Abelove et al. 1993, p. xv, 
italics my emphasis). Butler maintains that their parenthetical reference 
suggests that gender is interchangeable with 'female or male. ' According 
to Butler, this understanding of gender goes against the way in which the 
sex/gender distinction has been conventionally understood and formulated 
within feminist domains: female and male are associated with sex, 
whereas the social categories of men and women belong to gender. 10 In 
this light, Butler contends that the editor's analogy conflates sex with 
gender. Gender, the proper research object of feminist inquiry, is 
understood as a biological binary. 
It is significant for Butler how the term 'sex' operates in the editors' 
analogy (1997a [1994], p. 4). As Butler is correct to point out, although 
'female or male' appears in their formulation of gender as the proper 
research object of feminist inquiry, the term sex does not explicitly appear. 
It is only implied at the time gender is reduced to sex. It is however later 
made explicit in the editors' analogy but alongside one of the two proper 
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research objects that pertain to lesbian and gay studies (as previously 
cited): "Lesbian/gay studies does for sex and sexuality approximately what 
women's studies does for gender" (Abelove at al. 1993, p. xv, italics 
included in original). For Butler, sex in this context does not simply 
designate 'sexual desire and practice. ' It also designates, in the 
Foucauldian sense, "a regime of identity or a fictional ideal by which sex 
as anatomy, sensation, acts, and practices are arbitrarily unified" (Butler 
1997a [1994], p. 4). By definition, as she is correct to point out, the 
Foucauldian sense of sex includes what the editors attribute to feminist 
inquiry: identity and attribute ('female or male'). Thus, according to Butler, 
the editors' analogy moves from a formulation of feminist inquiry that 
conflates sex with gender to a formulation of lesbian and gay studies that 
explicitly includes and exceeds the sex of feminist inquiry. In the context 
of lesbian and gay studies, then, sex does not simply include identity and 
attribute ('female or male'). It also includes sexual practices, acts, 
sensation, and so on. 
As the analogy is now set up, then, there appears to be a commonality 
between feminist inquiry and lesbian and gay studies: sex or, more 
specifically, identity and attribute ('female or male'). The sex that is 
conflated with feminist inquiry's proper research object, gender, is an 
explicit proper research object of lesbian and gay studies. However, 
according to Butler, that commonality is refused through 'elision' or the 
semantic separation and redistribution of sex's constitutive parts: 
Whereas 'sex' in the elided sense attributed to feminism will mean 
only identity and attribute, 'sex' in the explicit and lesbian/gay 
sense will include and supersede the feminist sense: identity, 
attribute, sensation, pleasures, acts, and practices. Thus 'sex' in 
the sense deployed by lesbian and gay studies is understood to 
include the putative feminist binary (female or male) but also to 
imply the second proper object of lesbian and gay studies: 
'sexuality' (1997a [1994], pp. 4-5, italics my emphasis). 
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In other words, by assimilating sex in its elided sense to the set of terms 
that the analogy explicitly claims to be the proper research objects of 
lesbian and gay studies, 'sex and sexuality, ' sex supersedes its feminist 
connotation and a demarcation is made between feminist inquiry and 
lesbian and gay studies. Put more simply, the analogy construes sex as 
sexuality, with the result that a distinction is made between feminist inquiry 
and lesbian and gay studies. Butler points out that this distinction is in part 
made by assimilating sexual difference to a unitary sex: "Sexual 
difference, irreducible to 'gender' or to the putative biological disjunction of 
'female or male, ' is rhetorically refused through the substitution by which a 
unitary 'sex' is installed as the proper object of inquiry [of lesbian and gay 
studies]" (1997a [1994], p. 6). As the analogy is finally set up, then, 
gender as sex is the proper research object of feminist inquiry, whereas 
sex as sexuality is that of lesbian and gay studies. In other words, feminist 
inquiry is divorced from sexuality and lesbian and gay studies is divorced 
from gender. 
Butler problematises the different valences that sex carries in each 
context (1997a [1994], pp. 7-8). On the one hand, Butler maintains that 
very little feminist research reduces gender to a binary biological frame. 
According to Butler, this has mainly and only taken place in feminist 
investigations of the sex/gender distinction. Butler cites Sherry Ortner, 
Harriet Whitehead, Moira Gaetens, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Joan W. Scott 
as examples (no references). As Butler is correct to point out, even Kelly- 
Gadol's (1976) essay understands sex as a 'fully social category. ' Butler 
indicates that feminists have worked against gender being reduced to a 
binary biological frame in two main quarters: (1) work on the biological 
sciences and (2) work within feminism that examines the interconnections 
between gender, race, and sexuality and how gender is the product of 
these vectors of power. In respect to the former quarter, she cites Ruth 
Hubbard, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Monique Witting, Donna Haraway, and 
Helen Longino as examples (no references). In respect to the latter 
quarter, she cites Norma Alarcon, Cherrie Moraga, Chandra Mohanty, 
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Valerie Smith, Hortense Spillers, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak as 
examples (no references). On the other hand, Butler maintains that many 
lesbian and gay scholars work across both feminist inquiry and lesbian 
and gay studies, and they would problematise a unitary notion of sex, 
which elides the significance of sexual difference in the discursive 
constitution and materialisation of sex. " 
Butler is drawing attention to her dissatisfaction with a current in queer 
theory (1997a [1994], pp. 1-3). 12 She is dissatisfied with a current that has 
made a demarcation of proper research objects between feminist inquiry 
and queer theory. According to Butler, a distinction has been made 
between theories of gender and theories of sexuality, and the theoretical 
investigation of gender has been properly allocated to feminist inquiry and 
the same of sexuality has been properly allocated to queer theory. As I 
will discuss in Chapter Three, Sedgwick makes this demarcation of proper 
research objects in Epistemology of the Closet (1990). 13 
In the main, Butler is dissatisfied with the move to demarcate proper 
research objects because it denies the work of feminist and queer 
inquirers who work across the two domains, particularly those who perform 
challenges from each domain's alterities (1997a [1994], pp. 1-3). 
According to Butler, for those who work across feminist inquiry and queer 
theory and "insist on continuing the important intellectual tradition of 
immanent critique, " they are usually construed as having turned against 
the domain that they problematise: "if one analyzes the heterosexist 
assumptions of feminist inquiry, one will be construed as 'anti-' or 'post-' 
feminist; if one analyzes the anti-feminism of some gay and lesbian theory, 
one will be construed as hostile to that lesbian and gay theory" (1997a 
[1994], p. 1). 14 Butler suggests that this denial of or resistance to 
immanent critique is symptomatic of an identity politics that believes that 
challenges from within its own ranks can only weaken a movement. 
Butler maintains that if feminist inquiry and queer theory want to 
remain 'vital, ' 'expansive, ' and 'self-critical, ' then they must make room "for 
the kind of immanent critique which shows how the presuppositions of one 
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critical enterprise can operate to forestall the work of another" (1997a 
[1994], p. 1). In other words, feminist inquiry and queer theory need to 
take account of how they may be complicitous with other forms of 
oppression and vectors of power, whether they are homophobic, 
misogynistic, racist, colonial, or class-based. In these respects, then, 
Butler argues against the demarcation of proper research objects. This 
demarcation would probably only weaken rather than transform and 
strengthen feminist inquiry and queer theory from within. 
Chapter Two 
For a More Careful, Critical Reading (II): 
Problematising Some Misinterpreted Queer Theoretical Formulations 
I would say, then, that what has emerged in the course of the 
last ten or fifteen years is a sense of the increasing 
vulnerability to criticism of things, institutions, practices, 
discourses.... But together with this sense of instability and 
this amazing efficacy of discontinuous, particular[, ] and local 
criticism, one in fact also discovers something that perhaps 
was not initially foreseen, something one might describe as 
precisely the inhibiting effect of global, totalitarian theories.... 
the attempt to think in terms of a totality has in fact proved a 
hindrance to research. 
So, the main point to be gleaned from these events of the last 
fifteen years, their predominant feature, is the local character 
of criticism. ... I believe that what this essentially 
local 
character of criticism indicates in reality is an autonomous, 
non-centralised kind of theoretical production, one that is to 
say whose validity is not dependent on the approval of the 
established regimes of thought. 
-Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures" 
(1980, pp. 80-81, italics included in original) 
Introduction-and 
. 
Urpose 
In the previous chapter, I examined the tendency of social critiques of 
queer theory to conflate it with a queer thinker. This took place by charting 
how the conflation violently operated, and I suggested that it was a means 
to unproductively erect disciplinary walls and boundaries. Towards the 
end of this examination, I pointed out that if sociology wants to move 
towards disciplinary cross-fertilisation, then it needs to bring to the surface 
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queer theory's variegated depths by facilitating and promoting a more 
careful, critical reading of queer theory. I then performed and offered a 
brief careful, critical reading, which demonstrated that a single queer 
subject cannot be conflated with queer theory, as though he/she is 
somehow fully representative of it. To a certain degree, the chapter 
focused more on the conflation itself than what I meant by a careful, 
critical reading. I did gesture that it entailed bringing to the surface the 
constructed silences that problematise the representational gesture that 
produces a synthetic notion of queer theory (whether through a queer 
subject or a theoretical formulation), but I did not elaborate on it any 
further. The chapter can therefore be said to be deficient in this respect. 
In this light, this chapter is an attempt to pick up where my suggestion was 
left and give it more substance. This will take place by considering the 
tendency of social critiques to conflate queer theory with a set of 
misinterpreted theoretical formulations. However, before I outline the 
trajectory of the chapter, I want to briefly share an experience of mine, 
which I believe elucidates what I want to examine. 
As a sociologist with queer leanings, I have been recently caught up in 
quite a few discussions on current theories of sexuality, whether 
consciously seeking them out of my own accord or being actively solicited 
to participate in them by both queer and non-queer folk. These 
discussions have been somewhat ambivalent for me. On the one hand, I 
relish, even revel in, the camaraderie that they have fostered. The 
occasion to meet in a pub with politically- and academically-minded dykes, 
poofs, bisexuals, trannies, and pro-homosexuals has been a damn good 
excuse to drink with friends and catch up on how we are reworking and 
reinventing the world around us. Of course, the discussions have also 
acted as another effective channel for us to spread the latest gossip to 
have just rolled over in bed. On the other hand, I loathe the dogmatic lines 
of affiliation that they have drawn and promoted, if not solidified. I have 
often left them thinking that it is a miracle if we ever invite an open dialogic 
space for our differences and wondering what in the world prevents us 
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from questioning our own attachments to the grounds by which we 
theorise. Perhaps this is a confession of my own academic paranoia: a 
fear that I might lose my sense of self or be put out of control. While many 
important interventions have taken place in these discussions, which have 
challenged many of our own assumptions, both commonsensical and 
theoretical, they have been marred by an accompanying viciousness and 
distrust that has goaded us to produce strident cries of identification. The 
tenor has been callous if not downright bloody. Somehow the idea of 
forming articulations among our differences gives way to the all-too-often, 
by-now calculable move to 'camp' it up, that is, to strictly identify ourselves 
with one theoretical project or the other, whether it be postmodernism, 
poststructuralism, symbolic interactionism, social constructionism, or 
materialism for example. Elspeth Probyn has referred to this camping as 
"[getting] in on the star-coded politics of identity" (1992, p. 502). The 
project of Vertretung' has been central to the framing of our discussions; 
the critic as proxy installs him/herself as sovereign within a field of fraught 
fidelities. 
One of our discussions in particular found me in this embattled 
position: the efficacy of queer theory in relation to lesbian and gay politics. 
Most of the discussion's participants generally did not find any value in 
investing in queer theory and were of the opinion that it, at the very least, 
weakened or, at the very most, totally undermined lesbian and gay politics. 
Their reservations were structured as some of the following formulations: 
"if lesbian specificity is problematised by queer theory, then... "; "if there 
are no real bodies for queer theory, then. . . "; and "if queer theory claims 
that there is no true distinction between sex and gender, that is, sex is 
actually gender, then.... " What I understood to be a set of misinterpreted 
theoretical formulations conflated with queer theory was countered by me 
with a set of rejoinders: "yes, queer theory problematises the specificity of 
lesbian subjectivity, but. . . "; "yes, there are no real bodies 
for queer 
theory, but. . . "; and "yes, queer theory argues that there 
is no true 
distinction between sex and gender, but. .. ." 
Unfortunately, my 
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spontaneous theoretical reflex only installed a set of theoretical 
formulations in place of another, and I was just as guilty of conflating 
queer theory. This only had the effect of shutting the discussion down and 
crystallising our disciplinary alliances. What was lost in the exchange was 
a more careful, critical reading of queer theory, that is, a more localised 
reading. This kind of exchange would have probably facilitated a more 
informed and accurate reading of queer theory. Further, it may have 
facilitated a space for, paraphrasing Stuart Hall (1990, pp. 236-37), 
alternative forms of representation, which would have enabled us to work 
with(in) our differences and construct new kinds of theoretical perspectives 
from which to work across and between disciplines. 
Since queer theory's emergence, social critiques of the project have 
conflated it with a number of theoretical formulations, which have been 
understood as foundationalist premises of the project (for example, 
Gamson 1996; Jeffreys 1993,1994; Parnaby 1993; Wolfe and Penelope 
1993). Some of their subject matter have included discourse, the 
deconstruction of the lesbian and gay subject, the identity term 'queer, ' 
and the analytic separation of gender and sexuality. They have come 
under heavy criticism by these social critiques for a number of reasons, for 
example: the dismissal of reality, the denial of agency, and the death of 
the lesbian and gay subject. To install one's self within these terms is to 
turn against the sexuality that queer theory conceptualises. Conceived in 
this way, these social critiques have written against and distanced 
themselves from queer theory's theoretical formulations. However, had 
these social critiques read queer theory more carefully and critically by 
localising their readings, then they probably would have read queer theory 
differently. In other words, they probably would not have misinterpreted 
queer theory as the dismissal of reality, the denial of agency, and the 
death of the lesbian and gay subject. Nonetheless, queer theory remains 
conflated with a set of misinterpreted theoretical formulations. This has 
only had the effect of erecting disciplinary walls and boundaries and 
stalling movement towards disciplinary cross-fertilisation. What I want to 
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do here, then, is to examine, problematise, and rework some 
misinterpreted theoretical formulations that have been conflated with 
queer theory. In doing so, I will argue for a more careful, critical reading of 
queer theory, that is, a more localised reading. Michel Foucault's thoughts 
on local criticism, as outlined in "Two Lectures" (1980), will largely inform 
what I propose. The second section of the chapter will then seek to 
rework this conflation by performing and offering a careful, critical reading 
of a couple of queer theoretical formulations in greater detail: one on the 
deconstruction of the lesbian and gay subject and the other on queer 
theory's usage of the identity term 'queer' and its relation to gender and 
lesbian specificity. It is not until sociology facilitates and promotes a more 
careful, critical reading that it can then move towards some good, 
productive disciplinary cross-fertilisation. 
Section I The Conflation of Queer. Theory with 
Misinterpreted Theoretical Formulations 
i. Some Misinterpreted Theoretical Formulations 
Within sociological discourse, there have been calls to retrieve the 
theorisation of sexuality from what has been often characterised as the 
latest progeny of the Foucauldian Revolution spawned by literary critics 
and cultural theorists: queer theory and its linguistic idealism of 
poststructuralism (Malinowitz 1993; Paris 1993; Plummer 1998). 2 In 
another corner, lesbian feminist Sheila Jeffreys (1994) has argued that 
queer theory is a poststructuralist discourse convoluted in a masculinist 
language, which does not concern itself with questions of gender and 
lesbian existence. For Jeffreys, queer theory seeks "to establish that the 
study of sexuality is a field of inquiry quite separate from and impervious to 
feminist inquiry" (1994, p. 466). Jeffreys contends that if queer theory 
wants to be of greater ethical and political value, then it must take on 
board a broader agenda, particularly a feminist one. Indeed, although 
queer theory's emergence was marked in part by the problematisation of 
earlier theoretical formulations on sexuality made by White gay male 
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historiographers and sociologists, 3 its formulations within contemporary 
sexual theory have not been uncontentious. So, how has queer theory 
been understood within social critiques? 
When queer theory has appeared in social critiques, it has usually 
been conflated with and structured as the following formulations in some 
way or another (Bersani 1995; Bonwick 1993; Castle 1993; Cohen 1996; 
Gamson 1996; Hennessy 1995; Jeffreys 1993,1994; Link 1993; Maggenti 
1991; Malinowitz 1993; Paris 1993; Parnaby 1993; Plummer 1998; 
Seidman 1993; Smyth 1992; Wolfe and Penelope 1993). The structure 
and subject matter of these formulations have been very similar to Judith 
Butler's depiction of the way in which postmodernism has been 
conventionally understood and has conventionally operated in academic 
and political discourses (1992 [1991], p. 3-4). The main ones have 
included, which were previously highlighted in the introduction: "if 
everything is discourse for queer theory, then. . . "; "if the 
lesbian and gay 
subject is deconstructed by queer theory, then. . . "; "if queer theory uses 
the identity term 'queer' as an umbrella term to describe a number of anti- 
normative sexual identities, then. . . "; and "if gender and sexuality are 
analytically separated by queer theory, whereby gender is a question for 
feminist inquiry and sexuality is one for queer theory, then.... " In line 
with Butler's depiction of postmodernism, queer theory has become an 
intense site for all sorts of fears and warnings against a kind of 'impending 
nihilism, ' whether cultural, political, or theoretical: "The sentence begins as 
a warning against an impending nihilism, for if the conjured content of 
these series of conditional clauses proves to be true, then, and there is 
always a then, some set of dangerous consequences will surely follow" 
(1992 [1991], p. 3). These dangerous consequences have been well- 
rehearsed and well-publicised. Because discourse is the fashionable 
trend in queer theory, there are only representations. There is no reality 
and experience of it. At the same time, queer theory's emphasis on 
discourse denies the voluntarist, active agent. I can never say 'I' again 
(the reflexive, autobiographical 'I') or claim to wield any power. I am and 
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only ever will be programmed by discourse, and if the programme goes 
wrong, then I am a developmental failure. Queer theory's deconstruction 
of the lesbian and gay subject is the death of the subject. Lesbians and 
gays cannot speak as and for other lesbian and gay folk. Because queer 
theory uses the identity term 'queer' as an umbrella term to describe a 
number of anti-normative sexual identities, it marks the dissolution of 
gender and lesbian specificity. Queer theory's analytic separation of 
gender and sexuality is anti-feminist. Queer theorists do not entertain 
questions of gender because it really is a masculinist discourse. 
In line with Butler (1997a [1994], pp. 1-2), I would suggest that there is 
an undertone to these interpretations of queer theory that is symptomatic 
of an identity politics that believes that challenges from its own alterities 
only weakens rather than strengthens lesbian and gay struggles against 
compulsory heterosexuality and homophobia. In other words, queer 
theory has been understood as turning against the sexuality that it seeks 
to conceptualise. 
Contrary to queer theory and in an effort to distance themselves from 
the poststructuralist discourse, some social critiques have insisted that a 
lesbian and gay subject must serve as a point of departure to rally around 
within dominant political discourses (Bersani 1995; Castle 1993; Garrison 
1996; Link 1993; Wolfe and Penelope 1993). How can lesbians and gays 
produce a reverse-discourse from and through which to challenge 
compulsory heterosexuality and homophobia if a lesbian and gay subject 
does not exist? They have contended that politics is impossible without a 
foundation. Without a subject, lesbians and gays could not speak as and 
for fellow lesbians and gays. Without a subject, they could not articulate a 
viable identity that would contest and undermine the ways in which they 
have been either misrepresented or made non-existent, unthinkable, and 
unimaginable by compulsory heterosexuality and homophobia. 
Perhaps we should take these trepidations very seriously. Discourse, 
the deconstruction of the lesbian and gay subject, the identity term 'queer, ' 
and the analytic separation of gender and sexuality are not simple issues, 
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and definitely are not ones that can and should be fully settled. No 
amount of reflection can resolve their highly-charged investments and 
consequences, particularly in relation to lesbian and gay politics. 
However, time and again I have been struck in many ways by the narrow- 
mindedness of these debates, when the question has been about either 
avowing or disavowing queer theory rather than opening up its terms, 
queering their usages, and constructing new kinds of theoretical 
perspectives from which to work across and between disciplines. In other 
words, when the debate has been one of deciding either for or against 
discourse, for or against the deconstruction of the lesbian and gay subject, 
for or against the identity term 'queer, ' or for or against the analytic 
separation of gender and sexuality. Queer theory either offends or 
reconciles, repels or attracts, or breaks or reunites. It cannot help but to 
enslave or provoke exuberance. Is this all the project holds, however? 
It may come as a surprise, though, that to perform and offer a 
discursive analysis of lesbian and gay subjectivity is not to do away with 
reality and agency (for example, Butler 1990,1993; Grosz 1995 [1994]; 
Scott 1992 [1991]). Rather, it is to take account of the cultural, social, and 
historical conditions that discursively constitute the lived experiences of 
lesbian and gay subjects and to locate agency within that constitution. 
Here, discourse does not simply report on the subject and some prior truth 
but brings the subject into being and initiates the conditions for agency. It 
may also come as a surprise that to deconstruct the lesbian and gay 
subject is to neither negate nor dispense with the notion of identity 
altogether, as though we cannot speak as and for lesbians and gays (for 
example, Butler 1990,1991,1993; Cohen 1991; Edelman 1994,1995; 
Fuss 1989; Sedgwick 1990,1993a [1993]; Warner 1991). Rather, it is to 
understand identity as normative and exclusionary and to interrogate what 
the identity sign and its subject authorise and exclude so that any 
exclusions are safeguarded for possible future uses. It may once again 
come as a surprise that the identity term 'queer' does not mark the 
dissolution of gender and lesbian specificity (for example, Butler 1991, 
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1993; de Lauretis 1991a, 1991b; Dorenkamp and Henke 1995a, 1995b; 
Sedgwick 1993a [1993]). Rather, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick accurately 
puts it, 'queer' problematises the notion that lesbian and gay identity is 
monolithic: "That's one of the things that 'queer' can refer to: the open 
mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances, and resonances, 
lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of 
anyone's gender, of anyone's sexuality aren't made (or can't be made) to 
signify monolithically" (1993a [1993], p. 8, italics included in original). In 
other words, 'queer' plays on sexual identity being a question of the 
intersection of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and nationality, and it teases 
the interplay of these constituent' and constitutive elements of 
identity/difference out. It may come as a surprise, again, that the analytic 
separation of gender and sexuality, whereby gender is the proper research 
object of feminist inquiry and sexuality is the same of queer theory, does 
not signify that queer theory is an anti-feminist/masculinist discourse (for 
example, Abelove et al. 1993; Sedgwick 1990). For example, Henry 
Abelove et al. (1993) are pro-feminist, and their analytic separation has 
been understood as making a distinction between feminist inquiry and 
queer theory insofar as feminist inquiry "cannot capture the complexity of 
analysis [of sexuality] that takes place within lesbian and gay studies 
[queer theory]" (Butler 1997a [1994], p. 6). As another example, Sedgwick 
has made contributions to feminist inquiry (for example, Between Men 
(1985)), and her call for an analytic separation in Epistemology of the 
Closet (1990) was motivated by her perception that theories of sexuality 
were underdeveloped at the time of the writing and publication of her 
project. According to Sedgwick, their development and establishment 
was contingent upon making them a central interest in and of themselves 
and not giving way to other disciplinary discourses (for example, feminist 
inquiry). Further, as discussed in the previous chapter, not all queer 
theorists have subscribed to an analytic separation of gender and 
sexuality. For example, Butler has argued against this analytic separation 
(1997a [1994]), and most of her work concerns itself with the relation 
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between gender and sexuality (for example, Butler 1990,1991,1993, 
2000). 
ii. A Careful, Critical Reading of Queer Theory 
Why, then, are these theoretical formulations misinterpreted and conflated 
with queer theory? If queer theory does not designate the dismissal of 
reality, the denial of agency, the death of the lesbian and gay subject, the 
dissolution of gender and lesbian specificity, and the legislation of an anti- 
feminist/masculinist discourse, then what useful purposes do discourse, 
deconstruction, the identity term 'queer, ' and the analytic separation of 
gender and sexuality serve? Also, interpreted more accurately, what are 
their risks and limitations if we subscribe to them? It is my strong belief 
that what is more at risk here is not a critique of queer theory, but, rather, 
is an informed consideration of the productive contribution that queer 
theory can make to the theorisation of sexuality, as well as lesbian and 
gay politics. Foucault's (1980) thoughts on local criticism are particularly 
useful at this juncture. 
In his introduction to the first of two inaugural lectures for his course 
'Society Must Be Defended' (1976), Foucault muses over the on-going 
development of his work since he first took up his chair of 'History of 
Systems of Thought' at the College de France in 1970 (1980, pp. 78-79). 
The lecture begins with a forlorn confession and apology: his thinking's 
resistance to discipline. Although Foucault had intended to complete a 
series of researches of five years in his current lectures, he did not know 
how to do so. His researches included, for example: notes and 
observations on sophistry, a history of knowledge of sexuality based on 
confessional practices of the seventeenth century and infantile sexuality 
from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, and some work on the 
evolution and institutionalisation of psychiatry in the nineteenth century. 
Foucault writes: "None of it does more than mark time. Repetitive and 
disconnected, it advances nowhere. Since indeed it never ceases to say 
the same thing, it perhaps says nothing. It is tangled up into an 
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indecipherable, disorganised muddle. In a nutshell, it is inconclusive" 
(1980, p. 78). A problem was coming to head for Foucault. His 
researches had failed to develop into any continuous whole. Diffused and 
fragmentary, divergent and indefinite, they had neither a predetermined 
starting point nor a final destination. In other words, the theoretical unity of 
his researches was in jeopardy. As Foucault despairingly laments, "it 
mattered little where they led" (1980, p. 78). In fact, as he discloses, they 
were mere sketches for others to pursue and divert in other directions and 
ones for him "to extend upon or re-design as the case might be" (Foucault 
1980, pp. 78-79). This confession and apology does indeed seem rather 
harsh considering that some of his researches had just been published or 
were near publication at the time of his lecture (in French): Discipline and 
Punish in 1975 and The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 in 1976. 
Foucault is drawing attention to an increasing trend that had emerged 
over the past 10 or 15 years at the time of the writing of his lecture, which 
is characteristic of the way in which his then-current research projects 
methodologically theorised: the local character of criticism (1980, pp. 79- 
83). In support of this sort of research and theorising, Foucault argues 
against what he refers to as 'totalitarian theories' (1980, p. 80). He 
suggests that the sociology of delinquency and criticisms of the asylum 
methodologically theorised in this way. Foucault contends that the 
methodological move to theorise in totality, that is, to work and think in 
terms of coherence and systemisation, proves to be a stumbling-block to 
research. According to Foucault, this kind of theorising buries and 
disguises the social and historical contents of its subject matter within a 
functionalist language, further instituting and legitimating an appropriate, 
comprehensive, and centralised theoretical framework. In other words, 
theory becomes a conceptual and defining apparatus by and though which 
subjects of study become meaningful and only meaningful within its terms. 
What gets lost in particular are the 'ruptural effects' of the social and 
historical contents of its subject matter (Foucault 1980, p. 82). These 
ruptural effects, on the one hand, interrogate the coherence of its 
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formulations and, on the other hand, expose them as contingent and 
contestable. Foucault instead argues for a 'return of knowledge' (1980, p. 
81). In other words, he argues for a kind of non-centralised theoretical 
production that pays particular attention to local criticism. Foucault writes 
(as previously and partly cited in the epigraph): 
So, the main point to be gleaned from these events of the last 
fifteen years, their predominant feature, is the local character of 
criticism. That should not, I believe, be taken to mean that its 
qualities are those of an obtuse, naive, or primitive empiricism; nor 
is it a soggy eclecticism, an opportunism that laps up any and 
every kind of theoretical approach; nor does it mean a self- 
imposed ascetism which taken by itself would reduce to the worst 
kind of theoretical impoverishment. I believe that what this 
essentially local character of criticism indicates in reality is an 
autonomous, non-centralised kind of theoretical production, one 
that is to say whose validity is not dependent on the approval of 
the established regimes of thought (1980, p. 81, italics included in 
original). 
Foucault's points are well-taken. It is my belief that fundamental 
mistakes can be made when social critiques only think in terms of totality 
rather than paying particular attention to local criticism, as though theories 
offer themselves up in organised bundles and can be easily taken from a 
shelf. By thinking in terms of totality, social critiques can significantly bury 
and conceal queer theory's variegated depths within the terms of their 
conflation. In other words, what can get lost are those 'ruptural effects, ' 
which would interrogate a coherent notion of queer theory. If this was the 
case, then, a contestable, yet uncontested version of queer theory would 
result and remain. Unfortunately, this has usually been the case, as the 
previously-cited social critiques demonstrate. However, had they moved 
beyond their conflation and read queer theory more carefully and critically 
by localising their readings, then they probably would have teased out the 
ruptural effects of their conflation. This, most likely, would have facilitated 
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and promoted a more accurate reading and productive criticism of queer 
theory. More importantly, it may have facilitated and promoted disciplinary 
cross-fertilisation. Nonetheless, because they do not move beyond their 
conflation, queer theory remains misinterpreted, and there is no potential 
for thinking, reading, and writing across and between disciplines. The 
debate is only a question of deciding either for or against queer theory. 
The same goes for queer theory being conflated with a queer thinker. 
As I made clear in the introduction of the previous chapter, I am not 
suggesting here that we cannot make representational gestures about 
queer theory through a queer subject, a theoretical formulation, or even a 
number of them. In part, they are the very vehicles that enable us to piece 
queer theory together in order that we may understand it. However, we 
need to ask ourselves the following question: what are the risks when we 
only think in terms of totality by conflating queer theory with either a queer 
subject or a theoretical formulation? As I have already demonstrated, we 
risk misinterpreting queer theory and erasing its variegated depths. I also 
intimated that we risk considering the productive possibilities that queer 
theory opens up, particularly for lesbian and gay politics. Further, we stall 
movement towards disciplinary cross-fertilisation. I would like to suggest, 
then, that social critiques should not simply think in terms of totality when it 
comes to engaging with queer theory, if this can even count as 
engagement in the first place. Engagement should be and needs to be 
balanced with more careful, critical readings, that is, more localised 
readings, which tease out the ruptural effects of any grand gestures that 
are made about queer theory. It is my belief that this would usher in more 
informed and accurate readings of queer theory. It would also make the 
conditions ripe for sociology and queer theory to work with(in) their 
differences so that they could construct new kinds of theoretical 
perspectives from which to work across and between disciplines. I 
perform and offer the following careful, critical readings of queer theory in 
an attempt to move sociology in this direction. 
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Section li: 'Some More'Careful, Critical'Readingsý of Queer Theory 
I. "If the lesbian and gay subject is deconstructed, then.... " 
Judith Butler has pointed out that it seems to many that it is a political 
necessity to articulate an identity, through a subject, that represents 
lesbians and gays because they are being publicly erased and obliterated 
by compulsory heterosexuality and homophobic strategies (1991, p. 19). 
We have been lead to believe that this should happen regardless of its 
price. In other words, its benefits will outweigh its costs. This presumption 
that politics requires a lesbian and gay subject in advance has featured in 
lesbian and gay politics, as well as in both older and more contemporary 
sexual analyses of various kinds (Bersani 1995; Cass 1979; Castle 1993; 
Dank 1971; D'Emilio 1983; Epstein 1987; Garrison 1996; Link 1993; 
Ponse 1978; Smith 1988,1990; Troiden 1988; Weeks 1977; Wolfe and 
Penelope 1993). However, this is by no means enough. It is about time 
that we feel good about being lesbian and gay (The proclamation 'Gay is 
good! ' is still very pertinent. ). This is indeed incontrovertibly important 
taking into account that lesbian and gay lives are usually either 
misrepresented or do not even make their way into the thinkable, the 
imaginable, and the desirable. 
Whether on the scene of (inter)national lesbian and gay activism, in 
the academic journals and 'zines, on the streets, in the privacy of our own 
homes, or even in our classrooms, compulsory heterosexuality and 
homophobic strategies pervade our every thoughts, moves, and intimacies 
(or lack of them). This is a time when the utterance 'I am a homosexual' in 
the United States military does not merely describe or report on a defiled 
and offensive 'lifestyle' but is also construed as homosexual conduct in 
and of itself, that is, performing precisely what the utterance discloses 
(Butler 1997b, p. 122; Halley 1996). This is a time when, although later 
abandoned, a financial and moral alliance was seriously considered 
between one of Scotland's most powerful banks, The Bank of Scotland, 
and 'God's prophet on earth, ' the Born-again Christian crusader Pat 
Robertson (Hall and Nairn 1999, pp. 12-13). Having said this, chief 
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executive Peter Burt of the banking institution did not consider the joint 
venture to be a moral one. It was only a coincidence that Robertson 
believed that all feminists were bra-burning lesbians responsible for the 
breakdown of the 'family, ' gay males were actually Nazi Satanists in 
disguise, and Hindus had no business administering government policies. 
This is a time when Tinky Winky of the Teletubbies is 'outed' by the United 
States Moral Majority leader Jerry Falwell (O'Bryan 1999, p. 31). 
According to Falwell, Tinky Winky is a 'screaming queen' who can no 
longer hide in the closet: his costume is purple (one of the gay pride 
colours), he has an antenna shaped like a triangle on his head (the gay 
pride symbol), and he occasionally carries a handbag around (a sure sign 
of a cosmopolitan kind of girl). In a strong sense, for Falwell, Tinky Winky 
is the archetypal gay male. Gay males are, in his little twisted fantasy, the 
exploiters and converters of children (those digital signals transmitted 
though the television are a ploy to convert), the paradigmatic exemplars of 
mincing obscenity, and that identity which cannot or dare not be. And this 
is a time when we are haunted by high prevalence rates of lesbian and 
gay adolescent suicides (Gibson 1989). For lesbians and gays, the hard 
statistics come as no surprise: in the United States, lesbian and gay 
teenagers are two to three times likelier to attempt suicide than others, 
approximately 30% of teen suicides are those of lesbian and gays, and 
one-third of lesbian and gay teenagers reported that they had attempted 
suicide. 
It is my belief that the statistics on lesbian and gay adolescent suicides 
highlight the profligate effect compulsory heterosexuality and homophobic 
strategies have on lesbians and gays. They also highlight the degree to 
which compulsory heterosexuality and homophobic strategies will go to 
erase and obliterate the existence of lesbians and gays. Yet, these 
statistics do more than just represent the violence waged against lesbians 
and gays. They are violence in their literal exegesis, hitting home very 
hard. Within the aforementioned terms, then, lesbians and gays are not 
only the unthinkable and unimaginable, the unliveable and unviable but 
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are also death itself or, at the very least, the threat of death. It is therefore 
understandable that there have been calls for a lesbian and gay subject to 
represent and initiate lesbian and gay interests in political domains. If 
lesbian and gay lives are being misrepresented, excluded, erased, and 
obliterated by compulsory heterosexuality and homophobic strategies, 
then the political task must be to contest and develop a resistance against 
the violence that is being waged against them. A reverse-discourse is 
unthinkable without a foundation. Without a subject, as previously 
remarked, lesbians and gays would not be able to represent one another. 
Further, they would not be able to articulate a viable identity that would 
challenge and disable the cultural, social, and political conditions of their 
subordination. 
However, queer critiques of representation and identity politics have 
taken issue with the lesbian and gay subject serving as a political point of 
departure-the so-called 'deconstruction of the lesbian and gay subject. ' 
This has taken place in the writings of Judith Butler (1990,1991,1993); Ed 
Cohen (1991); Teresa de Lauretis (1991b); Lee Edelman (1994,1995); 
Diana Fuss (1989); David M. Halperin (1995); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
(1990,1993a [1993]); and Michael Warner (1991) in some way or another. 
Within this framework, the identity categories 'lesbian' and 'gay' have 
appeared in inverted commas. Queer theorists have questioned the 
viability of a subject representing lesbians and gays through an identity 
category. In the main, they have contended that a subject cannot fully or 
adequately represent lesbians and gays. 
This suspension of identity has been understood by social critiques as 
the death of the subject (Bersani 1995; Castle 1993; Garrison 1996; Link 
1993; Wolfe and Penelope 1993). In other words, it has been understood 
as a bidding farewell to the articulation of lesbian and gay realities and 
experiences. We cannot speak as and for lesbians and gays through a 
subject. Susan Wolfe and Julia Penelope convey this understanding in 
the introduction to their anthology on lesbian cultural criticism: 
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We [cannot] afford to allow privileged patriarchal discourse (of 
which poststructuralism is but a new variant) to erase the 
collective identity Lesbians have only recently begun to establish. . 
.. For what has in fact resulted from the incorporation of 
deconstructive discourse, in academic 'feminist' discourse at least 
[feminist discourse in queer theory], is the word Lesbian has been 
placed in quotation marks, either used or mentioned, and the 
existence of real Lesbians has been denied, once again (1993, p. 
5). 
For Wolfe and Penelope, the deconstructive discourse that encases the 
identity term 'Lesbian' in inverted commas signals the erasure and denial 
of a lesbian subject. The Lesbian, within this destructive deconstructive 
discourse, does not exist. There is no real Lesbian who represents a 
lesbian existence through the identity category. The Lesbian or, more 
accurately, the 'lesbian' is only an empty placeholder that she clings to, 
dead. Understood as the death of the lesbian and gay subject, these 
social critiques have contended that queer theory's deconstructive 
exercise is either anti-political or, worse yet, power (read: compulsory 
heterosexuality and homophobia) in recoil: 'isn't the death of the lesbian 
and gay subject a refusal to engage in politics? ' or 'isn't the death of the 
lesbian and gay subject how compulsory heterosexuality and homophobic 
strategies would have it, that is, lesbians and gays don't constitute a 
(legitimate) subject position? ' 
I previously implied at the beginning of this subsection that the lesbian 
and gay subject has not solely featured in contemporary sexual analyses. 
Previously and usually referred to as the 'Homosexual, ' the lesbian and 
gay subject had a central place in social-historical constructionist accounts 
of sexuality in the 1970s and '80s. It had a notable place within Steven 
Epstein's essay "Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity" (1987) in particular. Epstein 
argues for the political utility of reappropriating ethnicity as a model for gay 
identity and resistance: 
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How do you protest a socially imposed categorization, except by 
organizing around the category? Just as blacks cannot fight the 
arbitrariness of racial classifications without organizing as blacks, 
so gays could not advocate the overthrow of the sexual order 
without making their gayness the very basis of their claims (1987, 
p. 19, italics included in original) 
In other words, organising around the identity category enables gays to 
contest their social labelling and fight back against the 'sexual order. ' I 
elaborate on this centralisation within social-historical constructionism in 
Chapter Three. 
I do have some questions about lesbians and gays organising as an 
'ethnic minority' (Is the very use of inverted commas a sign that I am about 
to either dismiss or negate such a notion altogether? ). If we organise 
around an identity category, what will be its strategic aim? Who and what 
will discursively constitute the version that is circulated? What exclusions 
will be subsequently produced by the consolidation of identity, that is, who 
and what will not be represented by the identity category? In short, what 
will be the benefits and costs of consolidating identity? Butler, Cohen, and 
Fuss also echo the sentiments of these questions: 
There is no question that gays and lesbians are threatened by 
the violence of public erasure, but the decision to counter that 
violence must be careful not to reinstall another in its place. 
Which versions of lesbian or gay ought to be rendered visible, 
and which internal exclusions will that rendering visible 
institute (Butler 1991, p. 19)? 
So, although the assumption that 'we' constitute a 'natural' 
community because we share a sexual identity might appear 
to offer a stable basis for group formations, my experience 
suggests that it can just as often interrupt the process of 
creating intellectual and political projects which can gather 'us' 
together across time and space. By predicating 'our' affinity 
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upon the assertion of a common 'sexuality, ' we tacitly agree to 
leave unexplored any 'internal' contradictions which 
undermine the coherence we desire from the imagined 
certainty of an unassailable commonality or of incontestable 
sexuality (Cohen 1991, p. 72). 
Is politics based on identity, or is identity based on politics? .. 
. Can feminist, gay, or lesbian subjects afford 
to dispense with 
the notion of unified, stable identities or must we begin to base 
our politics on something other than identity? What, in other 
words, is the politics of `identity politics' (Fuss 1989, p. 100)? 
For the previously cited queer theorists, the subject does not fully or 
adequately represent lesbians and gays through an identity category 
because identity categories are never merely descriptive for them, simply 
reporting on a perceived homogenous constituency. They are also 
normative and exclusionary. The subject who is made to stand in for an 
identity category sets out the criterion by which it is discursively 
constituted. As such, the identity category that is used to represent 
lesbians and/or gays will proceed with a set of legitimations and 
exclusions, and representation will only be extended to those lesbians and 
gays who meet its discursive criterion. 
This questioning and suspension of the subject should not be 
understood as a thorough dismissal or negation of the lesbian and gay 
subject or doing away with the political usefulness of identity categories. 
Butler persistently reiterates this throughout her work: "Obviously, the 
political task is not to refuse representational politics-as if we could" 
(1990, p. 5); "Clearly, I am not legislating against the use of the term 
[lesbian or gay]" (1991, p. 16); and "the category ... does not 
become 
useless through deconstruction" (1993, p. 29). Rather, the deconstruction 
of the lesbian and gay subject should be understood as inquiring into what 
the subject and identity category authorise and exclude and safeguarding 
those exclusions for possible future uses. Any articulation of identity is 
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contingent and partial. This unsettling of the identity category's 
foundationalist weight thus enables the identity category to be a 
permanent site of variable meanings and serve multiple purposes, which, 
of course, can never be fully known in advance. This is to politicise, 
transform, and strengthen lesbian and gay identity and politics from 
within. 5 
ii. "If queer theory uses the identity term `queer' as an umbrella term 
to describe a number of anti-normative sexual identities, then.... " 
Questions of gender and (lesbian) sexuality have had a central place 
within queer theory. In the main, the task has been twofold. 
In the first instance, queer theorists have taken issue with the risks 
and limitations of some feminist attempts to invoke sexuality as an issue of 
sexual difference, particularly the work of Catherine MacKinnon (1982, 
1987) (Butler 1993, pp. 238-39; de Lauretis 1988; Sedgwick 1990, pp. 31- 
32). MacKinnon theorises sexuality within a structurally-determined 
framework of sexual difference. She contends that sexual relations of 
domination and subordination institute and maintain gender categories: 
"Sexuality is to feminism what work is to [M]arxism ... the moulding, 
direction, expression of sexuality organizes society into two sexes, women 
and men" (MacKinnon 1982, pp. 515-16). Within this sex hierarchy, 'men' 
are defined by their dominating social position over women, whereas 
'women' are defined by their subordination to men. Here, sexual 
difference is not only understood as the inculcation of sexual relations but 
is also understood as the primary object of sexuality. However, the 
previously-cited queer theorists have argued that the rigid framework 
ignores other forms of sexuality that do not take sexual difference as their 
primary object or are not about object choice at all (for example, 
homosexuality, bestiality, intergenerational sex, sex with multiple people, 
commercial sex, the use of manufactured objects, and public sex). Butler 
has further problematised the general privileging of sexual difference 
(1993, pp. 93-140,167-85). For Butler, "the disjunctive ordering of the 
For a More Careful, Critical Reading (II) 61 
human as 'masculine' or 'feminine' ... take[s] place not only 
through a 
heterosexualizing symbolic with its taboo on homosexuality, but through a 
complex set of racial injunctions which operate in part through the taboo 
on miscegenation" (1993, p. 167). In other words, sexual difference is 
also a set of heterosexualising and racialising norms. In this light, for 
example, the theoretical framework that locks sexuality within a structurally 
determined framework of sexual difference can inadvertently reproduce 
and further reinforce heterosexist assumptions of maleness and 
femaleness without realising it. Therefore, the analysis that foregrounds 
the monolithic workings of a vector of power over another, whether it be 
gender, sexuality, race, class, ethnicity, or nationality, ignores their 
interconnectedness, proceeding with exclusions that might well question 
the premises that are being made. 
In the second instance, queer theorists have problematised the 
continuing failure within academic and political discourses to render 
gender and lesbian sexuality visible in the identity formula 'lesbian and 
gay' (as well as the identity constituent elements of race, class, ethnicity, 
and nationality) (Butler 1991,1993; de Lauretis 1991 a, 1991 b; Dorenkamp 
and Henke 1995a, 1995b; Sedgwick 1993a [1993]). According to de 
Lauretis, at the turn of the 1990s, 'lesbian and gay' or 'gay and lesbian' 
was the then-current identity formula used by academics and political 
activists to refer to lesbians and gays (1991 b, pp. iv-v). It had superseded 
the earlier ones of 'gay' and 'homosexual, ' which, as mentioned in the 
previous subsection, had roots within academic and political discourses of 
the late 1960s and 70s. de Lauretis cites examples of how the identity 
terms 'gay' and 'homosexual' had been used in titles of 'classic works' by 
White gay male historiographers and sociologists (1991b, pp. iv-v). Some 
of them include: Homosexual: Oppression and Liberation (Altman 1971); 
Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual 
Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (D'Emilio 1983); "Gay Politics, 
Ethnic Identity" (Epstein 1987); The Making of the Modern Homosexual 
(Plummer 1981 b); and Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain from 
For a More Careful, Critical Reading (II) 62 
the Nineteenth Century to the Present (Weeks 1977). According to de 
Lauretis, this discourse of White gay male historiography and sociology on 
sexuality was mainly, if not exclusively, male-orientated and had little, if 
no, understanding of female/lesbian sexuality, which was its own separate 
enterprise (1991 b, pp. iv-v). de Lauretis writes: 
[an] understanding of female socio-sexual specificity ... 
developed separately from the printed discourse on white 
lesbianism that started with Jeanette Foster's Sex Variant Women 
in Literature (1956) and continued with, among others, Sydney 
Abbott and Barbara Love's Sappho Was a Right-on Woman 
(1972), Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon's Lesbian/Woman (1972), Jill 
Johnston's Lesbian Nation: The Feminist Solution (1973), Ti- 
Grace Atkinson's Amazon Odyssey (1974), Dolores Klaich's 
Woman Plus Woman (1974), Barbara Ponse's Identities in the 
Lesbian World: The Social Construction of Self (1978), to Adrienne 
Rich's "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, " first 
published in Signs in 1980. Those early titles remark an emphasis 
on gender and socio-cultural specificity-woman, lesbian, feminist, 
amazon-that is absent from the previous set, but has 
characterized lesbian thought and self-representation from early 
on (1991 b, pp. iv-v). 
de Lauretis contends that usages of the superseded identity formula 
'lesbian and gay' maintained this marginalisation of women's 'socio-sexual 
specificity. ' According to de Lauretis, the shorthand was, more often than 
not, exclusionary and ignored questions of gender and lesbian sexuality: 
'di ff erences'..... are less represented by the discursive coupling of ... 
'lesbian and gay, ' than they are elided by most of the contexts in which the 
phrase is used; that is to say, differences are implied in it but then simply 
taken for granted or even covered over by the word 'and' (1991b, pp. v- 
vi. ). Whether "by extending the male form of (homo)sexuality to females, " 
assuming the latter was only a 'slight variation' of the former, or merely 
considering lesbian sexuality as an afterthought, lesbianism was the lesser 
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of two sexualities represented in and by the discursive coupling of 'lesbian 
and gay' (1991 b, p. iv). 
de Lauretis introduces and proposes the identity term 'queer' in place 
of 'lesbian, ' 'gay, ' and 'lesbian and gay' (1991b, pp. iv-v). She does not 
want 'queer' to reproduce their 'fine distinctions' or to gravitate towards 
any one of them and their 'ideological liabilities, ' but, rather, "to both 
transgress and transcend them-or at the very least problematize them" 
(1991b, pp. v). In other words, she wants 'queer' to problematise 
exclusionary uses of identity. Within academic and political discourses, 
'queer' has come to signify not just lesbians and gays. It has been used 
as an umbrella term to signify a number of anti-normative sexual identities. 
Sedgwick has outlined some of them: 
[p]ushy femmes, radical faeries, fantasists, drags, clones, 
leatherfolk, ladies in tuxedoes, feminist women or feminist men, 
masturbators, bulldaggers, divas, Snap! Queens, butch bottoms, 
storytellers, transsexuals, aunties, wanna-bes, lesbian-identified 
men or lesbians who sleep with men, or ... people able 
to relish, 
learn from, or identify with such (1993a [1993], p. 8). 
Although the introduction of 'queer' marks an important shift in 
problematising exclusionary uses of the identity formula 'lesbian and gay, ' 
it has seemed to some social critiques that this alternative both confirms 
and refutes queer theory's own enterprise (Bonwick 1993; Castle 1993; 
Jeffreys 1993,1994; Maggenti 1991; Parnaby 1993; Smyth 1992). In 
particular, these cited social critiques have taken issue with queer's 
gender and lesbian non-specificity. According to these social critiques, if 
queer theory uses the identity term 'queer' as an umbrella term to describe 
a number of anti-normative sexual identities, then gender and lesbian 
specificity dissolve in any uses of the generic term. Philippa Bonwick 
captures these sentiments very well: "Perhaps the most damaging aspect 
of the pervasive push to be queer is that it shrouds lesbians in an ever 
thicker cloak of invisibility.... Queer totally ignores the politics of gender. 
Using a generic term wipes out women again" (1993, p. 10). Bonwick 
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further conveys how queer's gender and lesbian non-specificity has been 
understood by these social critiques. They have suspected that it is an 
extension, more so a reproduction, of how the identity formula 'lesbian and 
gay' has historically operated within academic and political discourses: the 
exclusion of questions of gender and lesbian sexuality. In this light, the 
identity term 'queer' has been translated as anti-feminist and a further 
affirmation of gay male sexuality and supremacy: 'queer' is "[a]nother way 
in which lesbians are being pulled back into cultural subordination to gay 
men" (Jeffreys 1993, p. 143). As it is set up, then, 'queer' is understood as 
a backlash. 
However, queer's gender and lesbian non-specificity is not the 
dissolution of gender and lesbian sexuality. It is not a reproduction of the 
identity formula 'lesbian and gay. ' For de Lauretis, the non-specificity of 
queer seeks to problematise and amplify differences within the identity 
terms 'lesbian, ' 'gay, ' and 'lesbian and gay' and reformulate sexual 
identity. Drawing upon writings of lesbians and gay men of colour, 6 de 
Lauretis' thesis is that sexual identity can no longer be understood as 
stable and unified, divorced of other markers of identity and difference (for 
example, gender, race, class, ethnicity, and nationality). Rather, sexual 
identity is always "emergent ... and thus still fuzzily defined, undercoded, 
or discursively dependent on more established forms, " that is, an 
intersection of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and nationality (de Lauretis 
1991 b, p. i). de Lauretis wants 'queer' to play on sexual identity being a 
permanent state of becoming, that is, 'emergent, ' and tease out and 
examine the ways in which sexual identity is not just a question of 
sexuality but is also one of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and nationality. 
This general understanding of lesbian and gay identity and/or the 
identity term 'queer' has featured in different ways in a number of queer 
works (Bergmann and Smith 1995; Butler 1993; Butler and Martin 1994a, 
1994b; Dorenkamp and Henke 1995a, 1995b; Garber 1992; Parker et al. 
1992; Raffo 1997; Sedgwick 1992). For example, Dorenkamp's and 
Henke's edited anthology Negotiating. Lesbian and Gay Subjects (1995b) 
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is a collection of 10 essays that were generated for and presented at the 
fifth annual Lesbian and Gay Studies Conference held over three days at 
Rutgers University, New Jersey in 1991 (Dorenkamp and Henke 1995a, 
pp. 1-3). In line with de Lauretis (1991b), Dorenkamp and Henke and their 
contributors work from the premise that lesbian and gay identity intersects 
with other non-hierarchical markers of identity and difference (for example, 
race, class, nationality, language, religion, and ability), which subverts the 
notion that it is monolithic: "while it may be possible to be a lesbian or gay 
man, it is never possible to be only a lesbian or gay man" (1995a, p. 2). In 
this light, according to Dorenkamp and Henke, "the essays in Negotiating 
Lesbian and Gay Subjects [1995b]... are in radical disagreement with one 
another. Such discord is not a bad thing, however, as it continually forces 
us to critically rethink the ways in which we negotiate lesbian and gay 
subjectivity-both for ourselves and for others" (1995a, p. 3). The 
subjects of the essays are queerly diverse, for example: Sylvia Molloy 
(1995) considers the relation between gay literary figures, particularly 
Wilde, and the construction of Latin American national (masculine) identity 
at the turn of the nineteenth century (`modernismo); Joseph A. Boone 
(1995) examines the construction of the sexual Arab 'other' in relation to 
the West's colonising ethos; and Richard Fung (1995) muses over the 
processes he went through in becoming gay and Asian, which were both 
simultaneous and distinct. 
In short, Sedgwick best captures the thrust of the identity term (as 
partly cited in the previous broad section): 
That's one of the things that 'queer' can refer to: the open mesh of 
possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances, and resonances, lapses 
and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of 
anyone's gender, of anyone's sexuality aren't made (or can't be 
made) to signify monolithically. ... A lot of the most exciting 
recent work around 'queer' spins the term outward along 
dimensions that can't be subsumed under gender and sexuality at 
all... (1993a [1993], pp. 8-9, italics included in original). 
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I would further add that 'queer' is not a cumulative list of identity 
components marked by those proverbial commas. 'Queer' is constituted 
through their convergence with and divergence from one another. 
Chapter Three 
Some Critical Citations: 
Problematising the Queer Erasure of Sociological Inquiry 
Sadly, queer theory represents an uncritical citation of its 
disciplinary and national locations: a repetition of American, 
humanities-based scholarship which actively ignores the 
history of ethnographic cultural studies, as well as the 
historical contributions of sociology and anthropology to 
investigations of sexuality and gender. 
-Ki Namaste, "'Tragic Misreadings"' (1996, p. 197) 
Introduction and'Purpose 
In a concerted effort to continue to have good faith in our ability to shift the 
grounds of belonging, I now want to focus, within the next two chapters, on 
an unproductive queer presupposition and an unproductive queer 
preoccupation, both of which have put a stranglehold on that good faith. 
However, I am not merely concerned here with their unproductiveness in 
the simplest sense, that is, precluding engagement with sociological 
inquiry. I am also interested in how their unproductiveness has 
productively constituted and demarcated the contours of queer disciplinary 
pursuits. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, I am interested in 
opening up possibilities for reengagement of that productivity. 
At this juncture, I want to problematise and rework the significance of 
an underlying presupposition that is used to legitimise the 
methodological/theoretical point of departure of the project of one of queer 
theory's queerest and thorniest thinkers: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's 
Epistemology of the Closet (1990). In particular, I want to problematise 
and rework her presupposition that 'antihomophobic terms of analysis' 
were considerably underdeveloped at the time of the writing and 
publication of her project. Her usage of antihomophobic terms of analysis 
simply, yet problematically designates a set of theoretical terms for 
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analysing sexuality and not other markers of identity/difference as well (for 
example, gender, race, and class). ' For those of us who are trained in 
flexing the muscle fibres of our sociological imagination, it comes as no 
surprise that quite the opposite is true: a fertile set of terms for analysing 
sexuality was well-cultivated by sociologists before Sedgwick even began 
to conceive her project. Nonetheless, her underlying presupposition 
analytically works to exclude, through erasure, those fertile terms from the 
parameters of her project. It is as though they never existed. 
The labour and economics of Sedgwick's underlying presupposition is 
'significant' insofar as it is symptomatic of queer theory's all-too-often, by- 
now calculable failure to acknowledge and actively engage with 
practitioners of sociology. This failure has primarily taken place through 
the conflation of Michel Foucault with social-historical constructionism. 
When this has taken place, it has operated to erase sociological social- 
historical constructionist accounts of sexuality from queer readings and 
writings, which, in turn, has acted as a fulcrum to preclude any kind of 
engagement with sociological inquiry in general. In this light, the larger 
motive driving this chapter is not to simply take issue with Sedgwick's 
underlying presupposition. It also seeks to problematise and rework the 
exclusion of sociological inquiry from queer critical engagement in general. 
Central to this erasure is the simultaneous production of queer disciplinary 
terms and practices. 
My objective, to begin with, is to explore the significance of Sedgwick's 
underlying presupposition. I will briefly sketch the outlines of her 
presupposition, examine its acute implications and consequences, and 
demonstrate how it is damagingly in line with and generative of queer 
knowledge. 
The second section will then set out to productively rework Sedgwick's 
presupposition, including its significance. This will take place by bringing 
to the forefront, through readings, a select number of essays and texts that 
have proven to be durable and notable investigations of sexuality within 
sociological social-historical constructionist quarters. They include Mary 
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McIntosh's classic and widely-cited essay "The Homosexual Role" (1968), 
which was influenced by mainstream structural-functional role theory and 
the labeling perspective, and John H. Gagnon's and William S. Simon's 
Sexual Conduct (1973b), which was influenced by symbolic interactionist 
theory. Prior to unpacking Sexual Conduct (1973b), I will be reading an 
earlier essay of Gagnon and Simon, "Introduction: Deviant Behavior and 
Sexual Deviance" (1967a), which outlines a structural-functionalist theory 
of sexuality. The primary aim of these readings is to practically do what 
queer theory has failed to do: partly acknowledge a set of sociological 
terms for analysing sexuality. In addition, these readings will demonstrate 
that well-cultivated terms for analysing sexuality pre-existed the 
conception of Epistemology of the Closet (1990). 
Please note that I intentionally and cautiously use the word 'partly. '2 
This is the case because I cannot masterfully group a set of investigations 
under the single and static heading of 'social-historical constructionism. ' 
No single compilation exists or ought to exist in the strictest sense. As 
Carole S. Vance is correct to point out, "[t]he widespread use of social 
construction as a term and as a paradigm obscures the fact that 
constructionist writers have used this term in diverse ways. ... 
The 
intellectual history of social construction is a complex one" (1998 [1989], 
pp. 162,164). For example, some social-historical constructionists have 
argued that certain aspects of sexuality are fixed (for example, desire and 
erotic interest) whilst others are not (for example, sexual identity). On the 
other hand, some have argued that every aspect of sexuality, even its 
deepest recesses, is socially constructed and historically specific. 3 
Furthermore, what right do 'I' have to make judgment on who/what ought 
to designate social-historical constructionism? A move to produce some 
grand notion of social-historical constructionism would only reproduce yet 
another version in place of queer theory's version and similarly open 
myself up to misrepresentation, suspicion, and protestation as to who/what 
constitutes social-historical constructionism. Thus, I can only make partial, 
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provisional acknowledgements here and now. I also take this issue up in 
the next chapter. 
It is fair to accept that I do not intend to create some synthetic notion 
of social-historical construction ism. It is also fair to accept that I do not 
have any right to make a final judgement on who/what constitutes social- 
historical constructionism. However, there is one significant issue of 
methodology that remains unaccounted for: why do I choose to publicise 
the aforementioned pieces? Is this a conscious decision that is politically 
wrought from the very beginning, in the sense of the politics that engulf 
disciplinary identifications? The answer is an outright 'no. ' I have chosen 
to elaborate on McIntosh's "The Homosexual Role" (1968) for three 
significant reasons. In the first instance, the timing of its publication 
coincided with homosexuals politically contesting their cultural conditions 
on both sides of the Atlantic. In the second instance, it contributed to that 
protestation theoretically within sex research and sexual theory. In the 
third instance, her reconceptualisation of homosexuality as a 'role' 
challenged sex role theory of her day. I have chosen to elaborate on 
Gagnon's and Simon's work because it highlights a theoretical tension 
between social theories of sexuality of their day. I elaborate on these 
points in the second section. 
Of course, the aforementioned sociological pieces will be given their 
own privileged discursive space for the time being. However, I loathe 
having them lie dormant for too long for the very simple, yet important 
reason that we need to move beyond sticking to our guns. What I want to 
do is conjugate a couple of theoretical lines interweaving queer theory with 
sociological inquiry in order to demonstrate that there is potential for 
disciplinary cross-fertilisation and to initially suggest how we might move in 
this direction. This will firstly involve an extended reading of Gagnon's and 
Simon's (1986) use of 'cultural sexual scripts' to conceptualise the 
production of interpersonal and intrapsychic scripted sexual behaviour (a 
revision of their earlier work). It will then briefly link with Sedgwick's (1990) 
hypothesis that a set of mutual contradictions has been central to 
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twentieth-century understandings of homo/heterosexual definition. At the 
end of making this link, I use the work of Butler (1993,1995) on the 
subject and agency to briefly highlight Gagnon's and Simon's over- 
theorisation of the social actor and to initially propose how they might 
reconsider their humanist leanings. 
Section) The Significance of ä Queer Presupposition 
i. Sedgwick's Queer Presupposition 
In laying out the methodological/theoretical trajectory of her assertive and 
unapologetic book Epistemology of the Closet (1990), Sedgwick informs 
the reader of her genuine decision not to pursue an integration of feminist 
(that is, gender-centred) and antihomophobic (that is, sexuality-centred) 
terms of analysis (pp. 14-16). Rather than explore how they might 
productively intersect, Sedgwick wants to attend to a more urgent and 
much-needed 'divergent' project: the further cultivation of antihomophobic 
terms of analysis. Indeed, according to Sedgwick, "[t]he only imperative 
that the book means to treat as categorical is the very broad one of 
pursuing an antihomophobic inquiry" (1990, p. 14). In this light, according 
to Sedgwick, the present project pursues a very different path in both its 
'subject matter and perspective' than its predecessor, Between Men 
(1985), to the extent that Between Men is a 'fusion' of feminist thought and 
antihomophobic concerns. 4 
Sedgwick legitimises her methodological/theoretical point of departure 
by arguing that antihomophobic terms of analysis are considerably 
underdeveloped (1990, p. 16). This is done by making a brief distinction 
between the disciplinary rootedness of feminist and antihomophobic terms 
of analysis. According to Sedgwick, when the disciplinary crudeness of 
antihomophobic terms of analysis is weighed up against the analytical and 
critical leverage of feminist terms of analysis, that crudeness is outweighed 
by the latter's more established, resourceful analytical and critical leverage 
('We've come a long way, baby! '). Sedgwick pressingly writes: 
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I have made this choice [to pursue an antihomophobic inquiry] 
largely because I see feminist analysis as being considerably 
more developed than ... antihomophobic analysis at present- 
theoretically, politically, and institutionally. There are more people 
doing feminist analysis, it has been being done longer, it is less 
precarious and dangerous (still precarious and dangerous 
enough), and there is by now a much more broadly usable set of 
tools available for its furtherance. This is true notwithstanding the 
extraordinary recent efflorescence of gay and lesbian studies, 
without which, as I've suggested, the present book would have 
been impossible; that flowering is young, fragile, under extreme 
threat from both within and outside academic institutions, and still 
necessarily dependent on a limited pool of paradigms and 
readings (1990, p. 16). 
However, it is worth noting that the underdevelopment of 
antihomophobic terms of analysis does not solely motivate and legitimise 
Sedgwick's decision not to pursue an integration of terms of analysis 
(1990, p. 16). Their very cultivation is radically contingent upon that 
decision as well. According to Sedgwick, the success in cultivating 
antihomophobic terms of analysis largely depends on making them a 
central interest in and of themselves and not a sentimental marginality 
giving way to other, more established disciplinary discourses. Their 
marginalisation would risk a premature development. It is not until a 
reflexive centrality has been established that antihomophobic inquirers can 
then begin the difficult, yet crucial task of widening their circumference and 
exploring their variegated depths with other disciplinary discourses. 
In light of Sedgwick's argument, we might draw the following 
conclusions, to which, in fact, she does gesture (1990, pp. 14-16). Firstly, 
antihomophobic terms of analysis are currently in the making at the time of 
the writing and publication of Epistemology of the Closet (1990) and are 
awaiting the right conditions and special care and attention needed for 
their flowering-theoretically, politically, and institutionally. Secondly, it is 
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thus her project that is pleased to make available new and productive 
antihomophobic terms of analysis. Thirdly, Epistemology of the Closet 
(1990) will be one of the starting points for other like-minded 
antihomophobic inquirers to cultivate antihomophobic terms of analysis. 
Fourthly, once a sense of belonging has been established, then the history 
of that grounding will provisionally date back to Epistemology of the Closet 
(1990). Of course, the latter conclusion will be coextensive with the 
glorification and canonisation of her heuristically powerful project. 
These renderings seem especially true if we take stock of the focal 
readings and the limited theoretical toolkit fuelling Sedgwick's project 
altogether. They consist of: 
1. Foucault's poststructuralist, social-historical constructionist 
account of sexuality, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 
(1978): "[I]n accord with Foucault's demonstration, whose 
results I will take to be axiomatic, that modern Western culture 
has placed what it calls sexuality in a more and more 
distinctively privileged relation to our most prized constructs of 
individual identity, truth, and knowledge, it becomes truer and 
truer that the language of sexuality not only intersects with but 
transforms the other languages and relations by which we 
know" (Sedgwick 1990, p. 3); 
2. Henry James' writings of male homosexual panic (1947, 
1964): "In the work of ... James, among others, male 
homosexual panic was acted out as a sometimes agonized 
sexual anesthesia that was damaging to both its male subjects 
and its female non-objects" (Sedgwick 1990, p. 188); 
3. two texts dating back to the year 1891,5 Herman Melville's 
Billy Budd, Sailor (1984) and Oscar Wilde's The Picture of 
Dorian Gray (1949): "The year 1891 is a good moment to 
which to look for a cross-section of the inaugural discourses of 
modern homo/heterosexuality.... Billy Budd and Dorian Gray 
are among the texts that have set the terms for a modern 
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homosexual identity. And in the Euro-American culture of this 
past century it has been notable that foundational texts of 
modern gay culture ... have been the 
identical texts that 
mobilized and promulgated the most potent images and 
categories for (what is now visible as) the canon of 
homophobic mastery" (Sedgwick 1990, p. 49); 
4. Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophical enterprise (1966,1968, 
1973,1979): "Nietzsche offers writing of an open, Whitmanlike 
seductiveness, some of the loveliest there is, about the joining 
of men with men, but he does so in the stubborn, perhaps 
even studied absence of any explicit generalizations, 
celebrations, analyses, reifications of these bodies as 
specifically same-sex ones" (Sedgwick 1990, p. 133); 
5. Marcel Proust's Remembrance of Things Past (1982): 
"[Remembrance of Things Past] has remained into the present 
the most vital center of the energies of gay literary high 
culture, as well as of many manifestations of modern literary 
high culture in general. It offers what seems to have been the 
definitive performance of the presiding incoherences of 
modern gay (and hence nongay) sexual specification and gay 
(and hence nongay) gender: definitive, that is, in setting up 
positions and sight lines, not in foreclosing future performance. 
.. " (Sedgwick 1990, p. 213); and, lastly, 
6. Gayle S. Rubin's widely-read essay "Thinking Sex" (1984): 
"This book will hypothesize, with Rubin, that the question of 
gender and the question of sexuality, inextricable from one 
another though they are in that each can be expressed only in 
the terms of the other, are nonetheless not the same question, 
that in twentieth-century Western culture gender and sexuality 
represent two analytic axes that may productively be imagined 
as being as distinct from one another as, say, gender and 
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class, or class and race. Distinct, that is to say, no more than 
minimally, but nonetheless usefully" (Sedgwick 1990, p. 30). 
ii. The Working of Sedgwick's Queer Presupposition 
I must admit, at this juncture, that I am drawn to Sedgwick's purposeful 
attempt to further develop antihomophobic terms of analysis. 
Furthermore, I applaud the magnetic relation that her project can 
potentially foster with another like-minded antihomophobic inquirer. I 
strongly believe that our power to survive is contingent upon us taking hold 
of and running with our talent to produce, test, and use fresh resources of 
antihomophobic terms of analysis for marking, unmarking, and remarking 
the world around us, a world that has too easily, too readily, and too often 
learned to violently mark us as 'other non-objects' for its continued 
sustenance and maintenance. This is not mere trivial play. It is deadly 
serious play born out of the sheer necessity to survive. However, despite 
her purposeful attempt, I find it somewhat disconcerting. In particular, I 
take issue with her underlying presupposition of having to work with a 
more or less bare garden. We have been closer to the development of 
antihomophobic terms of analysis than what she has us believe. To be 
more blunt, it has already happened. Where were you, Eve? 
The cultivation of terms for analysing sexuality long ago flowered 
within sociological domains, particularly through the labeling approach and 
symbolic interactionist theory (for example, Gagnon 1977; Gagnon and 
Simon 1967b, 1970,1973a, 1973b, 1986; McIntosh 1968; Plummer 1975, 
1981 b, 1982); ethnomethodology (for example, Garfinkel 1967); social- 
historical constructionism (citations to follow); and materialist approaches 
(for example, Delphy 1977; Smith 1988; Smith 1990; Wittig 1980). The 
social-historical constructionist work of Steven Epstein (1987), David 
Greenberg (1988), David Greenberg and Marcia Bystryn (1984), Stephen 
0. Murray (1984), Barbara Ponse (1978), and Jeffrey Weeks (1977,1981, 
1985,1986,1989 [1981]), in particular, have enabled that flowering to 
grow, blossom, and mature with increasing rapidity each season. Drawing 
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from the labeling approach, symbolic interactionist theory, and 
ethnomethodology and influenced by feminism and Marxism, social- 
historical constructionist perspectives formulated thoughts on the origins, 
changing form(ation)s and roles, and meanings of sexuality, particularly 
that of the 'modern' Homosexual. They also formulated thoughts on 
repression and political strategies of resistance. Broadly, social- 
constructionist perspectives challenged biological and 
transcultural/historical understandings of sexuality, particularly those put 
forth by sexologists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (for 
example, Sigmund Freud, Havelock Ellis, and Richard von Krafft-Ebing). 
Rather than asserting the naturalness of sexuality over time and across 
cultures, they argued that it is a variable construction shaped by culture, 
society, and history. This revision of sexuality is topical in the next broad 
section of the chapter. 
However, Sedgwick's underlying presupposition works to exclude, 
through erasure, these sociological terms from the parameters of her 
project. Her underlying presupposition does not simply legitimise her 
methodological/theoretical point of departure. It also acts as one of the 
discursive means by which the parameters of her project are constituted 
and demarcated. Because terms for analysing sexuality are considerably 
underdeveloped for Sedgwick, well-cultivated ones cannot possibly exist 
within the parameters of her project. The possibility of their existence is 
incompatible with the internal logic of her project. As a consequence, her 
underlying presupposition analytically erases the aforementioned 
sociological terms from the outset. 6 
iii. The Production of Queer Disciplinary Pursuits 
Perhaps I am being too pedantic, making an undue fuss of an underlying 
presupposition that seeks to legitimise the methodological/theoretical point 
of departure of one queer thinker, one queer project. It may very well be 
the case that Sedgwick's underlying presupposition can be written off as 
an inefficacious or innocuous error. The moderate critic might further 
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concede that her presupposition is simply ignorance in its purest form. 
After all, she is a literary critic and not a practitioner of sociology. We 
cannot expect her to be well-versed or even familiar with sociological 
inquiry. However, as Sedgwick is correct to point out in her very same 
project, paradoxically, ignorance cannot be understood as a 'single 
Manichean, aboriginal maw of darkness' or similarly labelled as an 
'originary, passive innocence, ' as the architectonics of the Enlightenment 
would mistakenly presuppose (1990, pp. 7-8). Rather, ignorance is 
'ignorance of a knowledge, ' with its own "material or rhetorical leverage 
required to set the terms of, and to profit some way from, " a particular flow 
of knowledge, whether that knowledge is understood as true or false 
(Sedgwick 1990, pp. 8,11 italics included in original). In other words, 
because ignorance is 'ignorance of a knowledge, ' ignorance designates a 
material and rhetorical wielding and collusion of knowledge or, rather, is 
knowledge in its constitutional and/or material effects. According to 
Sedgwick, "such ignorance effects can be harnessed, licensed, and 
regulated on a mass scale for striking enforcements, " productively 
constraining people, material conditions, meanings, and/or (non-)subject 
positions (1990, pp. 4-5,8). In this light, we might then begin to ask how 
her underlying presupposition is simultaneously structured by and 
generative of a particular flow of knowledge. Perhaps queer knowledge? 
Although Epistemology of the Closet (1990) does not make any 
explicit reference to the term 'queer' and, hence, 'queer theory, ' the timing 
of its publication and wider circulation within literary criticism and lesbian 
and gay studies at the turn of the 1990s coincided with, although by no 
means metonymically, the publication of a number of explosive queer 
works (for example, Bad Object-Choices 1991; Butler 1990; Cohen 1991; 
de Lauretis 1991a, 1991b; Fuss 1991b, 1991c). Together, these loosely-, 
yet tightly-knit works, including Epistemology of the Closet (1990), have 
broadly constituted and demarcated the disciplinary terms and practices of 
queer theory, whether or not their authors intended them to have such a 
reverberating effect in the first place. By using 'disciplinary terms and 
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practices, ' I mean, for example: who speaks as a queer theorist and for 
queer theory, who participates in conversations and to what extent, what 
constitutes its methodological/theoretical trajectory and subjects/objects of 
study, and within which intellectual arenas conversations are to take place. 
It is precisely these kinds of disciplinary terms and practices that have 
come under scrutiny from within sociological discourse. For some 
practitioners of sociology, to paraphrase the citation of Ki Namaste (1996, 
p. 197) in the epigraph, queer theory represents, in the main, an 
exclusionary textual practice of an elite few within the North American 
humanities that has repetitively refused to acknowledge and actively 
engage with contributions made by 'other' disciplinary locations to 
investigations of sexuality (for example, Epstein 1996 [1994]; Seidman 
1996a). In other words, queer theory has evolved into a tightly-knit 
conglomerate of bedfellows whose intellectual interests and pursuits have 
been primarily incestuous. Sociological inquiry, in particular, has been 
one of those 'other' disciplinary locations. Its exclusion from the 
disciplinary parameters of queer critical engagement has chiefly occurred 
through the conflation of Foucault with social-historical constructionism. 
Foucault's poststructuralist, social-historical constructionist account of 
sexuality and other writings of different, yet similar subject matter (for 
example, 1977,1978,1980,1985,1986) have had a lasting impact on 
queer critical engagement (for example, Butler 1990,1991,1993,1997b, 
1997c; Butler and Rubin 1997 [1994]; Cohen 1991; Halperin 1995; 
Sedgwick 1990). His work has enabled queer interrogators to think more 
seriously about, for instance: the horrifying and intimate relation between 
knowledge and power insofar as "knowledge is the magnetic field of 
power" (as so eloquently put by Sedgwick 1990, p. 4); the notion of 'sex' 
as a regulatory ideal whereby biological functions, desires, pleasures, 
acts, and anatomy are artificially arranged in a particular way for particular 
strategic aims within a particular cultural, social, and historical context; the 
disenchantment of libertarian politics; the constitutive and ambivalent role 
of discourse in the production of subjectivity; and the misnomer of identity 
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as a totalising construct. David M. Halperin even goes so far as to 
fanatically declare Foucault's sainthood: "I may not have worshiped 
Foucault at the time I wrote One Hundred Years of Homosexuality [1990], 
but I do worship him now. As far as I am concerned, the guy was a 
fucking saint" (1995, p. 6, italics my emphasis). Butler and Rubin make a 
similar emphatic gesture in an interview for the second special queer 
theory issue of the journal differences: 
GR: Yes. "Thinking Sex" [1984] had its roots back in 1977-78, 
and I started doing lecture versions of it in 1979. I think you 
were at one of these, at the Second Sex Conference at the 
New York Institute for the Humanities. 
JB: Right. The first time I saw a copy of Michel Foucault's The 
History of Sexuality [1978]. 
GR: Was I waving it around? 
JB: Yes. You introduced it to me. 
GR: I was really, just totally hot for that book. 
JB: Yes, you made me hot for it too... 
(laughter) (1997 [1994], pp. 77-78). 
On the surface, I do not take issue with Foucault's work having a 
lasting impact on queer theory. How can I? The impact has further 
spread and deepened sexuality as a topical concern-theoretically, 
politically, and institutionally. I do have a problem, however, when the 
impact is productively constructed with unproductive aims. To be more 
precise, I have serious reservations with queer theory's tendency to 
conflate Foucault with social-historical constructionism. Indeed, as 
Epstein has pointed out in a cautionary essay, for many thinkers of the 
queer persuasion, "the concept of social construction is assumed to have 
sprung, like Athena, fully formed from the head of Michel Foucault... " 
(1996 [1994], p. 146). I would suggest that the conflation operates as a 
reduction that excludes, through erasure, sociological social-historical 
constructionist accounts of sexuality from queer critical engagement. The 
aforementioned interview of Rubin by Butler performs this very erasure. 7 
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In response to Butler's comment that Foucault's The History of 
Sexuality, Volume 1 (1978) was a fruitful alternative to psychoanalysis for 
Rubin in "Thinking Sex" (1984), Rubin warns against the conflation of 
Foucault with social-historical constructionism (Butler and Rubin 1997 
[1994], p. 88). She takes issue with this conflation because it erases 
contributions made by other social-historical constructionists. An example 
is provided by Rubin for the reader. Rubin recounts a discussion about 
Foucault's work in which she participated on a gay studies list on the 
Internet. Within the discussion, one of the contributors cited Foucault as 
'the' originator of social-historical construction ism. Missing from the 
contributor's citation was an acknowledgement and further discussion of 
other important social-historical constructionist works. Consequently, as 
Rubin remarks, "the key roles of people like Mary McIntosh, Jeffrey 
Weeks, Kenneth Plummer, and a host of other historians, anthropologists, 
and sociologists were completely erased. . ." (Butler and Rubin 1997 
[1994], p. 88). Indeed, by citing Foucault as the originator of social- 
historical constructionism, the contributor condenses and restricts the 
empirical/theoretical field of social-historical constructionism within one 
central figure. This central figure, far from being a mere representation of 
social-historical construction ism, operates to control the very disciplinary 
terms and practices by which social-historical constructionism is 
constituted and demarcated. Subsequently, the work of other important 
social-historical constructionists is written over and erased. Rubin finds 
this disparaging because "Thinking Sex" (1984) is indebted to Weeks just 
as much as Foucault: "Weeks is one of the great under-appreciated 
figures in gay studies and the social theory of sexuality. He published the 
basic statement of social construction of homosexuality in 1977 [Coming 
Out], the year before Foucault's History of Sexuality [1978] was translated" 
(Butler and Rubin 1997 [1994], p. 88). 
However, within this very same queer context, Butler and Rubin 
paradoxically perform what Rubin warns against (1997 [19941, p. 91). 
Following Rubin's parenthetical reference to the importance of Weeks' 
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contribution to "Thinking Sex" (1984) and the key role of sociologists, 
among others, to social-historical constructionism, Butler asks Rubin to 
further explain how Foucault has shaped her thinking. However, this is not 
a simple, innocuous question. Once it is asked, it concurrently elides 
Rubin's parenthetical reference to sociologists and conflates Foucault with 
social-historical constructionism. As a result, sociological social-historical 
constructionists are erased from their queer intellectual exchange. 
Unfortunately, Rubin further reinforces this erasure by actually answering 
Butler's question. 
By erasing sociological social-historical constructionists from their 
queer exchange, I would suggest that it also acts as a fulcrum to further 
preclude engagement with sociological inquiry in general. The following 
(under)investments then ensue, which have indeed ensued over time 
within queer critical engagement: sociologists do not partially speak in the 
name of queer theory; sociological theory and practice do not in any way 
constitute queer theory's methodological/theoretical trajectory and 
subjects/objects of study; queer discussions do not move toward taking 
place within sociological domains; and the exclusion of sociological inquiry 
from queer critical engagement differentiates queer theory from other 
disciplinary discourses. There is no reading, thinking, and writing across 
and between disciplines. Therefore, on a more general level, the 
conflation of Foucault does not simply act as a fulcrum to preclude 
engagement with sociological inquiry. At the same time, it constitutes and 
demarcates the contours of queer disciplinary terms and practices. 
We can now begin to think differently and, of course, indifferently 
about Sedgwick's underlying presupposition. Indeed, we cannot write off 
Sedgwick's underlying presupposition as an inefficacious or innocuous 
error or further label it as ignorance in its purest form. The very 
obtuseness of her presupposition is increasingly significant to the degree 
that its working runs in parallel with a particular flow of queer knowledge: 
the erasure of sociological inquiry. Of course, the driving force behind 
each erasure is different. On the one hand, we have an intuition that 
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informs and structures the methodological/theoretical trajectory of a 
project and, on the other hand, the centralisation of a figure that pullulates 
the whole of social-historical constructionism. However, their labour 
economically functions the same in the end. Having said this, as I have 
just discussed, the erasure of sociological inquiry is not the only end 
product. It goes hand in hand with the production of queer disciplinary 
pursuits. This is, without question, tragic, considering sociological 
investigations of sexuality brought about a significant paradigm shift within 
sex research and sexual theory, as Epstein (1996) [1994] and Plummer 
(1992) outline in fine detail. 8 We therefore cannot assume that 
sociological contributions to investigations of sexuality are less important, 
less probing, or less refined than what has come out of queer theory over 
the years-on the contrary, to say the very least. They are just as 
important, just as probing, and just as refined, commanding and deserving 
recognition for their explosive potential to mark, unmark, and remark the 
world around us. 
Sectiön'II: Some Critical Citations 
i. McIntosh: The `Homosexual Role' 
McIntosh's "The Homosexual Role" (1968) is one of those classic pieces 
of work that somehow exceeds the problematics that it engenders or is 
engendered by. However, my usage of 'exceed' here does not in any way 
suggest that the essay's problematics are insignificant or not worthy of 
revision. Her essay has indeed been carefully and critically examined 
within sociological discourse: "it raises many more questions than it 
resolves" (Plummer 1981a, p. 23). The chief of these problematics is the 
narrow theoretical optic through which it is calibrated (Plummer 1981 a, p. 
23; Weeks 1989 [1981], p. 98). In its purposive effort to reconceptualise 
homosexuality as a 'role' through the lens of mainstream structural- 
functional role theory and the labeling perspective, particularly that of 
Howard S. Becker (1966) and Erving Goffman (1963), the essay both 
confirms and refutes the by-now, solidly established flaws of her usage of 
the concept of role, namely: "reification, over-determination, and 
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consensual absolutism" (Plummer 1981a, p. 23). In other words, McIntosh 
falls prey to granting the role god-like agency whereby it is presumed to 
unilaterally act on and control the social actor. It is as though the social 
actor is a passive recipient who somehow always freely agrees to take on 
some pre-ordained cultural law. No room is made available in her essay 
to consider the significant and consequential gap between the role and the 
social actor who fails to assume it. There are additional problematics: the 
existence of a homosexual role in late seventeenth-century England is 
contestable, definitions of sexuality are indicatively male, lesbianism is 
overshadowed by male homosexuality, and there is no substantial 
discussion about more complex subcultural roles (Faraday 1981, p. 115; 
Marshall 1981, pp. 137-39; Plummer 1981a, pp. 23-24; Weeks 1981, p. 
82). However, to dwell on these problematics, no matter how serious they 
may be, is to overlook the theoretical and political significance of the 
essay. It is here where my usage of 'exceed' becomes clearer. 
At the time of the publication of "The Homosexual Role, " 1968, which I 
alluded to in the previous section, biologically-determined notions of 
sexuality dominated medical, legal, literary, and psychological discourses 
on the subject (D'Emilio 1983, pp. 129-48; Weeks 1977, pp. 156-67). In 
the main, sexuality was conceptualised as an essential and static attribute 
that a person either 'had' or 'really was, ' across cultural, social, and 
historical contexts. Within this framework, the homosexual was 
conceptualised as a perverse, subnormal human. Homosexuality was a 
sickness that threatened the moral fabric and reproductive function of the 
'family. ' Although these views pervaded popular common sense, as well 
as moral and legal imperatives and crusades, they did not completely 
control homosexuality's conceptualisation. 
At this time, on both sides of the Atlantic, there was a very public, very 
visible political contest of homosexual definition (D'Emilio 1983, pp. 223- 
39; Duberman 1993, pp. 139-212; Weeks 1977, pp. 168-189). 
Homosexuals were strategically organising around the category in order to 
shift its conceptualisation from one of pathology to one of social legitimacy 
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(Of course, this organising was more often fraught with conflicting interests 
and discourses on homosexuality than with solidarity and agreement. ). ° 
This protestation culminated into events like the Stonewall Riots of June 
1969 in Greenwich Village of New York City, when and where lesbians, 
gays, drag queens, transsexuals, transvestites, and prohomosexuals 
rioted against institutionalised homophobia and proclaimed gay was 'good' 
for five days. McIntosh theoretically contributed to this protestation within 
sex research and sexual theory. She wild(e)ly inaugurated the notion that 
sexuality, particularly homosexuality, is not biologically determined. 
Rather, it is of social concern and inquiry and cannot be divorced from its 
cultural, social, and historical conditions. This timely and significant 
suggestion gave rise to a great paradigm shift for many practitioners within 
sex research and sexual theory and ushered in the beginnings of what 
would become more commonly known as social-historical constructionism, 
in its various forms, over time. 10 It is therefore precisely to this extent that 
her essay by far exceeds the problematics that it engenders or is 
engendered by. However, biologically-determined notions of sexuality did 
not lose their diacritical potential to produce and govern discourses on 
sexuality. On the contrary, they continued and have continued to exert 
discursive authority, even within quarters of social-historical 
constructionism (Saghir and Robins 1973; Spada 1979; Whitam 1977). 
However, what was different was that they could no longer claim 
propriodescriptive authority. 
However, Mcintosh's essay does not exceed its problematics solely 
because it prompted a theoretical shift for practitioners within sex research 
and sexual theory. It was also an important breakthrough within 
mainstream structural-functional role theory, which has received very little 
recognition. In particular, her reconceptualisation of homosexuality as a 
role inadvertently challenged sex role theory. As R. W. Connell outlines, 
sex role theory throughout the 1960s was primarily an 'analysis of a 
normative standard case' (1987, p. 51). " The normative standard case 
designates the abstract and conventional heterosexist nuclear family and 
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its sexual division of labour and 2.4 children. According to Connell, it was 
standard because it typified the majority of people's lives. It was 
normative because both theorists and laypeople presumed that it was the 
"proper (or socially functional or biologically appropriate) way to live" 
(Connell 1987, p. 51). Within this framework, homosexuality was 
understood as a failure to perform a role, that is, the normative standard 
case. However, if homosexuality is understood as a role, as McIntosh 
conceptualised it, then homosexuality cannot be a failure to perform a role. 
That failure is a role that the homosexual is expected to perform in order to 
be read as a 'homosexual. ' In this sense, the homosexual does perform a 
role. It is only through the acting out of his/her role, that is, the failure to 
perform the normative standard case, that the homosexual produces the 
semblance and misnomer that he/she fails to perform a role at all. 
In brief, McIntosh takes issue with the formulation of homosexuality as 
a 'condition. ' Using both mainstream structural-functional role theory and 
the labeling perspective, McIntosh argues that this formulation is a 
misnomer. Rather, homosexuality should be understood as a 'role, ' 
whose labeling of people as deviant is a social process linked to 
mechanisms of social control. The social act of labeling serves to: (1) 
make a distinction between appropriate and misappropriate behaviour and 
(2) segregate deviants/deviance from the rest of 'normal' society. 
According to McIntosh, the existence of a specialised homosexual role, 
particularly a Eurocentric, male one, can be traced to late seventeenth- 
century England. However, its existence within this particular cultural and 
historical context cannot be read as a final product of that context. The 
role's cultural and historical manifestations are highly volatile chiefly 
insofar as they have been very different across cultural and historical 
contexts. 
However, it is worth noting, before I dive into Mclntosh's essay, that 
her usage of the labeling perspective is quite distinct from labeling theory, 
which Plummer briefly outlines (in relation to deviants/deviance and the 
social act of labeling) (1981a, pp. 19-25). Both fall under the broad 
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heading of the 'labeling approach' within sociological theory, but they are 
quite distinct from one another. On the one hand, labeling theory usually 
sets up two generalised propositions and tests their validity against a few 
examples in order to demonstrate how they are problematical (for 
example, Farrell and Hardin 1974; Harry and DeVall 1978; Steffensmeier 
and Steffensmeier 1974; Tanner 1978; Weinberg and Williams 1974). 
Two propositions frequently put to the test are: 
1. [d]eviant labels are applied (in formal settings, overtly) without 
regard to (or independent of) the behaviours or acts of those 
labelled [whereby labeling is conceptualised as an 
independent variable] [and] 
2. [l]abeling produces (stabilizes or amplifies) deviants and 
deviant behaviour [whereby labeling is conceptualised as a 
dependent variable] (Plummer 1981 a, p. 20). 
On the other hand, the labeling perspective neither puts a number of 
generalised propositions to the test nor considers itself as some 'grand 
theory. ' Rather, the labeling perspective "seeks to establish new 
questions and problems of wider significance" (for example, in addition to 
McIntosh 1968, Gagnon 1977; Gagnon and Simon 1967a, 1970,1973b) 
(Plummer 1981a, p. 23). On this basis, the labeling perspective might ask: 
1. [w]hat is the nature of deviant labels? 
2. [h]ow do they arise? 
3. [u]nder what conditions do the labels become attached to 
conduct? and 
4. [w]hat are the consequence of such labelling-both for the 
individual and the wider society (Plummer 1981 a, p. 20)? 
McIntosh begins her essay by critiquing the then-commonly accepted 
view of homosexuality as a 'condition' (1968, pp. 182-83). Her usage of 
condition designates the broad view of 'scientists' and 'laymen' who 
understand homosexuality as an essential and defining characteristic that 
either a person 'possesses' or 'just is, ' "in the way that birthplace or 
deformity might characterize [him/her]" (McIntosh 1968, p. 182). McIntosh 
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does not specifically name or provide the reader with a general picture of 
who these scientists and laymen are, but she does examine some of their 
formulations in order to point out their deficiencies. There are two main 
ones that she focuses on. The first is the view of homosexuality as a 
condition that a person either has or does not have. The second is the 
view of homosexuality as a condition that is either innate or acquired. 
In the first view, the human species is understood to be divided into 
two distinct kinds of people: heterosexuals and homosexuals (McIntosh 
1968, p. 182). There is no grey area between this division. A person is 
either one or the other. However, according to McIntosh, some scientists 
who hold this view also acknowledge a paradox. There are people who 
they would not identify as homosexual but who nonetheless exhibit 
homosexual desires and/or behaviour. For McIntosh, this 
acknowledgement exposes the limits of their conceptualisation and can 
act as a critical resource to open up and rearticulate a set of terms. 
However, these scientists minimise or elide the significance of their 
acknowledgement and reinforce their conceptualisation by agonising over 
how to read a homosexual. McIntosh maintains that the same is true of 
laypeople: "Laypeople 
... discuss whether a certain person is 'queer' in 
much the same way as they might question whether a certain pain 
indicated cancer" (1968, p. 182). Further, according to McIntosh, 
laypeople usually consult scientists for the answer, which, in turn, 
reinforces the epistemological authority of such experts for producing 
discourses on sexuality. 
The second view is a question of etiology (McIntosh 1968, p. 183). Is 
homosexuality a condition that is determined from the very beginning 
(read: innate) or is it one that a person contracts, like the flu, and cannot 
shake off (read: acquired)? In the first instance, homosexuality is 
understood as a metaphysical substance whereby the person and 
homosexuality are one and the same thing. In other words, the 
homosexual is a self-identical being. In the second instance, 
homosexuality is understood as a sort of airborne condition whereby the 
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person and homosexuality are, at first, independent of each other but then 
become one and the same thing through the person contracting his/her 
homosexuality. According to McIntosh, the major research task for 
scientists has been to identify a sample of homosexuals and to test 
whether their condition is either innate or acquired. However, the 
evidence has been contradictory and has failed to deliver a decisive 
answer: "[A]fter a long history of such studies, the results are sadly 
inconclusive and the answer is still as much a matter of opinion as it was 
when Havelock Ellis published Sexual Inversion [1908] seventy years ago" 
(McIntosh 1968, p. 183). McIntosh argues that this shortfall is not an issue 
of crude methodology or inadequate data. Rather, it is an issue of 
interrogation: "the wrong question has been asked" (McIntosh 1968, p. 
183). However, McIntosh does not clarify with the reader what question 
ought to be asked or, at the very least, what type of question ought to be 
asked. 
Although McIntosh does not subscribe to the notion that 
homosexuality is a condition, she does find it useful as a 'possible object 
of study' (1968, p. 183). In particular, she is interested in how it socially 
operates. She wants to move towards a more social analysis of 
homosexuality. 
For McIntosh, the formulation of homosexuality as a condition largely 
functions as "a form of social control in a society in which homosexuality is 
condemned" (McIntosh 1968, p. 183). In other words, the formulation 
does not merely report on the nature of homosexuality for the mere sake 
of reporting and intelligence sharing, but largely acts as a vehicle to 
regulate a group of people who are despised and labelled as 'deviant. ' It 
is precisely in this sense for McIntosh that homosexuality is not a static 
condition of the person but is a social phenomenon from the very 
beginning. 
McIntosh chooses to focus on the social act of labeling of people as 
deviant and how it operates as a 'mechanism of social control' (1968, pp. 
183-84). According to McIntosh, the social act of labeling (1) makes a 
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distinction between permissible and impermissible behaviour and (2) 
segregates deviants from the law-abiding. In the first instance, labeling 
sets limits on what constitutes normal and abnormal behaviour, which 
enables normal and abnormal behaviour to be policed. As a result, any 
movement towards or into abnormal behaviour can be read as 
transgressive/transgression and enforce all the necessary penalties that 
come with that movement in order to control it. In the second instance, 
labeling contains deviants within a recognisable group, which keeps the 
law-abiding free from any contamination. 
Because homosexuality is a social phenomenon for McIntosh, she 
proposes that it is more appropriate and useful to conceptualise it as a 
'role' (1968, p. 184). Her usage of 'role' should not be understood as 
characterising a particular pattern of sexual behaviour. As McIntosh 
pointed out earlier in her critique, patterns of sexual behaviour do not 
neatly fall into a set of dichotomised roles. If the concept of role did 
characterise a twofold pattern of sexual behaviour, then "the idea of a role 
would be no more useful than that of a condition" (McIntosh 1968, p. 184). 
Rather, it should be understood as a 'set of expectations. ' According to 
McIntosh, if the concept of role is understood in this way, then it can be 
dichotomised into that of a homosexual and heterosexual role. McIntosh 
outlines some expectations of the modern, Western homosexual role 
(expectations of both homosexuals and nonhomosexuals): 
1. a homosexual will be exclusively or very predominantly 
homosexual in his feelings and behavior; 
2. he will be effeminate in manner, personality, or preferred 
sexual activity; 
3. sexuality will play a part of some kind in all his relations with 
other men; and 
4. he will be attracted to boys and very young men and probably 
willing to seduce them (1968, pp. 184-85). 
According to McIntosh, a homosexual role has not always existed 
(1968, pp. 187-88). For example, McIntosh briefly unfolds a time in 
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England, the medieval period, where and when homosexual behaviour, 
later referred to as 'sodomy, ' was being rooted out among churchmen. 
The behaviour of these churchmen was not understood, by and in the 
name of the law, as that of homosexuals. It was simply understood as 
sexual acts between men. There was no conscious identity attached to 
those acts or even the conceptualisation of sexual identity in its own right. 
As a result, these churchmen were not being punished because they were 
homosexuals. They were being punished for their 'indecent' acts. 
According to McIntosh, it is not until the end of the seventeenth-century in 
England that a specialised homosexual role can be traced. Historical 
evidence suggests that a 'rudimentary homosexual subculture' existed at 
this time in taverns and 'houses of resort, ' primarily in London. 
Homosexuals of this period were extremely effeminate in mannerisms and 
character, and homosexuality and transvestism were considered relatively 
the same thing. Referents to homosexuals, used by homosexuals, 
reinforced their effeminacy: 'Molly, ' 'Nancy-boy, ' and 'Madge-cull. ' 
Homosexuals were also expected to be discrete about their sexual liaisons 
and relations. McIntosh quotes a writer of 1729 who captured the 
homosexual role of this period: 
They also have their Walks and Appointments, to meet and pick 
up one another, and their particular Houses of Resort to go to, 
because they dare not trust themselves in an open Tavern. About 
twenty of these sort of Houses have been discovered, besides the 
Nocturnal Assemblies of great numbers of the like vile Persons, 
what they call the Markets.... 
It would be a pretty scene to behold them in their clubs and 
cabals, how they assume the air and affect the name of Madam or 
Miss, Betty or Molly, with a chuck under the chin, an "Oh, you bold 
pullet, I'll break your eggs, " and then frisk and walk away (1968, p. 
188, italics included in original). 
Some Critical Citations 91 
For McIntosh, the writer confirms that a recognisable homosexual role was 
established in England by 1729. However, according to McIntosh, the 
homosexual role evolved into a very different cultural manifestation by the 
nineteenth-century. Extreme effeminacy was no longer the fashion of the 
moment. Homosexuals were predominantly masculine in mannerisms and 
character, and homosexuality and transvestism were quite distinct from 
one another. Homosexuals were also more open about their sexual 
practices. 
It should be quite evident by now that McIntosh is pointing out the 
cultural and historical contingency of the homosexual role. The 
homosexual role, for McIntosh, is just as much a product of culture and 
history as it is of social processes: 
1. historical contingency: 
prior to the late seventeenth-century, only homosexual acts 
existed in England; 
during the late seventeenth-century, the existence of a 
homosexual role can be traced; and 
during the nineteenth-century, the homosexual role in England 
evolved into a different cultural manifestation 
and 
2. cultural contingency: 
taverns and 'houses of resort' were important definitional sites 
for the late seventeenth-century homosexual role in 
England; 
homosexuals of late seventeenth-century England were 
extremely effeminate in mannerisms and character, linked 
with transvestites, and discrete about sexual liaisons; 
referents to homosexuals during late seventeenth-century 
England reinforced their effeminacy: 'Molly, ' 'Nancy-boy, ' 
and 'Madge-cull'; and 
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homosexuals of nineteenth-century England were quite 
different from those of the late seventeenth-century: 
masculine in mannerisms and character, distinct from 
transvestites, and open about sexual practices. 
However, the homosexual role is not an end product of culture and history 
for McIntosh. As her account of the homosexual role in England 
demonstrates, it is a variable cultural and historical product. In other 
words, the homosexual role does not remain the same across cultural and 
historical contexts. She further evidences the role's variability by 
contextualising it within different cultures and historical periods, for 
example: the passive homosexual and active male partner in the ancient 
Middle East, boy-man sexual relations in the Aranda of Central Australia, 
and the berdache of the Mohave Indians in California and Arizona 
(McIntosh 1968, pp. 185-87). In this light, if there is one thread that holds 
the homosexual role together for McIntosh, then it is the notion that it is 
dependent upon its cultural and historical contexts. However, having said 
this, it is precisely this thread that threatens to pull the role apart. 
ii. Gagnon and Simon: 
Social Structure, Norms, Scripts, and Sexual Behaviour 
Whereas McIntosh distances herself from exploring the relation between 
the homosexual role and behaviour ("Homosexual behaviour should be 
studied independently of social roles, if the connection between the two is 
to be revealed" (1968, p. 189)), Gagnon and Simon put the study of sexual 
behaviour at the centre of their work on sexuality. This does not suggest 
that Gagnon and Simon are both one of those behaviourists who were 
dreaded by many sociologists of their time. Rather, their concern with 
sexual behaviour is one of social significance and inquiry from the very 
beginning. To begin to study sexual behaviour, for Gagnon and Simon, is 
to begin to study the dynamic relationship between sexual behaviour and 
social structure, norms, and (non)conformity, including the role of the 
social actor within that relationship. 
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In their earlier essay "Introduction: Deviant Behavior and Sexual 
Deviance" (1967a), Gagnon and Simon focus on the relationship between 
sexual behaviour and social structure, norms, and (non)conformity. 
Largely absent from the essay is a sustained examination of the role of the 
social actor within that relationship. In this sense, the essay leans towards 
a more structural-functionalist theory of sexuality rather than a symbolic 
interactionist one. It is not until several years later that they examine the 
social actor's role. 
From the start, for Gagnon and Simon, the source of a particular form 
of sexual behaviour is not to be found in the sexual behaviour itself 
(1967a, pp. 1-3). Sexual behaviour is more than just a set of acts that 
exhaustively describe what people do and do not do sexually. Rather, its 
source is to be found in the social structure of society whereby different 
forms of collective norms produce and govern sexual behaviour, whether 
or not they are shared by everyone who comprises collective life. 
Collective norms can be either institutional or norms of a populace, for 
example. This understanding of sexual behaviour suggests that (1) the 
relation between sexual behaviour and collective norms is not a static one 
but is a dynamic process and (2) constraint is central to the production and 
governance of sexual behaviour. Furthermore, the centrality of constraint 
suggests that we can anticipate a violation of collective norms. This 
introduces a split in sexual behaviour: appropriate and deviant sexual 
behaviour. In this sense, for Gagnon and Simon, collective norms do not 
simply produce and govern what is considered appropriate sexual 
behaviour. They also produce and govern the sexual behaviour of people 
who do not conform to them. Thus, according to Gagnon and Simon, an 
examination of sexual behaviour that conforms to the collective norms of a 
social structure would be totally incomplete and premature without a 
further examination of sexual behaviour that does not conform to those 
norms. The same is true of the inverse. 
In this light, for Gagnon and Simon, deviant sexual behaviour is not 
intrinsically deviant (1967a, pp. 1-3). Because deviant sexual behaviour is 
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the product of a dynamic process between sexual behaviour and collective 
norms and there have been differences between and within social 
structures as to what counts as deviant sexual behaviour, there is no 
universal basis to deviant sexual behaviour. According to Gagnon and 
Simon, it is usually formal institutional norms, such as those laid down by 
juridical structures, that are empowered to formally sanction what is and is 
not considered deviant sexual behaviour, although they do frequently work 
informally and covertly. However, once a particular form of sexual 
behaviour is labelled as deviant by institutional norms and a person 
pursues "a social career as a [sexual] deviant, " that sexual behaviour is 
more likely to be shaped by the norms of a social structure that embraces 
it (for example, the relation between homosexuals and the homosexual 
community) (Gagnon and Simon 1967a, pp. 2-3). 
According to Gagnon and Simon, the defining of deviant sexual 
behaviour is not simply the product of institutional norms set by juridical 
structures (1967a, pp. 4-7). It is more complex. It reflects the correlation 
between institutional norms, mores, and patterns of sexual behaviour. 
'Mores, ' for Gagnon and Simon, designate "shared and internalised norms 
of a populace" (1967a, p. 4). There is usually a high correlation of these 
norms within a social structure that is 'normatively integrated, ' that is, 
norms are not significantly at odds with each other and most people fulfil 
them individually and collectively. The same can be true for a social 
structure that is not significantly normatively integrated but strongly agrees 
on what constitutes deviant sexual behaviour. Gagnon and Simon cite 
incestuous behaviour within modern Western society as an example. 
Institutional norms, through juridical structures, vehemently condemn and 
sanction the suppression of incestuous sexual behaviour. Just as much 
as institutional norms oppose and seek to root out incestuous sexual 
behaviour, most people socially disapprove of it, both individually and 
collectively. Furthermore, only a relative minority participates in 
incestuous sexual behaviour. According to Gagnon and Simon, the same 
is true of rape and the sexual abuse of children. However, having said 
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this, the degree and scale of minorities who commit these sexual 
behaviours vary. 
Whilst there are forms of deviant sexual behaviour that reflect a 
relatively high correlation between institutional norms, mores, and patterns 
of sexual behaviour, there are ones for which that correlation is not as high 
(Gagnon and Simon 1967a, pp. 4-5). Gagnon and Simon cite 
masturbation, premarital coitus, and heterosexual mouth-genital contact 
within modern Western society as examples. For example, at the time of 
writing their essay, masturbation was not considered sexually deviant by 
institutional norms (at least masturbation that was singularly explored 
within the confines of private spaces). There were no specific laws that 
formally prohibited masturbation within private spaces. Furthermore, 
masturbation was central to males' sexual development prior to marriage 
and engaged, on average, by two-thirds of females in the United States. 
However, at the same time, it was formally damned and prohibited as a 
selfish act against nature by far-right religious collectives, such as the 
Catholic Church, and generally viewed by many people as sexually 
deviant. 
There are also forms of deviant sexual behaviour that reflect a high 
correlation but are not entirely suppressed like incestuous behaviour 
because of their perseverance (Gagnon and Simon 1967a, pp. 5-6). As a 
consequence, they can only be governed by norm-enforcing agencies. 
Gagnon and Simon refer here to homosexual behaviour and prostitution 
within modern Western society. For example, at the time of writing their 
essay, homosexual behaviour was formally and strongly defined as 
deviant by institutional norms and mores. Furthermore, only a relative 
minority participated in homosexual behaviour. However, because a 
sizeable minority participated in homosexual behaviour, that minority acted 
as a constraint: "relatively large numbers of persons engaging in such 
deviant behavior [was] ... sufficient to constrain norm-enforcing agencies 
to attempt to regulate either the deviant behaviour or the deviant 
themselves rather than attempting to suppress it or them entirely" (Gagnon 
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and Simon 1967a, p. 6). However, it is debatable that these forms of 
deviant sexual behaviour were not suppressed simply because a sizeable 
minority participated in them. Would incestuous behaviour have been 
simply regulated if a sizeable minority participated in it? Gagnon and 
Simon do not entertain this obvious point. 
According to Gagnon and Simon, the degree of correlation between 
norms relies on different variables (1967a, pp. 6-7). Unfortunately and 
prematurely, Gagnon and Simon only cite and elaborate on the impact of 
urbanisation within modern Western society. For example, urban areas 
are more likely to offer anonymity than rural ones, which enables more 
people to pursue deviant sexual behaviour with more ease. Urban areas 
are also more likely than rural ones to accommodate and facilitate social 
structures that support deviant sexual behaviour. Furthermore, deviant 
sexual behaviour in urban areas is more likely to be controlled by 
institutional norms than by mores, whereas the inverse is more likely to be 
true in rural areas. This may be due to the social nature of urban areas: it 
is difficult to express a consensual opinion, interpersonal involvement is 
usually impersonal, and heterogeneity is usually more valued than 
homogeneity. However, this does not suggest that urban communities are 
the source and cause of deviant sexual behaviour or that deviant sexual 
behaviour does not exist or persist within rural ones. Rather, it suggests 
that a social setting will have an impact on the degree of correlation 
between institutional norms, mores, and patterns of sexual behaviour for 
defining deviant sexual behaviour. 
It should be quite evident by now that deviant sexual behaviour does 
not designate a homogenous collectivity of people. The variable 
correlation between norms is evidence that it can be differentiated. There 
are three 'rough categories' for Gagnon and Simon (1967a, pp. 8-11). 
Their rough categories do not suggest that deviant sexual behaviour can 
be homogeneously subdivided. Rather, they relate to "the social 
dimensions of the activity itself, " that is, they are a social mapping of how 
deviant sexual behaviour operates within a particular social structure 
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(Gagnon and Simon 1967a, p. 8). This social mapping is largely 
contingent upon the correlation between institutional norms, mores, and 
patterns of sexual behaviour, which I just discussed. Gagnon's and 
Simon's three rough categories include: 'normal sexual deviance, ' 
'pathological sexual deviance, ' and 'socially-structured sexual deviance. ' 
Normal deviant sexual behaviour usually corresponds to the second 
correlation between norms: it is generally frowned upon by institutional 
norms and mores but practiced by a relatively high frequency of people 
who are rarely formally punished for their behaviour (Gagnon and Simon 
1967a, pp. 8-9). Formal punishments are rarely invoked because it serves 
a 'socially useful purpose, ' articulating "with more fully legitimate 
expressions of sexuality" (Gagnon and Simon 1967a, p. 8). It is in these 
respects that normal deviant sexual behaviour is 'normal. ' It should 
therefore be clear, from my previous discussion, that masturbation, 
premarital coitus, and heterosexual mouth-genital contact fall within this 
category. For example, at the time of writing their essay, premarital coitus 
was a legal offence and generally met with social disapproval by the 
populace. However, a relatively high frequency of males and females in 
the United States, approximately over half, participated in premarital coitus 
without any formal punishments invoked. Formal punishments were rarely 
invoked because pre-marital coitus functioned as "a [natural] process of 
progressive intimacy and emotional evolvement that appear[ed] to be part 
of generating the conditions for marriage" (Gagnon and Simon 1967a, p. 
8). 
There is one additional characteristic of normal deviant sexual 
behaviour: no social structures are linked to it (Gagnon and Simon 1967a, 
p. 8). It is not generated by or does not generate any kind of social 
structure that recruits, organises, and supports it. There are no 
communities of masturbators, people engaging in pre-marital coitus, and 
people engaging in heterosexual mouth-genital contact. However, as just 
discussed, normal deviant sexual behaviour does articulate with legitimate 
forms of sexual behaviour that are linked to social structures. 
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Gagnon and Simon understand pathological deviant sexual behaviour 
as a form of deviant sexual behaviour that "is linked to the contingencies 
of ... [the pathological deviant's] biography rather than 
those of social 
structure" (1967a, p. 9). Gagnon and Simon cite incest, the sexual abuse 
of children, voyeurism, and exhibitionism as examples. 'Biography' 
designates learned responses rooted in the pathological deviant's family 
or personality. It is here where Gagnon and Simon lean towards a 
psychological analysis rather than a social one. However, this does not 
suggest that pathological deviant sexual behaviour does not have any 
social significance for Gagnon and Simon. As previously discussed, 
incest and the sexual abuse of children are linked to institutional norms, 
mores, and patterns of sexual behaviour. Indeed, Gagnon and Simon 
maintain that the correlation between these norms is high for incest and 
the sexual abuse of children: institutional norms and mores strongly 
oppose and seek to suppress them, and a relatively small minority 
participates in them. In addition, like normal deviant sexual behaviour, 
Gagnon and Simon maintain that pathological deviant sexual behaviour is 
not generated by or does not generate any kind of specific social 
structures. However, this is debatable today. For example, the Internet 
has largely facilitated and harboured the generation of social structures for 
child paedophile rings and pornography. 
Gagnon and Simon do not specifically name their third rough category, 
but it can be referred to as 'socially-structured deviant sexual behaviour' 
(1 967a, pp. 9-11). Socially-structured deviant sexual behaviour usually 
corresponds to the third correlation between norms: there is a high 
correlation between institutional norms, mores, and patterns of sexual 
behaviour; however, it is governed rather than thoroughly suppressed 
because of its sheer perseverance. As a consequence, it gives rise to and 
is partially shaped by its own social structures. It is precisely this feature 
that differentiates it from Gagnon's and Simon's other rough categories of 
deviant sexual behaviour. Its social structures also enable norm-enforcing 
agencies to keep it under control and in check. It should therefore be 
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evident that homosexual behaviour' and prostitution fall within this 
category. Again, let us turn to homosexuality as an example. According 
to Gagnon and Simon, at the time of writing their essay, male homosexual 
behaviour was closely linked to the 'homosexual community' and its 
institutions of bars/discos, baths, homophile political organisations, and 
underground publications. This social structure not only shaped male 
homosexual behaviour but also enabled the police to contain and monitor 
it so that the general populace was not contaminated. 
I remarked earlier that Gagnon and Simon largely fail to examine the 
role of the social actor within the relationship between sexual behaviour 
and social structure, norms, and (non)conformity. The essay outlines a 
structural-functionalist theory of sexuality-a macroscopic approach. It is 
not until the publication of Sexual Conduct in 1973 that they examine the 
role of the social actor in greater detail. However, it becomes so central to 
their work that they abandon examining it within the relationship between 
sexual behaviour and social structure, norms, and (non)conformity and 
solely focus on its relationship with sexual behaviour. This is done 
through their concept of the 'sexual script, ' which was primarily influenced 
by symbolic interactionist theory-a microscopic approach. There is no 
cross-fertilisation between the two approaches, which explores how they 
might productively intersect. Rather, they sit on their own. In fact, the 
sexual script primarily remained a permanent feature of their subsequent 
work (for example, Gagnon 1977; Gagnon and Simon 1973a, 1973b, 
1987a, 1987b; Simon 1996). In this light, the sexual script marks a 
significant theoretical shift for Gagnon and Simon. 
Symbolic interactionist theory is largely the product of the Chicago 
School (The University of Chicago) of the 1920s (Plummer 1975, pp. 10- 
11; Plummer 1982, p. 224). It emerged as a dominant strand of 
sociological theory through the pragmatist/formalist thought of John 
Dewey (1925) and George Herbert Mead (1934) and the ethnographic 
studies of urban areas of Ernest W. Burgess and Robert E. Park (1921, 
1925 [with Roderick D. McKenzie]) and Ellsworth Faris (1955,1967). In 
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the main, symbolic interactionist theory preoccupies itself with the relation 
between human social interaction and symbolic meaning. It is argued that 
human social interaction is not simply a set of actions between two or 
more people or groups of people. It has significant symbolic meanings for 
symbolic interactionists. People act towards each other according to the 
symbolic meanings that they attribute to each other. For example, if I 
come running up to you with two closed fists hovering between us, then 
you will probably either run away or challenge me. Here, my gestures 
symbolise a certain meaning for you, you then interpret and give meaning 
to them, and you then finally act on the basis of that interpretation and 
meaning. Of course, the context of the social interaction will influence 
what symbolic meaning you attribute to my gestures and how you interpret 
and react to them. It may very well be the case that we are good friends 
and I am being jovial with you. In this case, my gestures will symbolise a 
different meaning for you, and you will interpret, define, and react to them 
differently. Having said this, people do not only act towards each other 
according to the symbolic meanings gestures have. Demeanour, 
language, and symbols (that is, letters and characters and their 
combinations) also have symbolic meanings. Further, this example of 
human social interaction suggests that symbolic meanings are unstable 
and uncertain and a product of negotiation. In this sense, then, symbolic 
meanings are not a by-product of human social interaction. They arise 
within human social interaction. 
According to Gagnon and Simon, the relationship between sexual 
behaviour and the social actor is contingent upon the 'sexual script' 
(1973b, p. 19). People do not sexually behave towards each other 
spontaneously, that is, sexual behaviour does not naturally occur. Rather, 
people sexually behave towards each other according to the symbolic 
meanings that they have for each other. Symbolic meanings arise from 
sexual scripts that are learned through primary and secondary 
socialisation. The sexual script designates a conventional prescription 
that "defines the situation, names the actors, and plots the behaviour" as 
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sexual in a particular way (Gagnon and Simon1973b, p. 19). It is not a 
static product for Gagnon and Simon, but, rather, a dynamic one: "[Sexual] 
[s]cripts are involved in learning the meaning of internal states, organizing 
the sequences of specifically sexual acts, decoding novel situations, 
setting the limits of sexual responses, and linking meanings from 
nonsexual aspects of life to specifically sexual experience" (1973b, p. 19). 
Gagnon and Simon maintain that people are highly unlikely to sexually 
behave towards each other in the absence of a sexual script (1973b, pp. 
19-20). For example, combining the sexually-charged elements of erotic 
desire, privacy, and an exceedingly attractive person is not necessarily 
enough to illicit sexual behaviour between people. In order for any degree 
of sexual behaviour to occur, these elements must be part of a sexual 
script that is relatively shared among its participants. Gagnon and Simon 
ask the reader to imagine the following scenario as an example (1973b, p. 
20). 
Take a run-of-the-mill middle class man (representational politics set 
aside, please), cut him off from his usual social setting, and situate him in 
a relatively unknown, private hotel for business purposes. Additionally, 
endow him with an appetite for sex. After a long day of business pursuits 
with his clients, he returns to his hotel late at night. Upon fumbling for his 
keys to open the door to his room, he notices the silhouette of a relatively 
attractive, nearly naked female further down the corridor. Gagnon and 
Simon maintain that his initial reaction to the female most likely will not be 
sexual. Indeed, for the more paranoid man, he probably will look around 
for signs that his wife is setting him up and seek refuge in his room. For 
the less paranoid man, he probably will seek refuge in his room with 
embarrassment. After seeking refuge in his room, his next set of actions 
probably will not be sexual again. He might return to the corridor to make 
sure he is on the correct floor and in the correct room. He might also 
telephone or visit the front desk in order to establish her identity and 
business. According to Gagnon and Simon, the mere fact that the female 
is attractive and naked does not guarantee that sexual behaviour will 
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occur. The middle class man does not necessarily behave sexually 
because a sexual script does not exist, which identifies both the female 
and the encounter as sexual. If such a sexual script did exist, then the 
silhouette of the female probably would have elicited sexual arousal and 
activity. 
There are 'two major dimensions' to sexual scripts for Gagnon and 
Simon: the 'interpersonal' and 'intrapsychic' (1973b, p. 20). The 
interpersonal designates what they blandly refer to as the 'external': 
sexual scripts that structure relatively shared, routine conventions between 
people so that they can jointly participate in sexual behaviour. The 
intrapsychic designates what they blandly refer to as the 'internal': sexual 
scripts that structure and elicit the conditions for psychological and 
physiological arousal and release. It is here where Gagnon and Simon 
begin to make a distinction between different 'layers' to the sexual script. 
At the level of interpersonal scripting, gestures, demeanours, 
language, and symbols are elements of the sexual script (Gagnon and 
Simon 1973b, pp. 20-21). They are the relatively-shared, routine 
conventions that sexual scripts structure and enable social actors to jointly 
participate in sexual behaviour. Gagnon and Simon cite language (for 
example, 'Make me fell like a man/woman! '; 'Come sort me out! '; 'Ohhh! '; 
'We're almost there! ') and necking and petting as examples. They are 
shared and routine because they are collectively defined as sexual and 
learned over time. 
At the level of intrapsychic scripting, the meanings of sexual interior 
states, both psychological and physiological, do not reside within those 
interior states in and of themselves (Gagnon and Simon 1973b, pp. 21- 
22). Because the sexual script elicits sexual interior states, their meanings 
are contingent upon their corresponding sexual script: "meaning is 
attributed to the interior of the body by many of the same rules as it is to 
an exterior experience, depending on a vocabulary of motives that makes 
the biological into a meaningful psychological [and physiological] 
experience" (Gagnon and Simon 1973b, p. 21). Although not sexually 
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scripted but scripted nonetheless, Gagnon and Simon cite drug 
experience as an example. Drug experience designates interior 
psychological and physiological states: hallucinations, euphoria, paranoia, 
relaxation of the muscles, and increased heart rate. According to Gagnon 
and Simon, research has demonstrated that the meaning of a particular 
drug experience does not strictly derive from its corresponding drug. If it 
did, people would report the same experiences from the same drug. The 
experience of a drug is radically contingent upon, for example: the mood 
of the social location and social actor, the social actor's history of drug 
usage, and prescriptions for taking the drug. In other words, a drug 
experience is dependent upon the way in which it is effected, that is, 
scripted. A script brings together various elements that will elicit the 
experience of a drug. Therefore, the meaning of a drug experience 
resides within its script. 
The sexual script also structures the bodily activities that potentially 
release sexual interior states (Gagnon and Simon 1973b, p. 22). Gagnon 
and Simon turn to heterosexual coitus within modern Western society as 
an example. Heterosexual coitus involves a number of activities, for 
example: touching, hand- and mouth-genital contact, rubbing, kissing, and 
petting. However, these bodily activities are not in isolation to one another 
for Gagnon and Simon. Rather, they are scripted in a particular way so 
that they lead to heterosexual coitus, usually advancing from touching and 
kissing, to petting and rubbing, to hand- and/or mouth-genital contact, and 
then lastly to coitus. In the course of these bodily activities, sexual arousal 
transpires and orgasm potentially occurs. Arousal and orgasm are only 
possible because the sexual script, that is, normal heterosexual activity, 
assembles and organises bodily activities leading to coitus. However, 
Gagnon and Simon quickly point out that arousal and orgasm do not 
simply occur because we are "rubbing two sticks together to produce fire" 
(1973b, p. 22). On the parts of the social actors, there must be a sexual 
investment in their bodily activities in order for arousal and orgasm to 
occur: "Unless the two people involved recognize that the physical events 
Some Critical Citations 104 
outlined are sexual and are embedded in a sexual situation, there will not 
be the potentiation of the physiological concomitants ... necessary in the 
production of sexual excitement and the orgasmic cycle" (Gagnon and 
Simon 1973b, p. 22). 
Gagnon and Simon make it quite clear that the sexual script does not 
designate what they refer to as the 'conventional dramatic narrative form' 
(1973b, p. 23). In other words, it does not follow the conventional bell- 
shaped Aristotelian narrative plot form of introduction, rising climax, 
climax, resolution, and conclusion. For example, different pairs of social 
actors with the same sexual script can translate its elements differently. 
There can also be incongruity between social actors with the same sexual 
script. In these instances, the actual form that the sexual script takes will 
vary in sequence and duration and, hence, will not strictly follow a 
conventional form. This incongruity can occur because the symbolic 
meanings of the sexual script's elements may be linked to different 
sexually-scripted symbolic universes for the social actors. In this light, 
according to Gagnon and Simon, the 'dramatic' more appropriately 
designates the sexual script: "the nonnarrative qualities of modern poetry, 
the surrealistic tradition, or the theatre of the absurd" (1973b, p. 24). 
The theoretical shape that Gagnon's and Simon's work evolves into, 
that is, from a macroscopic to a microscopic approach, reflects a tension 
between social theories of sexuality of their day. Plummer outlines this 
tension. 
According to Plummer, social theories of sexuality of their day 
predominantly approached the theorisation of sexuality at two levels: the 
macroscopic and the microscopic (1975, pp. 46-52). I briefly outlined 
them previously in this chapter. Again, macroscopic theories examined 
the relationship between society and sexuality. Within this approach, the 
social actor was understood to be born into an 'objective reality, ' which 
defined and regulated the sexuality of the social actor prior to his/her 
existence. Objective reality designates social institutions and 
legitimisations. Social institutions included, for example: 
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1. the family, and gender, providing routine patterns of sexuality 
through their mere existence; 
2. the legal and normative system, providing explicit statements 
about how people ought to behave sexually; 
3. imagery, providing controlling portraits of both 'normal' and 
'aberrant' sexuality; 
4. belief systems-attitudes and opinions-providing clues as to 
`what everybody thinks' about sexuality; and 
5. language-providing a rhetoric which through its mere 
existence gives structure to the sexual world (Plummer 1975, 
p. 48). 
These social institutions were linked to implicit and explicit legitimisations, 
which operated to uphold an existing social order and make it appear 
natural. Legitimisations were understood to be informed by medical, 
theological, juridical, philosophical, and literary discourses. In this light, a 
macroscopic approach conceptualised the source of sexuality as residing 
within society. Sexuality was formulated as external to the social actor. 
Again, microscopic theories examined the relationship between the social 
actor and sexuality. Within this approach, sexuality was not understood as 
an external force that preceded the social actor. Rather, sexuality, 
particularly its meanings, was understood to arise within human social 
interaction. It was understood to be 'intersubjective, ' 'emergent, ' and 
'negotiated. ' In this light, a microscopic approach conceptualised the 
source of sexuality as residing within human social interaction. Sexuality 
was formulated as a dynamic product of the interactive social actor. 
Plummer does not specifically discuss or even cite tenants of each 
approach for the reader, but it should be evident by now that Mcintosh's 
"The Homosexual Role" (1968) employed a macroscopic approach. 
According to Plummer, these two approaches were usually set up 
against each other during their day (1975, pp. 46-48). Social theorists 
approached the theorisation of sexuality at either the macroscopic or the 
microscopic level. No concerted efforts were made to explore how 
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sexuality is a product of both 'objective, global realities' and 'micro 
intersubjective realities. ' This was largely the case because the source of 
sexuality was understood to reside in one or the other, not both (Plummer 
1975, p. 48). However, for Plummer, sexuality is not an either/or issue. 
Plummer maintains that sexuality is a product of both 'objective, global 
realities' and 'micro intersubjective realities' (1975, p. 47). Plummer 
specifically draws upon Peter L. Berger's and Thomas Luckmann's (1967) 
argument that a dialectical relationship exists between the two. Berger 
and Luckmann write: 
The objectivity of the institutional world, however massive it may 
appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed 
objectivity ... despite the objectivity that marks the world in 
human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological 
status apart from the human experience that produced it. ... 
[Here is] the paradox that man is capable of producing a world that 
he then experiences as something other than a human product ... 
the relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, 
his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is man and his 
social world interact with each other. The product acts back upon 
the producer. Externalisation and objectivation are moments in a 
continuing dialectical process. The third moment in this process .. 
. is internalisation. ... It is already possible to see the 
fundamental relationship of these three dialectical moments in 
social reality. Each of them corresponds to an essential 
characterisation of the social world. Society is a human product. 
Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product (1967, pp. 
78-9). 
According to Plummer, sexuality marks a dialectical relationship between 
'objective, global realities' and 'micro intersubjective realities' insofar as 
the social actor constructs a sexual objective reality, which then becomes 
routinised and institutionalised as a 'given' over time, which is then 
internalised and/or modified by the social actor. It may appear to the 
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reader that this dialectical relationship is a set of discrete and separable 
dialectical moments, which belies Plummer's contention that sexuality is 
not an either/or issue. However, he maintains that they are only capable 
of separation analytically. Within a sexual reality, the dialectical moments 
of the dialectical relationship are continually in concurrent interaction with 
each other, whether reinforcing, thwarting, or modifying each other. 
Plummer calls on social theorists to explore these dialectical moments 
individually and, more importantly, to begin to understand how they work 
with each other within the dialectical relationship. Having said this, 
Plummer only calls on social theorists to move towards such an analysis. 
He does not explore or perform such an analysis himself: "Their complex 
interconnection will remain a research problem" (Plummer 1975, p. 48, 
italics included in original). 
Section III: Some Disciplinary Cross-fertilisa'6n 
i. Cultural Sexual Scripts and the Voluntarist Subject 
Gagnon's and Simon's "Sexual Scripts: Permanence and Change" (1986) 
is an extension of Sexual Conduct (1967b) and their subsequent work (for 
example, Gagnon 1977; Gagnon and Simon 1973a, 1973b). Once again, 
it is primarily preoccupied with the relationship between sexual behaviour 
and the social actor and how that relationship is contingent upon the 
sexual script. Further, interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual scripts 
continue to have the same meanings and significance. Interpersonal 
sexual scripts are "the ordering of representations of self and other that 
facilitate the occurrence of the sexual act" and intrapsychic sexual scripts 
are "the ordering of images and desires that elicit and sustain sexual 
arousal" (Gagnon and Simon 1986, p. 97). In these respects, "Sexual 
Scripts" (1986) first appears to uphold their theoretical departure of 1973, 
moving from a macroscopic to a microscopic theorisation of sexuality 
through the use of the sexual script. However, I did remark earlier that 
their theoretical departure primarily remained a permanent feature of their 
subsequent work. The essay moves from a microscopic theorisation of 
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sexuality to one that attempts to integrate both macro and micro 
considerations of sexuality, an obvious move that Plummer would support. 
This is done through introducing a third level of sexual scripts, 'cultural 
scenarios, ' that is, 'cultural sexual scripts. ' However, their notion of 
cultural sexual scripts is thoroughly immersed in symbolic interactionist 
theory and they do not fully produce the kind of analysis that Plummer 
advocates in Sexual Stigma (1975). 
In order to avoid repetition, I will concern myself with Gagnon's and 
Simon's introduction of cultural sexual scripts and their relationship to 
interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual behaviour. 
For Gagnon and Simon, cultural sexual scripts are to sexual behaviour 
(at the levels of the interpersonal and intrapsychic) what language is to 
speech (in the Lacanian sense): they are a precondition for that which is 
within their operating syntax (1986, p. 98). Here, Gagnon and Simon are 
pointing out that interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual behaviour are 
contingent upon a much larger operating syntax: cultural sexual scripts. 
Cultural sexual scripts "are the instructional guides that exist at the level of 
collective life, " which directly or indirectly script interpersonal and 
intrapsychic sexual behaviour (Gagnon and Simon 1986, p. 98). 
Institutions are the primary source of cultural sexual scripts. Gagnon and 
Simon do not provide examples for the reader, but the subject matter of 
their work suggests that they probably would have had the following in 
mind: the 'family' and its prescriptions on maleness and femaleness, 
'compulsory heterosexuality' and its prescriptions on sexual object choice, 
and medical/juridical institutions and their prescriptions on normal and 
abnormal sexuality. 
Interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual behaviour therefore reflect 
cultural sexual scripts in some way or another. However, Gagnon and 
Simon do acknowledge that cultural sexual scripts are not strictly 
predicative of sexual behaviour (1986, pp. 98-99). According to Gagnon 
and Simon, there is incongruence even within paradigmatic societies, that 
is, traditional societies, where it is highly unlikely to occur. In order for the 
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cultural to function as an operating syntax that is reflected in interpersonal 
and intrapsychic sexual behaviour, two interrelated things must happen 
according to Gagnon and Simon. In the first instance, cultural sexual 
scripts must be abstract and general rather than specific. Because social 
settings can be very specific within any given society and will therefore 
vary from one to the next within a given society, the cultural cannot script 
interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual behaviour if they are also specific. It 
would be like trying to piece together two very different pieces of a puzzle, 
with no consideration of each piece's specific, unique, and varied 
contours. However, if cultural sexual scripts are abstract and general, 
then they are more likely to script interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual 
behaviour because they are more flexible and adaptive to their specific 
social setting. In the second instance, room must be made for 
'improvisation' or 'tinkering. ' It is not enough for cultural sexual scripts to 
be abstract and general. They will only script interpersonal and 
intrapsychic sexual behaviour if social actors can modify them. Of course, 
the degree to which cultural sexual scripts must be abstract and general 
and can be modified will be dependent upon their social setting and a 
matter of negotiation. 
In this light, cultural sexual scripts do not unilaterally script 
interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual behaviour (Gagnon and Simon 
1986, p. 99). According to Gagnon and Simon, interpersonal sexual 
behaviour, in particular, "transforms the social actor from being exclusively 
an actor trained in his or her role(s) and adds to his/her burdens the task 
of being a partial scriptwriter or adaptor. . ." (1986, p. 99). 
However, 
interpersonal sexual behaviour is more than just a variation on a theme for 
Gagnon and Simon, whereby the social actor slightly modifies cultural 
sexual scripts in order to make them congruent with his/her sexual 
behaviour with significant others within a specific social setting. 
Interpersonal sexual behaviour enables the social actor to wilfully 
determine or influence how he/she is recognised by other significant social 
actors, whether that recognition is fulfilled or unfulfilled. In this respect, 
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Gagnon and Simon understand the social actor as a voluntarist subject. 
As a result, the social actor displaces cultural sexual scripts as a unilateral 
structural determinant. The same is true of intrapsychic sexual behaviour. 
When there is incongruity between cultural sexual scripts and 
interpersonal sexual behaviour that is not easily reconcilable, more weight 
is put on the social actor at the level of the intrapsychic (Gagnon and 
Simon 1986, pp. 99-100). According to Gagnon and Simon, "[the social 
actor] transforms the surrounding social world [read: cultural sexual 
scripts] from the source of desire [read: intrapsychic sexual behaviour] into 
the object of desire" (1986, p. 100). This inversion opens up a possibility 
for the social actor to negotiate a degree of congruence between cultural 
sexual scripts and interpersonal sexual behaviour and to wilfully determine 
or influence how he/she is recognised by significant others at the level of 
the interpersonal. Here, again, the social actor is able to maintain his/her 
agency as a voluntarist subject. 
As I previously gestured, Gagnon and Simon maintain that the degree 
of congruence between cultural sexual scripts and interpersonal and 
intrapsychic sexual scripted behaviour is partly dependent upon their 
corresponding type of society (1986, p. 102). Within a paradigmatic 
society, there is usually a master set of cultural sexual scripts that is 
mostly shared among its social actors across social settings. Because it is 
mostly shared, it usually requires few, if any, modifications in order to 
maintain a congruence with interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual 
behaviour. Therefore, there is likely to be a high degree of congruence. 
However, within a postparadigmatic society, that is, a highly differentiated 
society, the opposite is likely to be the case. Cultural sexual scripts are 
not uniformly and unilaterally shared among its social actors across social 
settings. As a result, they usually require significant modification in order 
to maintain some degree of congruence with interpersonal and 
intrapsychic sexual behaviour. Therefore, there is likely to be a lower 
degree of congruence than that of a paradigmatic society. 
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Sedgwick's queer project Epistemology of the Closet (1990) 
converges with Gagnon's and Simon's notion of cultural sexual scripts. 
Sedgwick argues that a set of mutual contradictions has been central to 
modern Western understandings of homo/heterosexual definition: (1) a 
'minoritising' and 'universalising' view and (2) a 'gender-separatist' and 
'gender-integrative' view (1990, pp. 1-2). 
The minoritising view understands homo/heterosexual definition "as an 
issue of active importance primarily for a small, distinct, relatively fixed 
homosexual minority, " whereas the universalising view understands it "as 
an issue of continuing, determinative importance in the lives of people 
across the spectrums of sexuality" (Sedgwick 1990, p. 1). According to 
Sedgwick, the minoritising view has had its place within essentialist and 
third-sex theoretical quarters, as well as within civil rights movements 
(1990, pp. 84-86,88-90). Within these quarters, homosexuality 
constitutes a distinct, small group of people (read: the minority) who are 
defined up against the norm: heterosexuality (read: the majority). The 
universalising view has had its place within social constructionist quarters, 
as well as within the lesbian continuum and Freud's thesis that a potential 
bisexuality lies within each of us. Within these quarters, homosexuality 
has been largely understood as only one sexual identity within a 'solvent 
of stable identities, ' which constitute one another. Whereas sexuality is 
encased within brackets in the first view, it exceeds them in the second 
one. 
The gender-separatist and gender-integrative views have specifically 
shaped homosexual definition within the homo/heterosexual dyad 
(Sedgwick 1990, pp. 1-2,86-90). Homosexuality is conceptualised as a 
gendered category within these views. The gender-separatist view 
understands it "as reflecting an impulse of separatism-though by no 
means necessarily political separatism-within each gender, " whereas the 
gender-integrative view understands it "as a matter of liminality or 
transivity between genders" (Sedgwick 1990, pp. 1-2). According to 
Sedgwick, the gender-separatist view has had its place within manhood- 
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initiation and lesbian separatist models of homosexual definition, as well 
as within the homosocial continuum. Within these quarters, the 
homosexual has been largely understood as identifying with the gender 
that mirrors his/her sex. The gender-integrative view has had its place 
within cross-sex, androgyny, and solidarity models of homosexual 
definition. Within these quarters, the homosexual has been largely 
understood as crossing gender boundaries and assuming a gender that 
does not mirror his/her sex. This has often been read by both gay and 
non-gay people as an impulse to preserve heterosexual gender relations 
within homosexual desire. Again, whereas sexuality is encased within 
brackets in the first view, it exceeds them in the second one. 
It should be quite evident that Sedgwick's two sets of contradictions 
are cultural sexual scripts in their own right. They fulfil Gagnon's and 
Simon's definition of cultural sexual scripts in two respects. In the first 
instance, they function as an operating syntax at the level of collective life: 
"many of the major nodes of thought and knowledge in twentieth-century 
Western culture as a whole are structured-indeed, fractured-by a 
chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual definition. . . "; "an 
understanding of virtually any aspect of modern Western culture must be . 
.. damaged in its central substance to the degree that it does not 
incorporate a critical analysis of modern homo/heterosexual definition... "; 
and "I am trying to make the strongest possible introductory case for a 
hypothesis about the centrality of this nominally marginal, conceptually 
intractable set of definitional issues to the important knowledges and 
understandings of twentieth-century Western culture as a whole" 
(Sedgwick 1990, pp. 1-2). In the second instance, the source of their 
social meaning partly lies within institutions: "The passage of time, the 
bestowal of thought and necessary political struggle ... have only spread 
and deepened the long crisis of modern sexual definition, dramatizing ... 
the internal incoherence and mutual contradiction of each of the forms of 
discursive and institutional 'common sense' on this subject" and "New, 
institutionalized taxonomic discourses-medical, legal, literary, 
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psychological-centering on homo/heterosexual definition proliferated and 
crystallized with exceptional rapidity in the decades around the turn of the 
century. . ." (Sedgwick 1990, pp. 1-2). 
In effect, Sedgwick's project confirms Gagnon's and Simon's notion of 
cultural sexual scripts. Indeed, her project argues that there are 
'instructional guides' that script sexuality at the level of collective life. It 
proposes that the minoritising/universalising and gender- 
separatist/gender-integrative views have largely scripted discourses 
(particularly legal and literary) on modern, Western homo/heterosexual 
definition. Understood as "a presiding master term of the past century, " 
she further maintains that homo/heterosexual definition has affected 
broader cultural definitional nexuses, for example: knowledge/ignorance, 
active/passive, in/out, health/illness, private/public, masculine/feminine, 
and majority/minority (Sedgwick 1990, p. 11). 
Although a link can be drawn between Sedgwick's queer project and 
Gagnon's and Simon's concept of cultural sexual scripts, their work is 
informed by different disciplinary locations and theoretical apparatuses. In 
the first instance, as I mentioned in the first section of the chapter, 
Sedgwick is a literary critic, whereas Gagnon and Simon are sociologists. 
In the second instance, whereas Gagnon's and Simon's work is primarily 
influenced by symbolic interactionist theory, Sedgwick's queer project is a 
deconstructive exercise, although "in a fairly specific sense" (Sedgwick 
1990, p. 9). More specifically, Sedgwick's project examines the 
asymmetry between heterosexuality and homosexuality whereby: 
[1. ] term B [read: homosexuality] is not symmetrical with but 
subordinate to term A [read: heterosexuality] ...; 
[2. ] the ontologically valorized term A actually depends for its 
meaning on the simultaneous subsumption and exclusion of 
term B ...; [and] 
[3. ] the question of priority between the supposed central and the 
supposed marginal category of each dyad is irresolvably 
unstable, an instability caused by the fact that term B is 
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constituted as at once internal and external to term A (ibid., p. 
10). 
There are some further differences. Whereas Sedgwick's arguments are 
mainly drawn from literary texts, Gagnon's and Simon's formulations are 
based in social life (I discuss their methodology in the next chapter). Also, 
Sedgwick focuses on sexuality in general, whereas Gagnon and Simon 
focus on sexual behaviour. Further, Sedgwick does not really go beyond 
the level of the cultural, whereas Gagnon and Simon consider the 
interpersonal and intrapsychic as well. 
Granted, there are differences between Gagnon's and Simon's and 
Sedgwick's work. However, their convergence with one another should 
not be dismissed because of their differences. It suggests that there is 
room for disciplinary cross-fertilisation between queer theory and 
sociology. A brief reading of Gagnon's and Simon's understanding of the 
social actor as a voluntarist subject in light of Butler (1993,1995) further 
highlights that there is potential for this sort of work. 
I remarked earlier that Gagnon and Simon understand the social actor 
as a voluntarist subject. Although cultural scripts are a precondition for 
interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual behaviour, the social actor is still 
understood as a subject who wilfully determines or influences how he/she 
is read by other significant social actors. As a result, the social actor 
inverts the relationship between cultural sexual scripts and interpersonal 
and intrapsychic sexual behaviour. This formulation of the social actor is 
in line with humanist conceptions of the subject, which, coincidently, 
"[social] constructivism has, on occasion, sought to put into question" 
(Butler 1993, p. 7). Within this framework, the social actor is (1) free of 
constraint and (2) the locus of agency. In the first instance, the social 
actor is understood as an authorial subject who is not constrained in 
determining or influencing his/her present and future cultural 
manifestations. In the second instance, agency is understood as an 
essential capacity of the social actor. The social actor is a Cartesian 
subject: 'I think, therefore I am. ' However, a reading of some of Butler's 
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(1993,1995) work on the subject and agency highlights Gagnon's and 
Simon's over-theorisation of the social actor and suggests how they might 
reformulate their humanist leanings. 
It is trivial that Gagnon and Simon conceive the social actor as a wilful 
subject free of constraint. How can Gagnon and Simon simultaneously 
and nonetheless understand the social actor as a wilful subject free of 
constraint when the social actor's sexual behaviour is conditioned by 
cultural sexual scripts from the very beginning? Further, constraint is 
central to their arguments on sexual behaviour in "Introduction: Deviant 
Behavior and Sexual Deviance" (1967a). Butler takes up a similar 
question in respect to the relation between the social actor and his/her 
gender matrix: 
If gender is a construction, must there be an 'I' or a 'we' who 
enacts or performs that construction? How can there be an 
activity, a constructing, without presupposing an agent who 
precedes and performs that activity? How would we account for 
the motivation and direction of construction without such a 
subject? As a rejoinder, I would suggest that it takes a certain 
suspicion toward grammar to reconceive the matter in a different 
light. For if gender is constructed, it is not necessarily constructed 
by an `I' or a `we' who stands before that construction in any 
spatial or temporal sense of 'before. ' Indeed, it is unclear that 
there can be an 'I' or a `we' who has not been submitted, 
subjected to gender, where gendering is, among other things, the 
differentiating relations by which speaking subjects come into 
being. Subjected to gender, but subjectivated by gender, the 'I' 
neither precedes nor follows the process of this gendering, but 
emerges only within and as the matrix of gender relations 
themselves (1993, p. 7, italics my emphasis). 
Butler points out that the social actor is in no way a voluntarist subject who 
can wilfully determine his/her gender. The social actor's manifestation as 
a gendered subject is preconditioned by and emerges within a gender 
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matrix. As a consequence, constraint is built into the social actor's 
subjecthood. In this light, if cultural sexual scripts are a precondition of 
interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual behaviour for Gagnon and Simon, 
then they will constrain the social actor's sexual behaviour from the very 
beginning. Therefore, the social actor is not a wilful subject free of 
constraint. Rather, constraint is built into his/her sexual behaviour. As 
such, Gagnon and Simon might want to explore how cultural sexual scripts 
precondition and constrain the social actor's sexual behaviour at the 
interpersonal and intrapsychic levels. 
Further, if the social actor's sexual behaviour is preconditioned and 
constrained by cultural sexual scripts, then how can the social actor be the 
locus of agency simultaneously and nonetheless? In relation to discourse, 
Butler maintains that the agency of the social actor arises out of the social 
conditions where discourse does not have a firm fix on or cannot firmly fix 
the social actor. She writes: "If the subject is a reworking of the very 
discursive processes by which it is worked, then 'agency' is to be found in 
the possibilities of resignification opened up by discourse" (1995, p. 135). 
Butler's formulation of agency does not dismiss or minimise the social 
actor's agency. Rather, it seeks to explore "the concrete conditions under 
which agency becomes possible" (Butler 1995, p. 136). In this light, 
agency should not be understood as an essential capacity of the social 
actor for Gagnon and Simon. Rather, it should be understood as arising 
within the social conditions where there is incongruity between cultural 
sexual scripts and interpersonal and intrapsychic sexual behaviour. As 
such, Gagnon and Simon might want to explore how and to what degree 
cultural sexual scripts give rise to the social actor's agency. 
In light of these readings between Gagnon and Simon, Sedgwick, and 
Butler, I propose that we seek to create and establish discursive spaces 
within which there is an integration of queer and sociological terms of 
analysis, whether they converge with or diverge from one another. This 
may involve an element of decontextualising and reappropriating a set of 
terms within reason, but it should not be an excuse to abandon such a 
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project altogether. It is discursive spaces like the one that I have just 
begun to create that generate the conditions to explore how a 
subject/object of study can be conceptualised similarly or differently 
through a different lens. This promotes more mature and critical reading, 
thinking, and writing across and between disciplines. I further move in this 
direction in the next chapter and more forceful formulate it as way forward 
for future conversations and work between queer theory and sociology in 
the conclusion of the thesis. 
Chapter Four 
A Question of Methodology: 
Problematising Queer Theory's Textualism 
It should go without saying-but unfortunately needs to be 
said-that there is considerable space within such an 
enterprise [queer theory] for the perspectives and approaches 
of disciplines such as sociology, and indeed substantial need 
for sociological contributions, both theoretical and empirical. .. 
. [T]o the extent that queer studies focus[es] overwhelmingly 
on discourses and texts, crucial questions about social 
structure, political organisation, and historical context are 
investigated in only partial ways. 
-Steven Epstein, "A Queer Encounter" 
(1996 [1994), p. 157) 
Introduction' and Purpose 
In the previous chapter, I explored the wider disciplinary mapping of an 
unproductive queer presupposition and exploited that presupposition for 
more productive interdisciplinary pursuits. The chapter predominantly, if 
not exclusively, focused on the issue of theory rather than methodology or 
a combination of both. The chapter can therefore be said to be deficient in 
this respect. Having said this, I never did claim that the chapter sought to 
be some kind of grand master narrative-the type of narrative Michel 
Foucault would have written and worked against. In this light, the 
following chapter is an attempt to address that very deficiency. 
At this juncture, I want to consider the significance of a preoccupation 
of one of queer theory's best known and widely consulted critical thinkers: 
Judith Butler. In particular, I want to examine, problematise, and rework 
how she methodologically approaches her subjects/objects of study by 
performing analyses of texts. ' Although there are traces of sociological 
interests and matters of concern within Butler's work, her methodological 
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approach inhibits a more developed social analysis of her subjects/objects 
of study. For practitioners of sociology, a social analysis does not reside 
within a detached textual methodological approach that sits on its own. It 
resides in one that also actively incorporates the lived experiences of 
social actors, for example: focus group discussions, face-to-face 
interviews, (participant) observation, life histories, case studies, or 
questionnaires. Methodology, for the most part, is rooted in social life. 
Nonetheless, Butler uncritically fails to incorporate such a rich sociological 
methodological programme into the parameters of her work (for example, 
1990,1991,1993,1997b, 1997c). 
Butler's methodological approach is significant insofar as it runs in 
tandem with queer theory's broad methodological approach to 
investigating its subjects/objects of study. Although there is local variation 
from one queer theorist to the next in relation to what subject/object of 
study he/she may examine, what medium he/she may explore, what 
theoretical apparatus he/she may employ, or what kind of analysis he/she 
may perform, queer theorists have primarily methodologically approached 
their investigations textually. In turn, queer theory's textualism has 
operated to narrowly define and demarcate its disciplinary terms and 
practices, particularly how queer critical engagement ought to take place. 
Sociological ways of investigating queer theory's subjects/objects of study 
have been excluded from that methodological programme as a result. 
Therefore, in this light, I use Butler's work as a springboard to 
problematise queer theory's textualism and, more importantly, rework it in 
order to offer a more developed social analysis. The main aim here is to 
move towards broadening and deepening the frame by which queer 
theory's subjectslobjects of study are methodologically approached and to 
put the social at the centre of queer theory's methodological programme. 
My objective, to begin with, is to explore the significance of Butler's 
methodological approach. This will take place by critically examining the 
way in which she methodologically frames her analysis of male-to-female 
drag via Jennie Livingston's film Paris is Burning (1991), which is a 
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dedicated chapter entitled "Gender is Burning" in Bodies That Matter 
(1993, pp. 121-40). I will sketch the outlines of her methodological 
approach to and subsequent analysis of drag, examine where and how 
her methodology constrains a more developed social analysis, and 
demonstrate how it runs in parallel with queer theory's broad 
methodological programme. In relation to how her methodology 
constrains her analysis of drag, I will briefly take issue with: (1) the way in 
which drag is only investigated in relation to compulsory heterosexuality's 
hegemonic subject positions and not implicated in producing and 
regulating its own normative subject positions; (2) her rather weak 
conceptualisation of norms and their intricate workings at different, yet 
inextricably linked levels; and, implicated within the previous two 
constraints, (3) her narrow account of the encoding-decoding architecture 
of the drag represented in Paris is Burning (1991). In the process of 
examining these constraints, I will draw upon the work of Esther Newton 
(1972) (on normative gay male male-to-female drag subject positions and 
their regulation), John H. Gagnon and William S. Simon (1967a, 1986) (on 
norms and scripting), and Stuart Hall (1993) (on the encoding-decoding 
architecture of the production of messages, that is, production, circulation, 
distribution/consumption (use), and reproduction). In a similar fashion to 
the previous chapter, I conclude my examination of queer theory's 
textualism by proposing that discursive spaces are created within which 
there is an integration of queer and sociological methodological 
approaches. It is my belief that such discursive spaces would move queer 
theory and sociology in the direction of disciplinary cross-fertilisation. 
The second section of the chapter will then seek to productively 
rework queer theory's textualism by offering such a discursive space. The 
main aim here is to demonstrate how the broadening and deepening of 
queer theory's methodological programme can lead to a more developed 
social analysis of a subject/object of study. This will take place by 
integrating and reengaging Butler's discursive analysis of drag via Paris is 
Burning (1991) with ethnographic fieldwork that I conducted on gay male 
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male-to-female drag in Portland, Oregon, United States. My work focused 
on two drag spaces, The Embers Avenue, where the space was 
predominately patronised by those who identified as 'lesbian, ' 'gay, ' 
'bisexual, ' or 'transgender' and Darcelle XV, where the space was 
predominantly patronised by those who identified as 'heterosexual. ' In 
particular, I will focus on Butler's analysis of the centrality of a 
'morphological ideal' in respect to subjectivity and the production of 
dominant subject positions. My ethnographic work in The Embers Avenue 
will only inform this discursive space. I expand on this later in the chapter. 
An outline of my methodological approach and a character sketch of my 
interlocutors will precede my discussion of my work. 
However, before I proceed with the above investigation, there are 
several issues of definition and intent that I want to clarify. 
In the first instance, I want to clarify what I mean when I use the term 
'textual analysis' as a methodological approach. I use the term in its 
broadest sense: a research method that approaches the investigation of a 
subject/object by performing an analysis of a text in, of, and by itself. A 
'text' can designate a play, movie, fiction, music, or sign. The text is both 
the source and frame by which a textual analysis proceeds. This definition 
is in line with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's understanding and usage of the 
methodological approach in Epistemology of the Closet: 
Any critical book makes endless choices of focus and 
methodology. ... If the book [Epistemology of the Closet] were 
able to fulfill its most expansive ambitions, it would make certain 
specific kinds of readings and interrogations, perhaps new, 
available in a heuristically powerful, productive, and significant 
form for other readers to perform on literary and social texts with, 
ideally, other results (1990, p. 14). 
However, although I am employing a broad definition of textual analysis, I 
do want to underscore that there is no one definition that can capture the 
varied and complex nuances of the methodological approach. As I 
previously remarked, there will be variation from one queer inquirer to the 
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next in relation to what subject/object of study he/she may examine (for 
example, representational politics, drag, transsexualism, queer 
subjectivity, or lesbian desire), what theoretical apparatus he/she may 
employ (for example, Derridean, Foucauldian, or Nietzschean, which may 
be subsequently at odds with each other), what kind of textual analysis 
he/she may perform (for example, deconstructive, discursive, 
psychoanalytic, rhetorical, or semiotic), or what medium he/she may 
explore (for example, movies, fiction, or signs). The possibilities are 
endless. Therefore, throughout the course of this chapter, if I use the term 
'textual analysis' in a general context, then the reader should read it in the 
broad sense that I offer as a definition. Conversely, if I refer to a specific 
textual analysis of a specific queer inquirer, then I will recognise and 
identify its local character. 
In the second instance, I want to clarify my promotion of a 
methodological approach that incorporates the lived experiences of social 
actors. It is not to be understood as a return to positivism, whereby the 
social actor is taken as a point of departure for an analysis of the social, 
devoid of critically interrogating that point of departure in the first place. 
Within sexual theory and feminist debates, particularly within 
poststructuralist quarters, an examination of experience has often been 
perceived as a move towards positivism (Butler 1992 [1991]; de Lauretis 
1984; Scott 1992 [1991]). Angela McRobbie captures this view very well 
in her discussion of the 'three Es' (empiricism, ethnography, and 
experience) and the 'anti-Es' (anti-essentialism, poststructuralism, and 
psychoanalysis) within feminist domains (1999 [1997]). According to 
McRobbie, descriptive humanism has conventionally been understood to 
belong to the Es and high theory and critical reflection to the anti-Es: 
Ethnography? The truth-seeking activity reliant upon the (often 
literary) narratives of exoticism and difference? Can't do it, except 
as a deconstructive exercise. Empiricism? The 'representation' of 
results, the narrative of numbers? Can't do it either, except as 
part of a critical genealogy of sociology and its role in the project of 
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modernity and science. Experience? That cornerstone of human 
authenticity, that essential core of individuality, the spoken voice 
as evidence of being and of the coincidence of consciousness with 
identity? Can't do it, other than as a psychoanalytic venture (1999 
[1997], pp. 75-76). 
am not suggesting that this is an outright misconstrual. Historically, an 
examination of experience in the social sciences empirically took the 
social actor as a matter-of-fact point of departure. This was a 
methodological move that sought to establish it as a 'legitimate science. ' 
However, experience is rarely studied and conceived in this positivistic 
way today, particularly since Clifford Geertz (1973) outlined his insights on 
interpreting culture and introduced 'thick description. ' According to Geertz, 
an analysis of culture should not be "an experimental science in search of 
some law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (1973, p. 5). In 
other words, it should be an analysis of the context of the practices and 
discourses that occur within a particular society. For Geertz, meaning is 
embodied in symbols, which are vehicles that provide insight into a 
particular culture. According to Geertz, it is the job of the social scientist to 
immerse him/herself within culture. The deeper he/she immerses 
him/herself, then the thicker his/her description will be. It is in this spirit 
that I promote a methodological approach that incorporates the lived 
experiences of social actors. 
Moreover, I do not assume or even suggest that the drag in my 
fieldwork is exactly the same as the drag in Paris is Burning (1991). In 
addition to the obvious fact that each have their own geopolitical spaces, 
each also have their own social structures and histories. Having said this, 
this essay is not a comparative study of drag in and of itself. Further, 
Butler's discursive analysis of drag is not part of a study of drag. It is an 
analysis that supports a larger argument on subjectivity. As I previously 
outlined, the aim of the chapter is to critically examine and demonstrate 
how a particular methodology can constrain the analysis of a 
subject/object under investigation and how the broadening and deepening 
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of its outlines can lead to a more developed social analysis. It is to this 
extent that I compare my fieldwork on drag with Butler's discursive 
analysis of drag via Paris is Burning (1991). I reiterate this later in the 
chapter. 
Lastly, the drag represented and examined herein is North American 
gay male drag, that is, gay male male-to-female drag. Because it is a 
cultural product of North American gay male culture, it has different 
cultural meanings, social relations, and histories than that of lesbian 
female-to-male drag, heterosexual drag (male and female), and different 
forms of British drag. Again, the intent of the chapter is not to explore the 
differences between these forms of drag. Please consult Roger Baker 
(1994), David Bergman (1993), Marjorie B. Garber (1992), Judith 
Halberstam and Annamarie Jagose (1999), and Moe Meyer (1994) for an 
examination of these different forms of drag. 
Secti6n- 1: A Question o-f. -Methodology 
i. Butler's Take on Drag 
Butler methodologically approaches her analysis of male-to-female drag 
by performing a discursive analysis of drag in the film Paris is Burning 
(1991). Using Louis Althusser's (1971) doctrine of 'interpellation' as a 
springboard and supporting a larger argument on subjectivity, Butler 
maintains that drag can be a critical resignification, that is, 
denaturalisation, of hegemonic subject positions, particularly those of 
compulsory heterosexuality. However, drag is not always subversive for 
Butler. It can also be, at the same time and paradoxically, an occasion for 
hegemonic subject positions to be renaturalised. This is accomplished by 
focusing on three aspects in the film: (1) the general structure of the drag 
performances, (2) kinship relations between the drag performers, and (3) a 
drag performer's effecting of compulsory heterosexuality's binary gender 
economy. 
However, before I begin to unpack Butler's methodological framing 
and subsequent analysis of drag, I want to offer a narrative summary of 
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Paris is Burning (1991), which is in line with Butler's own summary (1993, 
pp. 128-29). 
Paris is Burning (1991) was directed and produced by Jennie 
Livingston. It documents a world where the Paris runways and Houses of 
Coco Chanel, Christian Dior, Yves Saint Laurent, and Jean Paul Gaultier 
intersect with Harlem's very own drag balls and haute couture Houses- 
the House of Xtravaganza, the House of Labeija, and the House of Ninja. 
Mademoiselle Chanel is alive and living well. She has just flown into 
Harlem from Paris, and she is here to stay! Founded, organised, and 
attended primarily by African-American and Hispanic gay men and male- 
to-female transsexuals (pre- and post-operative), the Houses sponsor 
drag balls where drag artists arrive in high fashion with attitude and battle 
it out between each other in a number of categories that they attempt to 
approximate. 
The categories themselves are marked by social norms. Some 
categories include, for example: 'executive wear' and 'evening wear' 
(marked by White high class and all conveniently located on one shop 
floor), the 'drag queen' (marked by femininity), and the 'military officer 
(marked by masculinity and juxtaposed up against the feminine 
categories). Until Madonna popularised voguing, an 'Egyptian-like' dance 
form that originated in the Houses, the drag balls were scarcely known to 
the public. Some of their dancers have materially benefited from the 
'Madonna-effect' (as it is now referred to in Scotland). In addition to 
joining Madonna's stage entourage for her "Blonde Ambition Tour" in 
1991, dancers have furthered their careers in choreography and 
modelling, particularly Willi Ninja of the House of Ninja. 
I do not want to suggest that the drag artists who compete in these 
categories, especially the more affluent and privileged ones, actually 
constitute and live them outside of the drag balls and Houses. I also do 
not want to suggest that they lead relatively comfortable lives. As the film 
disturbingly documents, the discursive and material realities of their daily 
lives are very much far removed from those spaces. Their realities as gay 
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men and transsexuals, who are also Black and who are also working 
class, unemployed, or in 'illegitimate' forms of employment, are marked by 
violence and rejection, whereby heterosexual, race, and class privilege 
seek to bring them down and erase them from the map of social 
legitimacy. For example, the film documents the tragic fate of Venus, a 
Latina pre-operative male-to-female transsexual prostitute, whose struggle 
to escape homophobia, racism, and classism by effecting compulsory 
heterosexuality's gender economy ends in death when one of her male 
clients discovers her deceptive 'little secret, ' that is, she is not a real 
woman but a transsexual/man. It is precisely to this stark degree that the 
affluent and privileged categories of the drag balls and Houses are 
juxtaposed up against the hard streets of Harlem. In this light, the drag 
balls and Houses act as safe havens where the drag artists can occupy 
privileged subject positions and survive, ones that would not be reserved, 
let alone even thinkable, for their 'kind' outside on the streets of Harlem 
and beyond. As one drag artist accurately puts it in the film, "After all, how 
many gay black males are there in the business executive ranks? " 
However, the drag balls and Houses are more than just safe havens for 
the drag artists. As I will soon discuss, Butler points out that they also 
allow the drag artists to implicitly, if not explicitly, pass social commentary. 
Butler begins her chapter by outlining and expanding upon Althusser's 
(1971) doctrine of interpellation (1993, pp. 121-24). Generally, it is part of 
a larger theory of ideology in respect to representation, which draws upon 
Lacan. For Althusser, representations do not signify some prior, given 
reality, whereby reality enjoys ontological status free of any social 
significance. Rather, representations are constitutive of social reality. 
They are discursive products that arise within social relations. Althusser's 
doctrine of interpellation is a theory of the juridical and social formation of 
the subject. The subject is the effect of an authoritative voice, which 
brings the subject into being as a subject within its language. Butler 
recounts Althusser's well-known example of interpellation. In brief, there 
is a policeman who is constitutive and representative of the 'Law. ' The 
A Question of Methodology 127 
policeman hails a person on the street: 'Hey, youl' The person then turns 
around and answers to the terms of the Law. Through the act of turning 
around to answer the policeman's reprimand, the person is subjected to 
the terms of the Law and assumes a certain order of social existence as a 
subject as set out by the discursive terms of the Law. Prior to the 
reprimand, the person did not exist as a subject. It is only through the 
actual act of turning towards and answering the Law, that is, being 
subjected to the Law, that the person is formed as a subject. In this light, 
subjectivation is central to the juridical and social formation of the subject. 
However, as Butler is correct to remark, it is questionable whether 
subjectivation is a direct consequence of the Law's reprimand, 'Hey, you!, ' 
or the reprimand's "power to compel the fear of punishment and, from that 
compulsion, to produce a compliance and obedience to the law" (1993, p. 
122). Additionally, it is very questionable whether the social scene of 
interpellation is as unilateral and uniform as Althusser purports it to be. 
As Butler points out, Althusser does recognise that misrecognition can 
exist between the Law and the subject. Althusser refers to these subjects 
as 'bad subjects. ' However, according to Butler, Althusser does not 
elaborate on "the range of disobedience that such an interpellating law 
might produce" (1993, p. 122, italics included in original). The Law might 
intend and expect to unilaterally and uniformly interpellate the subject 
within its discursive terms, but it might produce, instead, a set of 
unintended and unexpected consequences. More specifically, the subject 
might reject its terms or mime, embody, and repeat them but mime, 
embody, and repeat them in such a way that calls them into question 
(what Butler refers to as a 'parodic inhabiting of conformity'). Regardless 
of the range of disobedience, disobedience or, more precisely, the 
possibility of disobedience suggests that the monotheistic force of the Law 
is not strictly unilateral and uniform in its effects. If this was the case, then 
disobedience would not arise within the social scene of interpellation. 
However, because the possibility of disobedience always threatens the 
social scene of interpellation, the Law's status as the divine performative is 
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permanently vulnerable, always open to resignification. Of course, this will 
be to varying degrees. 
Butler asks the reader to consider the construction of the 'I' in relation 
to being called a name. Her analysis suggests that although the Law may 
be enabling, the subject who opposes its discursive terms cannot fully 
extricate itself from them. The subject is, from the start, radically 
dependent upon the discursive terms of the Law for its existence as a 
subject. Without them, the subject cannot come into being. 
Consequently, according to Butler, the subject who opposes them will 
express its opposition by drawing from them. Further, it is precisely here 
where the subject will partly draw its agency: from right within the very 
heart of power relations that it opposes. However, Butler is quick to 
qualify that although the subject wields its agency by being implicated 
within the relations of power that it opposes, implication does not mean 
that the subject is reducible to the discursive terms of the Law. 
Furthermore, it does not imply that the subject should not make use of 
them. In being occupied by the discursive terms of the Law, as well as in 
occupying them, Butler maintains that the task is to repeat them, but to 
repeat them in such a way that they reverse and dislocate their original 
purposes (again, what Butler refers to as the 'parodic inhabiting of 
conformity'). For Butler, this may risk a reinscription and reconsolidation of 
the terms of the Law, but it is a risk worth taking nonetheless. It is from 
this formulation of the disobedient subject that Butler's analysis of drag 
proceeds in parallel. 
Butler begins by outlining the categories that the drag artists compete 
in. As I previously outlined, the drag artists compete in a variety of 
categories that they attempt to approximate, which are marked by social 
norms discursively constituted across the lines of class, gender, and race. 
In addition to the ones that I have already mentioned, Butler cites the 'Ivy 
League student' (a product of White culture and a sign of high class); the 
'butch queen' (marked both by working class masculinity and femininity); 
and the 'bangie' (marked by straight, masculine African-American street 
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culture). Therefore, neither are the categories products of White culture 
only nor are they constituted by one modality of identity/difference. 
However, these categories are not mere trivial play on cultural signs 
for the drag artists. As Butler correctly points out, 'realness' is central to 
each category, that is, each category has a standard by which a drag 
artist's performance of a given category is rated and 'read' by others 
(1993, p. 129). The degree of success in effecting realness lies in the 
drag artist's ability to naturalise realness, to produce the notion that he/she 
is the embodiment of realness. Butler maintains that this is attempted by 
miming, embodying, and repeating a 'morphological ideal, ' that is, a bodily 
norm particular to a category, which regulates a given performance but for 
which no performance is able to fully and finally achieve (I explain this 
point in due course. ). 
Please note that I encase 'read' in inverted commas. For Butler, the 
success of a drag artist effecting realness is not about being literally read, 
whereby being literally read designates a divergence between realness 
and the drag artist's attempt to effect realness (1993, p. 129). Rather, 
success is about being figuratively read, whereby figuratively read 
designates a 'transparent seeing, ' a transparent doing of the convergence 
between realness and the drag artist's effecting of realness. Here, the 
drag artist's effecting of realness is realness. There is no distinction 
between the two. They are relatively one and the same thing. In these 
respects, the drag balls are competitions of realness for Butler. 
Within Althusserian conventional parlance, these competitions of 
realness are the staging of the social scene of interpellation for Butler 
(1993, pp. 129-31). By successfully miming and embodying the realness 
of a particular category, the drag artist gains his/her social existence as a 
subject of an established category. This staging is significant for Butler. 
The general structure of the drag performances reveals not so much the 
realness but the imitative nature of the categories. Each category is not 
representative of some natural sort of being. They only achieve the 
semblance and misnomer of realness by the drag artists (1) setting them 
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up as the original, the natural and (2) attempting to mime and embody 
their originality, naturalness through repetition (what Butler refers to as 
'reiteration'). In other words, it is only through a drag artist's performance 
that a category achieves the semblance and misnomer of originality and 
naturalness. The realness of a category is itself an effect of a drag artist 
effecting realness. Therefore, the general structure of his/her performance 
implicitly rearticulates that realness as a phantasmatic and regulatory 
construction, which cannot lay claim to originality and naturalness but 
nonetheless regulates the given performance as such. Accordingly, the 
realness of the category is denaturalised. It is to this extent, for Butler, 
that no performance is able to fully and finally achieve the realness of a 
particular category. It can only ever be a fantasy or, more precisely, a 
failed promise. 
This formulation of drag has been central to Butler's doctrine of gender 
performativity, which was introduced in Gender Trouble (1990) and later 
clarified and strengthened in Bodies That Matter (1993). I say 'clarified' 
and 'strengthened' because it has been significantly misinterpreted within 
feminist and queer quarters. By Butler citing drag as an example of 
gender performativity in Gender Trouble (1990), some readers, notably 
Kath Weston (1993), took her to mean that drag was "exemplary of 
[gender] performativity.... that all [gender] performativity [was] ... to 
be 
understood as drag" (Butler 1993, pp. 230-31, italics included in original). 
However, Butler makes it quite clear, in three separate passages in Bodies 
That Matter (1993, pp. x, 125,230-33), that she did not intend to construe 
gender as drag whereby "gender was like clothes" and "one woke in the 
morning, perused the closet or some more open space for the gender of 
choice, donned that gender for the day, and then restored the garment to 
its place at night" (1993, pp. x, 231). For Butler, gender is neither like 
clothes nor a highly reflective choice of a wilful subject free of social 
constraint. Rather, gender is like drag or is drag to the extent that it is a 
repeated and highly regulated idealisation of a hegemonic norm (read: 
compulsory heterosexuality) (Butler 1993, p. 125). As I previously 
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gestured, gender only achieves the semblance and misnomer of originality 
and naturalness by (1) compulsory heterosexuality setting it up as original 
and natural and (2) the subject miming and embodying that originality and 
naturalness through repetition. 
However, a critical distinction needs to be made here. It is the general 
structure of the drag performances that reveals the imitative nature of the 
realness of a subject position, not necessarily the drag artists themselves. 
Drag is not necessarily subversive for Butler (1993, p. 125). The general 
structure of a drag performance might be implicitly revealing the imitative 
nature of the realness of a subject position; however, on the surface, 
something totally different might be happening. For example, a drag artist 
might be actually renaturalising the realness of a subject position. On the 
other hand, a hegemonic norm might be renaturalising a hegemonic 
subject position that a drag artist is attempting to denaturalise through 
reiteration. Butler further considers how the parodying of norms can be 
subversive/non-subversive by further considering the kinship relations 
between the drag performers and a drag performer's effecting of 
compulsory heterosexuality's binary gender economy (1993, pp. 129-33, 
136-37). Whereas the drag performers' kinship relations denaturalise the 
realness of dominant subject positions, the converse is true for the drag 
performer effecting compulsory heterosexuality's binary gender economy. 2 
Each House houses or, more precisely, is housed by its own kinship 
system. For the most part, each kinship system is structurally and 
discursively based on Western society's conventional heterosexist nuclear 
family-that privileged familial unit based on biology/'blood' and comprised 
of relations between a husband/father proper (of the male sex), a 
wife/mother proper (of the female sex), and 2.4 children proper. Although 
the heterosexist nuclear family has significantly changed in form and has 
lost some of its diacritical power to produce and regulate discourses on 
gender and sexuality since the 1950s, it is still invoked today as the 
original and natural familial unit, especially since it is structurally and 
discursively based on biology/'blood. ' It is a major defining force of the 
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concept 'family. ' The two are relatively one and the same thing. However, 
please note that I state that each kinship system is based on this familial 
unit 'for the most part. ' This is because it is not fully replicated by the drag 
artists. There is no husband/father figure actually present. He is only an 
absent, imaginary figure but nonetheless one that still exists as a real 
figure for the drag artists. Having said this, the rest of the familial unit is 
structurally and discursively fulfilled and subscribes to proper subject 
positions. The Houses themselves are proper 'houses, ' replete with 
'mothers' and 'children. ' The drag artists who are mothers are mothers 
who 'mother' their children. That is, they rear, look after, support, and 
sustain their children-psychologically, emotionally, socially, and 
materially. And the drag artists who are children are children who are 
vulnerable and depend on that mothering for their present and future 
survival. There is, without question, an attachment between those who 
mother and those who are mothered. 
It is to this extent for Butler that the drag artists effect the realness of 
the subject positions of 'mother' and 'child' as understood by the 
conventional heterosexist nuclear family. By reiterating the subject 
position mother, the drag artists effectively naturalise mothering as a role 
that properly belongs to that of mothers. The same is true for the drag 
artists who occupy the subject position child. Through their psychological, 
emotional, social, and material attachments to their mothers, they 
naturalise those attachments as that of the subject position child. 
However, in effecting the realness of these subject positions, the drag 
artists effectively denaturalise the conventional heterosexist nuclear 
family. 
For Butler, the kinship systems of the Houses are a parodic inhabiting 
of conformity of the heterosexist nuclear family, that is, a resignification of 
the familial unit. Butler does not specifically elaborate on how they are a 
parodic inhabiting of conformity, but we might be able to make the 
following readings (They are not meant to be exhaustive. ). In the first 
instance, the drag artists might effect the realness of mothering as a role 
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that properly belongs to mothers, but they resignify that subject position 
insofar as they displace its metaphysical lodging. The drag artists reveal 
that the subject position mother does not naturally and exclusively belong 
to the female sex. It is just as easily possible for the subject position to 
belong to the male sex as well. After all, it is gay men and transsexuals 
effecting the subject position mother, not the female sex. Just like the 
general structure of their drag performances would implicitly reveal, the 
subject position mother only achieves the semblance and misnomer of 
naturally and exclusively belonging to the female sex by (1) compulsory 
heterosexuality setting it up as the natural subject position of the female 
sex and (2) the subject reiterating that naturalness in its discursive, 
institutional, and material manifestations. Therefore, the discontinuity 
between the drag artists' sexed body and culturally constructed gender 
suspends and questions the supposedly-natural binary gender system that 
underpins the whole of compulsory heterosexuality and, hence, the 
heterosexist nuclear family. Compulsory heterosexuality's binary gender 
system presupposes that there are two discrete natural sexes, male and 
female, that are understood and expressed through two discrete natural 
genders, man/masculine and woman/feminine, and then through a natural 
sexuality, heterosexuality. For the drag artists effecting the realness of the 
subject position mother, gender does not mirror its supposedly-respective 
natural sexed body. Gender becomes, as Butler has argued elsewhere, "a 
free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine might 
just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and 
feminine a male body as easily as a female one" (1990, p. 6, italics 
included in original). Here, gender exceeds the binary gender system. In 
doing so, it resignifies that system not as an interpretation of some natural 
order of the sexes but as a phantasmatic, yet regulatory ideal. 
In the second instance, the drag artists might effect the realness of the 
heterosexist nuclear family via the subject positions of mother and child, 
but they do this insofar as they dislodge the concept of family from its 
ontological lodging. I mentioned earlier that the heterosexist nuclear 
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family usually sets itself up as the original, the natural familial unit. This is 
accomplished by claiming that the concept of family is rooted in nature, 
that is, it is established by biology/'blood. ' However, by effecting the 
heterosexist nuclear family via the subject positions of mother and child, 
the drag artists suspend and question, as gay men and transsexuals, its 
naturalness. They demonstrate that gay men and transsexuals can also 
occupy the same subject positions within a familial unit and likewise 
sustain one, and they are by no means related to each other by 
biology/'blood. ' In doing so, they reveal not so much the realness but the 
imitative nature of it. Again, the heterosexist nuclear unit only achieves 
the semblance and misnomer of originality and naturalness by (1) 
compulsory heterosexuality setting the concept of family up as rooted in 
biology/'blood, ' (2) compulsory heterosexuality setting all other 
permutations of the family up as derivative and illegitimate, and (3) the 
subject reiterating that originality and naturalness in its discursive, 
institutional, and material manifestations. Revealed in this way, the drag 
artists' kinship relations effectively denaturalise the concept of the 
heterosexist nuclear family. Again, it is a phantasmatic, yet regulatory 
ideal. 3 
Although Butler does not explicitly make the previous readings, she 
does make it clear that the drag artists' parodic inhabiting of conformity is 
an enabling occasion for them to guarantee and preserve their present 
and future existence. As I previously mentioned and as Butler accurately 
puts it, the drag artists are faced with "dislocation, poverty, [and] 
homelessness" on a daily basis (1993, p. 137). They live in a reality 
dominated by the discursive terms, social structures, and material 
conditions of compulsory heterosexuality, which seek to exclude their kind 
of people from participating in and reaping the benefits of that reality 
(across the lines of gender, class, and race). As gay men and 
transsexuals, they are forced to live in isolation. As gay men and 
transsexuals, they are not permitted to economically benefit from the fruits 
of their labour or to participate in a labour market that bears fruit. And as 
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gay men and transsexuals, they are kicked out of the homes that they 
were born and reared in and are forced to live rough on the streets. 
However, by effecting the realness of the heterosexist nuclear family 
through the subject positions of mother and child, they resignify that 
familial unit in order to establish and sustain their own familial unit or, more 
precisely, community. This community is not, as Butler puts it, "a vain or 
useless imitation [of the heterosexist nuclear family based on 
biologyfblood'], " but one "that binds, cares, and teaches, that shelters and 
enables" (1993, p. 137). In other words, it is a community that enables 
them to house and sustain one another as gay men and transsexuals in 
the face of compulsory heterosexuality. In short, it is a community that 
enables them to survive-psychologically, emotionally, socially, and 
materially. 
Conversely, for Butler, a drag performer's effecting of compulsory 
heterosexuality's binary gender economy demonstrates that the parodying 
of a subject position of a hegemonic norm is not always sufficient to 
denaturalise it. Indeed, Venus' parodying of compulsory heterosexuality's 
binary gender economy via the subject position woman implicitly 
denaturalises gender. However, it is questionable for Butler whether she 
explicitly denaturalises gender herself. Venus' death finally testifies for 
Butler that she is unsuccessful in her attempt to denaturalise compulsory 
heterosexuality's binary gender economy. For Butler, Venus' death 
demonstrates that a hegemonic norm will go to extreme lengths to 
renaturalise itself, "that there are cruel and fatal social constraints on 
denaturalization" (1993, p. 133). 
previously outlined that Venus is a member of the House of 
Extravaganza. Since she is housed by the House's very own kinship 
system, she formally goes by the full name of Venus Extravaganza of the 
House of Extravaganza. As a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual, 
she has not morphologically changed her sex from male to female yet. 
She refers to her remaining bits of masculinity as her 'little secret, ' what 
male-to-female transsexuals usually refer to as their 'candy' or 'T. ' She 
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does however take hormone tablets. Venus also tries to pass as White. 
However, she is light-skinned. Venus is a Latina. Furthermore, Venus 
lives in poverty. Her only shelter, apart from the House of Extravaganza, 
is on street corners and within dislocated bedrooms of motels and houses 
of male customers. She sustains shelter through illegitimate employment 
as a prostitute. In these respects, Venus is not just a woman. She is also 
Black and economically and materially underprivileged. 
Venus effects the subject position woman as set out by compulsory 
heterosexuality's binary gender economy. She makes no secret of her 
motive throughout the film. She talks about her desire to become a full 
and final woman, to find a man and get married, and to live in the suburbs 
tending to the daily laundry. In order to effect the realness of the subject 
position woman, to pass as a full and final woman, Venus compels and 
effects a mimetic relation between her sexed body (female) (via taking her 
course of female hormones), culturally constructed gender 
(woman/feminine) (via subscribing to and taking on female gender roles), 
and sexuality (heterosexuality) (via desiring and seeking out the male 
sex). Because her penis can reveal that she is not a real woman, she 
carefully hides it with precision. To a large degree, she is successful. She 
is figuratively read as a woman by others within the film, particularly her 
male clients. However, this does become her downfall. 
For Butler, Venus' effecting of the subject position woman implicitly 
denaturalises it. She reveals that its mimetic relation between sex, 
gender, and sexuality is not representative of some original, natural 
essence or order. The subject position woman is an effect of the 
idealisation and reiteration of a regulatory norm (read: compulsory 
heterosexuality). However, Butler questions whether Venus explicitly 
denaturalises the subject position herself. She is not totally convinced that 
she does. Butler does not specifically state her reservations, but we might 
be able to make the following reading. On the surface, Venus 
understands her subjectivity as a woman as reflective of a natural 
essence. She understands herself as a true woman trapped within a 
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man's body. Furthermore, she understands the mimetic relation between 
sex, gender, and sexuality as reflective of a natural order. As I previously 
mentioned, she talks at great lengths about her desire to be a woman 
(female sex), to live in the suburbs tending to the laundry (female gender 
role), and to marry a man (heterosexuality). Thus, for Butler, there is a 
potential split in Venus' success in parodying and denaturalising the 
subject position woman. The question for Butler is "whether the 
denaturalization of gender ... she performs ... culminates 
in a reworking 
of the normative framework of heterosexuality" (1993, p. 133). 
Regardless of whether Venus implicitly/explicitly 
denaturalises/naturalises the subject position woman, Butler correctly 
points out that Venus' effecting of the subject position is not solely a 
renegotiation of her gender. It is also a means for her to renegotiate her 
subjecthood along the lines of race and class. In her pursuit to effect a 
mimetic relation between her sexed body, culturally constructed gender, 
and sexuality, she wants "to find an imaginary man who will designate a 
class and race privilege that promises a permanent shelter from racism ... 
and poverty" (Butler 1993, p. 130). This imaginary man is, unsurprisingly, 
White and of a professional class. Having said this, Butler is quick to point 
out that gender is not the primary 'substance' or 'substrate' of Venus' 
subjecthood, with race and class as the additional 'qualifying attributes. ' 
Rather, gender is a "nexus of race and class, the site of its articulation" 
(Butler 1993, p. 130). In this light, Venus' reiteration of compulsory 
heterosexuality's binary gender economy is not solely an effecting of 
femaleness. It is also a reiteration of Whiteness and of a professional 
class. Ultimately, Venus wants to, at best, be or, at worst, pass as a 
White, middle/upper-class woman. According to Butler, this is critically 
significant for the psychoanalytic paradigm. 
According to Butler, compulsory heterosexuality's binary gender 
economy would be referred to as 'the Symbolic' within Lacanian discourse. 
For Butler, the Symbolic designates a set of "rules that regulate and 
legitimate realness ... [and] constitute the mechanism by which certain 
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sanctioned fantasies, sanctioned imaginaries, are insidiously elevated as 
the parameters of realness" (1993, p. 130). Within this framework, as 
Butler is correct to point out, sexual difference is understood as the 
primary marker in the constitution of the subject. The markers of race and 
class are considered secondary or derivative. However, Paris is Burning 
(1991) suggests for Butler that the Symbolic is not simply an issue of 
gender norms: "the Symbolic is also and at once a racializing set of norms, 
and ... norms of realness by which the subject is produced are racially 
informed conceptions of 'sex"' (1993, p. 130). Although Butler does not 
mention class, she would formulate it within these terms. Accordingly, 
Butler maintains that the entire psychoanalytic register needs to subjected 
to such a critique. 
Venus may implicitly denaturalise the subject position woman and its 
normative framework by effecting it, but it is not sufficient to denaturalise it. 
In her pursuit to find an imaginary man who will secure her effecting of the 
subject position across the lines of gender, class, and race, Venus 
becomes a victim. Upon the discovery that her'natural' sexed body (male) 
does not mirror the gender (woman/feminine) and sexuality (desiring the 
male sex/heterosexuality) that she presents, one of Venus' male clients 
mutilates and kills her for having tricked him into seduction. According to 
Butler, Venus' death is the renaturalisation of compulsory heterosexuality: 
"As much as she crosses gender, sexuality, and race performatively, the 
hegemony that reinscribes the privileges of normative femininity and 
[W]hiteness wields the final power to renaturalise Venus's body and cross 
out that prior crossing, an erasure that is her death" (1993, p. 133, italics 
included in original). Indeed, Venus dies because her effecting of the 
subject position woman defies and questions the naturalness of 
compulsory heterosexuality's binary gender economy. Her death is the 
mechanism by which compulsory heterosexuality stamps out and erases 
the notion that the subject position woman is the effect of the idealisation 
and reiteration of a regulatory hegemonic norm and, in doing so, 
renaturalises it as reflective of a natural essence and order of the sexes. 
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Hence, her death is a means for compulsory heterosexuality to protect and 
secure its foundations as natural and ward off the possibility of opening up 
its discursive terms. 
li. Butler's Under-analysis of the Social 
at the Expense of Textualism 
I must admit at this juncture that I am seductively drawn to Butler's 
analysis of drag, and, furthermore, I will not offer an apology to those who 
are offended by this open and frank admission. Throughout her discursive 
analysis of drag in Paris is Burning (1991), she traverses some tricky and 
sticky terrains (some more than others): the 'subject, ' identity, and agency 
are all topical in relation to sexuality, gender, race, and class. Her 
analysis is insightful and useful at both the intellectual and political levels. 
I strongly believe that the theoretical insights that arise out of her analysis 
are particularly useful for a broad-based queer politics that is not only 
critical of the matrices of power within which it is constituted and it 
opposes but is also critical of its own politics from within. In particular, she 
encourages her readers to seriously consider the following: the realness of 
a subject position is an effect of the effecting of a regulatory hegemonic 
norm; a hegemonic norm is and always will be implicated in the present 
and future discursive manifestations of the subject who opposes its 
constitution, no matter how and to what degree an identificatory move 
seeks to oppose that norm; the parodic inhabiting of conformity can be a 
strategic move to denaturalise a hegemonic norm; and, conversely, the 
denaturalisation of a hegemonic subject position is in no way free play and 
can be an occasion for a hegemonic norm to painfully renaturalise itself. 
However, despite the enabling and productive impulse of her analysis, I do 
have one strong reservation. In particular, I take serious issue with her 
methodological framing of drag. 
Although there are traces of sociological interests and matters of 
concern within Butler's analysis of drag, her sole usage of a detached 
methodological approach inhibits her from offering a more developed 
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social analysis. For example, because Butler solely relies on Paris is 
Burning (1991) for her analysis of drag and Paris is Burning is limited in its 
content and form, she is unable to explore any of the following sociological 
questions in great(er) detail. They include but are not limited to: 
1. the drag artists denaturalise hegemonic subject positions of 
compulsory heterosexuality along the lines of gender, 
sexuality, race, and class by revealing their imitative nature; 
however, do they produce and regulate their own normative 
subject positions? 
2. if the drag artists produce their own normative subject 
positions, are they constitutive of an identificatory value 
system, which avows certain identifications and disavows 
others? 
3. through what mechanisms do they regulate identification? are 
they institutional, discursive, or material? 
4. for those identifications that are disavowed, how do they 
constitute and sustain the limits of sanctioned identifications? 
what is the relationship between the two? 
5. for those identifications that are disavowed, do they ever open 
up and resignify the discursive terms of sanctioned 
identifications, and, if 'yes, ' how and under what conditions? 
conversely, if 'no, ' what are the social constraints that prevent 
them from being opened up, and how are they renaturalised?; 
6. the drag artists effect a particular category by reiterating a 
bodily norm; however, is this the only kind of norm that the 
drag artists effect? do they also effect institutional norms, 
mores, or normative patterns of behaviour? 
7. are these norms effected differently? are they effected 
separately or is there a correlation between them? if there is a 
correlation between them, then are there various degrees of 
correlation? 
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8. at what levels do these norms script the drag artists' subject 
positions: the cultural, interpersonal, or intrapsychic? 
9. is there a convergence or divergence between these levels of 
scripting? what are the social conditions that give rise to a 
convergence or divergence? 
10. the bodily norm of compulsory heterosexuality is not only a 
gender norm for Butler but is also a race and class norm; 
however, what does Butler mean by 'race' and 'class'? for 
example, is class rooted in and driven by market relations or is 
it part of a larger distribution of power in the Weberian sense 
(as well as class, status and party)? 
11. if the drag in Paris is Burning (1991) is understood as a social 
text that is a product of a complex structure of social relations 
of encoding and decoding, then what is its encoding-decoding 
architecture? and 
12. how does Butler's disciplinary location inform her decoding of 
drag? what are the other possible decodings of drag from 
other social locations? 
If Butler had employed or incorporated a sociological methodological 
programme that is based in social life and actively incorporates the lived 
experiences of social actors, then she probably would have shed (more) 
light on some of the aforementioned sociological questions. In other 
words, she may have produced a more developed social analysis of drag 
and, subsequently, of subjectivity. Here, I have in mind face-to-face 
interviews, questionnaires, (participant) observation, focus group 
discussions, life histories, and case studies. The task, then, for Butler, 
could be about employing or incorporating a methodological approach (or 
set of approaches) that examines drag outside of the text. This 
methodological move is neither intended to work against a textual 
methodological approach nor is it to be understood as a return to 
positivism, as I explained in the introduction of the chapter. Rather, its 
intention is to widen and deepen the examination of a subject/object and 
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to generate an analysis that is more socially sustained than what a textual 
methodological approach may produce on its own. 
iii. Normative Drag Subject Positions 
Paris is Burning (1991) vividly underscores the centrality of the discursive 
terms of compulsory heterosexuality in relation to the drag artists' 
subjecthood, both on and off the stage. On stage, compulsory 
heterosexuality sets out and regulates the discursive terms by which the 
drag artists effect compulsory heterosexuality's subject positions and gain 
their social existence. Off stage, compulsory heterosexuality sets out and 
regulates the discursive terms by which the drag artists are de-legitimised 
as non-subjects as gay men and transsexuals. Furthermore, both on and 
off stage, the drag artists effect the realness of compulsory 
heterosexuality's subject positions in order to denaturalise and resignify 
them in directions that undermine compulsory heterosexuality. In other 
words, compulsory heterosexuality is worked so that it can be reworked 
against itself and the drag artists can attempt to guarantee a more 
enabling future for themselves as gay men and transsexuals. However, 
despite the centrality of compulsory heterosexuality, Paris is Burning 
(1991) does not enable Butler to examine whether the drag artists 
themselves produce and regulate their own normative subject positions. 
Esther Newton's classic and widely-cited ethnography on North 
American gay male male-to-female drag, Mother Camp (1972), examines 
this very point. Her methodological approach enabled her to widen and 
deepen her examination of drag, with the result that she produces a more 
developed social analysis than that which Paris is Burning (1991) permits 
and Butler subsequently produces. Her methodological approach is based 
in social life and actively incorporates the lived experiences of gay male 
drag artists, their audience, and their employers. This was achieved by 
conducting ethnographic fieldwork in gay male drag bars in Chicago, New 
York City, and Kansas City over a fourteen-month period via face-to-face 
interviews, observation, questionnaires, and informal conversations. By 
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creating a dialogue with her interlocutors, Newton's fieldwork revealed that 
drag artists produce and regulate their own normative subject positions 
(1972, pp. 41-58). 
For example, Newton discusses two subject positions that are cultural 
products of gay male drag: the 'glamour drag queen' and the 'transy drag 
queen' (1972, pp. 46-51). Glamour drag queens impersonate cultural 
icons such as Bette Davis, Mae West, Marlene Dietrich, and Judy Garland. 
Ideally, the glamour drag queen is beautiful in appearance: she is youthful 
and has supple skin, yet has a good, strong bone structure; she has large, 
soft breasts; her makeup is not heavy but complementary; her jewellery is 
classic and minimalist and does not weigh her down; her hair or wig is 
preferably blond and sophisticatedly coiffed; and she wears an evening 
gown, preferably high cut and floor length, with matching high heels. 
Ideally, the glamour drag queen is also a highly-skilled singer and does 
not lip-sync her songs performed on stage. Further, the glamour drag 
queen ideally has strong mimicry skills and is versatile throughout her 
performances in any given night. A true, real glamour drag queen can 
effectively perform four or more impersonations in one hour. Lastly, the 
glamour drag queen only does drag in social spaces that are reserved for 
drag. She never does drag off stage. Drag is a profession, not an identity 
badge that one wears off stage. On the other hand, transy drag queens 
do drag differently and for different reasons. In the first instance, drag is 
not solely reserved for the stage. The transy drag queen does drag off 
stage in a range of private and public spaces. Also, drag is not a 
profession for the transy drag queen. Drag is a means for the transy drag 
queen "to be rather than to imitate a woman" (Newton 1972, p. 51, italics 
included in original). Thus, the transy drag queen does not imitate a 
glamorous cultural icon. Rather, she attempts to pass as an ordinary- 
looking woman. According to Newton, transsexuals, transgenders, and 
transvestites usually occupy the subject position of transy drag queen. 
The glamour drag queen and transy drag queen are not simply 
descriptive subject positions of different types of drag artists for Newton. 
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They are also prescriptive, normative subject positions that set out the 
discursive terms by which a drag artist becomes a subject of one of them. 
Again, in order for a drag artist to be a glamour drag queen, she must fulfil 
and maintain a beauty standard in any given performance; she must sing 
her own songs rather than lip-sync; she must have strong, versatile 
mimicry skills and be able to mimic a number of idolised glamour stars; 
and she must only reserve her drag for the stage. Again and conversely, 
the transy drag queen does not reserve drag for the stage only and does it 
in order to be a woman, not imitate a woman. Ideally, she wants to pass 
as a real, ordinary woman. 
These normative subject positions are regulatory for Newton because 
they are constitutive of the drag artists' own identificatory value system. It 
regulates which drag subject positions are considered good, normal, and 
natural, that is, legitimate, and those that are considered bad, abnormal, 
and unnatural, that is, illegitimate. According to Newton, the glamour drag 
queen is a subject position that is highly valued by the drag artists and one 
that they ultimately want to be recognised as by other drag artists. As 
Newton correctly puts it, "[g]lamour drag and serious drag are synonymous 
terms to female impersonators" (1972, p. 49). In short, it is a drag subject 
position that carries high status. Whereas the glamour drag queen 
designates a legitimate subject position, the opposite is true for the drag 
subject position of transy drag queen. This is reflected in a couple of 
Newton's observations: 
A street-oriented boy was changing costume backstage. This 
revealed that he had on a pair of women's underpants. However, 
these were not the usual simple nylon briefs worn by the others 
[the glamour drag queens], but were pink and frilly. The other 
performers immediately began to tease him about his 'pussy' 
underpants. He laughed it off, saying, "You old queens are just 
jealous of my transy panties. " However, I noticed that he did not 
wear them again. 
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Another street-oriented boy, who was very much disliked by the 
other performers, and who had only been working for a few weeks, 
had outfitted himself largely with skirts and blouses. The emcee 
began to criticize this, saying his appearance was too transy. 
Soon the boy was in a state of some anxiety about it, and before 
he would go on stage he would nervously ask anyone who was 
standing around, "Does this look too transy? " to which they would 
always reply, "Yes. " When I asked one of the older performers 
what this meant, he said it meant the boy's drag looked "too much 
like a real woman. It's not showy enough. No woman would go 
on stage looking like that" (1972, p. 51). 
Additionally the drag artists' identificatory value system is a means for 
the drag artists to legitimise certain drag subject positions, which, in its 
absence, would otherwise be de-legitimised by compulsory 
heterosexuality. According to Newton, the drag artists' identificatory value 
system primarily legitimises certain drag subject positions by underscoring 
their context and motivation. As I previously alluded, legitimate drag 
subject positions, such as the glamour drag queen, are only reserved for 
the stage and performance and are a means to make legitimate money. 
In other words, legitimate drag subject positions are equated with 
professionalism. Here, according to Newton, the drag artists' identificatory 
value system brings drag under group control and legitimises certain drag 
subject positions so that dominant culture (read: compulsory 
heterosexuality) reads them as 'legitimate' rather than 'deviant. ' 
Conversely, according to Newton, the drag artists' identificatory value 
system further de-legitimises the transy drag subject position, which is 
already read by compulsory heterosexuality as deviant. Because the 
context and motivation of transy drag are not equated with 
professionalism, transy drag is understood as an illegitimate drag subject 
position. 
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iv. Other Kinds of Norms and their Relationship 
In the main, Paris is Burning (1991) vividly underscores the centrality of 
only one kind of norm in relation to the drag artists' performances: a bodily 
norm. As I previously outlined, the categories that the drag artists attempt 
to effect each have their own bodily norm, which is the standard that 
regulates a drag artist's given performance and by which his/her 
performance is read and rated by other drag artists. A drag artist's degree 
of success in effecting a particular category lies in his/her ability to 
reiterate the bodily norm of the category as closely as possible, whereby 
there is a transparent seeing rather than a literal interpretation of the 
category. Although Butler analyses gender roles and sexuality in relation 
to the kinship systems of the Houses and Venus' effecting of compulsory 
heterosexuality's binary gender economy, Paris is Burning's (1991) 
emphasis on bodily norms does not provide the occasion for Butler to 
provide a more developed social analysis of other kinds of norms that the 
drag artists might be reiterating in their attempt to effect a particular 
category. 
As I discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter, the work of 
Gagnon and Simon examines norms in great detail, particularly 
"Introduction: Deviant Behavior and Sexual Deviance" (1967a), Sexual 
Conduct (1973b), and "Sexual Scripts: Permanence and Change" (1986). 
Their examination of norms is not in relation to drag but it is in relation to 
sexuality (particularly sexual behaviour). Their methodological approach 
enabled them to widen and deepen their examination of norms and 
provide a more developed social analysis than that which Paris is Burning 
(1991) permits and Butler subsequently produces. Although their work is 
mainly conceptual and theoretical, it is based on the empirical-theoretical 
observations of other social scientists who conducted systematic fieldwork 
in gay male communities through face-to-face interviews, questionnaires, 
observation, and informal conversations. They include: Nancy Achilles' 
(1967) work on the homosexual bar as an institution; Evelyn Hooker's 
(1966) and Maurice Leznoffs and William S. Westley's (1956) formulations 
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on the 'homosexual community'; Laud Humphrey's work on impersonal 
public sex among gay men; and Michael Schofield's (1965) sociological 
typology of homosexuality. By incorporating the empirical-theoretical 
observations of other social scientists, they revealed how sexuality is 
regulated by different norms: institutional norms, mores, and patterns of 
sexual behaviour. Gagnon and Simon were also able to generate a 
sustained examination of how these norms have varied correlations with 
one another and are scripted at different, yet interconnected levels: the 
cultural, interpersonal, and intrapsychic. Nonetheless, Butler cannot 
consider these kinds of norms and their relationship in respect to the drag 
artists' performances because she does not expand her methodological 
approach. 4 
v. The Encoding-Decoding Architecture of Drag 
In relation to the eleventh sociological question and its subsidiaries, 
Butler's methodological framing of drag precludes a more developed 
social analysis of the encoding-decoding architecture of the drag 
represented in Paris is Burning (1991). To a certain degree, Butler does 
examine it (1993, pp. 133-35). In particular, she briefly critiques bell 
hooks' (1991) critique of the relationship between Livingston's identity, that 
is, White woman/lesbian filmmaker, and the drag artists' racial identities 
and how Blackness represented in Paris is Burning (1991) is the product 
of Livingston's specific Whiteness. Butler also briefly considers the 
relationship between Livingston's identity and the identities of the drag 
artists and how Livingston's identity enables her to have the power to 
transubstantiate the gender of the transsexual drag artists from male to 
female via the phallic camera. However, because Butler's analysis of the 
encoding-decoding architecture of drag is solely reliant on Paris is Burning 
(1991), she is unable to move towards producing a more developed social 
analysis. Her insights are only, at best, gestural or, at worst, theoretically 
ungrounded, sociologically. If she had moved her analysis outside of 
Paris is Burning (1991) by incorporating or employing a methodological 
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programme that is based in social life, then she may have considered 
some points that Stuart Hall (1993) makes in his formulation of message 
production, subsequently producing a more developed social analysis. 
Although Hall's formulation is conceptual and theoretical and is not 
based on any fieldwork that he carried out himself, it does make points 
and raise questions for the reader that can only be studied by employing a 
methodological approach that is based in social life. His work did indeed 
prompt a flurry of encoding-decoding studies within the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham in the 1980s, most notably 
David Morley's (1980,1981,1983) work on how social groups interpret a 
television programme differently. 
In brief, Hall's "Encoding, Decoding" is a deep examination and 
theoretical account of the production and use of messages, particularly in 
relation to television (1993, pp. 90-94). Writing against mass- 
communications research's behaviourist tendency to conceptualise 
message exchange, that is, sender/message/receiver, as a 'tap on the 
knee cap, ' Hall proposes a four-stage communication theory instead. His 
theory takes into consideration both the dominant encoded meanings of a 
message and the distinctiveness of each moment of the communicative 
chain/process. For Hall, a message is produced, disseminated, and 
sustained by four 'linked, but distinctive' moments: production, circulation, 
distribution/consumption (use), and reproduction. Each moment is linked 
insofar as a message is imprinted (encoded) with dominant meanings that 
are constitutive of institutional discourses and power relations. As a result, 
the message's reception at each moment is somewhat controlled from the 
very beginning. However, each moment is distinctive insofar as a 
message is subjected to each moment's own 'specific modality and 
conditions of existence, ' which can interrupt the passage of a message or 
interpret its meanings differently (decode). In this sense, for Hall, the 
communicative chain/process is a 'complex structure in dominance. ' Hall 
provides an example for the reader in relation to the television 
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communicative process, although his example is more general rather than 
specific (1993, pp. 92-94). 
According to Hall, the institutional structures of broadcasting are 
tasked with producing a television programme, which he understands as a 
message. In order to produce a television message with certain encoded 
meanings, they will first draw upon their own practices, networks of 
production, and technical infrastructure to inform the message. The 
message here is in its raw, although dependent form: a set of material 
instruments, social relations, and organised practices, which work to 
produce a message. Thus, for Hall, in one sense, the communicative 
chain/process of producing a message begins here. However, please 
take note that this is 'in one sense' for Hall. According to Hall, the 
television message's initial production does not take place within a 
vacuum: "the production process is not without its 'discursive' aspect" 
(1993, p. 92). The production of the television message will be informed 
by other frameworks of knowledge as well, particularly that of the wider 
media machinery and the socio-cultural and political landscape of the 
audience: professional ideologies, technical skills that are historically 
defined, assumptions about the audience, images of the audience, 
agendas and events of the day, and so on. In this light, for Hall, the target 
audience is not simply the receiver of the television message but is also its 
source: "Thus-to borrow Marx's terms-circulation and reception are, 
indeed, 'moments' of the production process in television and are 
reincorporated, via a number of skewed and structured 'feedbacks, ' into 
the production process itself' (1993, pp. 92-93). 
Broadcasting structures will then circulate the encoded television 
message in the form of symbolic vehicles. This is another linked, yet 
distinctive moment of the communicative chain/process for Hall. In order 
for the television message to be realised by its intended audience, that is, 
to be put to use or to fulfil a need, it must first be understood and 
appropriated as a meaningful discourse. According to Hall, the formal 
rules of discourse and language will transform the encoded television 
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message into a meaningful discourse. This is done by provisionally 
decoding it for its audience. Thus, the formal rules of discourse and 
language are now in dominance, at the linked, yet distinctive moment of 
circulation. It is this form of the encoded television message that will be 
decoded by the audience and have an effect. According to Hall, effect 
here may designate influencing, entertaining, instructing, or persuading, 
with consequences that may be behavioural, emotional, psychological, 
ideological, cognitive, or perceptual. 
Once the television message is circulated as per the formal rules of 
discourse and language, then another linked, yet distinctive moment of the 
communicative chain/process will be initiated: the television message will 
be decoded by the audience. According to Hall, decoding cannot be 
understood in simple behavioural terms. There is no immediate effect. 
Hall writes: 
The typical processes identified in positivistic research on isolated 
elements-effects, uses, 'gratifications'-are themselves framed 
by structures of understanding, as well as being produced by 
social and economic relations, which shape their 'realization' at the 
reception end of the chain and which permit the meanings 
signified in the discourse to be transposed into practice or 
consciousness (to acquire social use value or political effectivity) 
(1993, p. 93). 
In other words, the television message will not be unilaterally decoded by 
the audience according to its institutional encoded meanings. Its decoding 
will be partly informed by the audience's own modality and conditions of 
existence, which are culturally, socially, economically, and politically 
specific. In this light, according to Hall, the relationship between the 
television message's dominant encoded meanings and their articulation 
into the audience's specific modality and conditions of existence may not 
be perfectly symmetrical. On the one hand, the television message may 
be symmetrically articulated into the audience's specific modality and 
conditions of existence, with the result that it will be finally reproduced 
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according to its dominant encoded meanings. In this instance, the 
communicative chain/process will be complete. On the other hand, the 
television message may be asymmetrically articulated into the audience's 
specific modality and conditions of existence: the television message may 
be decoded differently (a 'negotiated reading') or invoke non-identification 
and produce a reverse-discourse (a 'counter-hegemonic' reading). In 
these instances, the television message's dominant encoded meanings 
will not be fully reproduced. 
A reading of Hall's essay does indeed highlight that a developed social 
analysis of the encoding-decoding architecture of the drag represented in 
Paris is Burning (1991) cannot be simply restricted to the documentary. It 
can only be examined outside of, although with, Paris is Burning (1991). 
Some questions that Hall's essay incites include: how is the drag 
represented in Paris is Burning (1991), as well as Paris is Burning itself, 
produced, circulated, distributed/consumed, and reproduced? how are 
Paris is Burning's encoded meanings of drag constitutive of institutional 
practices, networks/relations of production, and technical infrastructures 
within the media machinery? how does the socio-cultural and political 
landscape of Paris is Burning's target audience shape and inform its 
encoded meanings of drag? what are the formal rules of language and 
discourse that govern Paris is Burning's (1991) circulation, and how do 
they transform it into a meaningful discourse meaningfully decoded for its 
audience? how does Butler's disciplinary location inform her reading of 
drag, as does Livingston's and the drag artists' social locations? To this 
extent, Hall highlights Butler's lack of methodology. 
A. Queer Theory's Textualism 
Perhaps the degree of my criticisms of Butler's methodological framing of 
drag are a little too severe. Perhaps my criticisms are unfairly weighted 
more by my sociological leanings than taking into the balance Butler's 
disciplinary location. Indeed, Butler is a critical feminist theorist who toils 
in the domains of philosophy, and she is not a practitioner of sociology. In 
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this light, I can neither expect her to be fully methodologically equipped to 
examine the aforementioned sociological questions outside of the text nor 
have those questions at the forefront of her critical horizon. Furthermore, 
Butler's discursive analysis of drag is not part of a study of drag. It 
supports a larger argument on subjectivity. In these respects, any fair 
criticisms need to take into consideration and have a certain respect for 
the scope and nature of her disciplinary location and its pursuits, as well 
as the principal subject matter of her chapter. However, I think my 
criticisms are fair game. In the first instance, as I have demonstrated, 
there are significant traces of sociological interests and matters of concern 
within her analysis, particularly in respect to subjectivity, norms, and the 
encoding-decoding architecture of drag. In the second instance, she does 
not attempt to examine her sociological leanings in greater detail. In the 
third instance, she does not employ or, at the very least, incorporate a 
methodological programme that would more appropriately equip her to 
examine those leanings. Her sociological leanings are contradicted 
methodologically in practice. Having said this, the criticisms I make here 
are less about Butler being well-versed in sociological method herself. 
Her failure to employ or incorporate a sociological methodological 
programme is in line with a wider queer preoccupation. 
Within sociological discourse, queer theory has come under heavy 
criticism for its under-analysis of the social at the expense of investing in 
textualism (for example, Epstein 1996 [1994]; Namaste 1996; Seidman 
1993,1995,1996a; Warner 1993). Sociologists' reservations have not 
simply been about texts being objects of study for queer theorists. They 
have also and mainly been about the way in which queer debates on the 
social have been largely framed methodologically: textually. They have 
found it troublesome that queer theorists, on the one hand, make social 
gestures about sex, gender, and sexuality but, on the other hand, fail to 
welcome and entertain a methodological programme that facilitates a 
more developed analysis of the social. For practitioners of sociology, a 
developed social analysis does not reside in a textual methodological 
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approach that sits on its own and is detached from the social. It resides in 
one that actively incorporates the lived experiences of social actors in 
some way or another, for example (again): focus group discussions, face- 
to-face interviews, (participant) observation, life histories, case studies, or 
questionnaires. Methodology is rooted in social life. Nonetheless, 
sociological ways of investigating subjects/objects of study have largely 
been excluded from queer theory's methodological programme, and the 
under-analysis of the social has continued to plague queer theorists. Let 
us briefly turn to Butler once again as a case in point. 
John Hood-Williams and Wendy Cealey Harrison have pointed out that 
Butler's (1993, pp. 7-8,232) recurrent example of the 'girling' of girls is 
partly aligned with functionalist sociology and anthropology (namely 
Oakley 1981) and fails to perform a more developed social analysis that is 
akin to "the radicalism implied by Foucault's conception of discourse" 
(1998, p. 89). According to Hood-Williams and Harrison, "[i]t is unhelpful . 
.. to find what looks suspiciously like a return to early sociological notions 
of 'sex role socialization' in her repeated example of the 'girling' of girls.. . 
. Such an implied movement from 'It's a girl' through 'girling' to woman ... 
is far too neat" (1998, p. 89). Ian Burkitt (1998) has also pointed out 
Butler's under-analysis of the social in light of Foucault. According to 
Burkitt, Butler's (1990,1993) formulation that the binary distinctions of 
gender (man and woman) and sexuality (heterosexuality and 
homosexuality) are fictive discursive constructions fails to employ a more 
social reading of Foucault's understanding of power. Burkitt argues 
against Butler's formulation and understands these binaries as arising in 
social-historical relations. As another example, Terry Lovell (2003) has 
argued that Butler's (1997b) emphasis on speech acts and the individual 
in her theory of iterability fails to examine the social contexts that inform 
and delimit the capacity of the social actor to disrupt institutional authority. 
A surface review of the methodological landscape of a couple key 
queer texts broadly highlights the degree to which queer theory's under- 
analysis of the social has been at the expense of investing in textualism. 
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They include: Teresa de Lauretis' specially-edited issue of the journal 
differences, "Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities" (1991a), and 
Diana Fuss' edited anthology Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories 
(1991 b). 5 
de Lauretis' "Queer Theory" (1991 a) is a collection of eight essays that 
were presented at a conference on theorising lesbian and gay sexualities 
held at University of California, Santa Cruz in February 1990 (in addition to 
de Lauretis' introductory essay) (de Lauretis 1991b, pp. iii-iv). According 
to de Lauretis, the authors of the essays worked from the premise that 
homosexuality can no longer be understood as a 'marginal, ' 'deviant' 
sexuality vis-ä-vis a 'dominant, ' 'proper, ' 'natural, ' 'stable' sexuality, that is, 
heterosexuality. Male and female homosexualities are "social and cultural 
forms in their own right, albeit emergent ones and thus still fuzzily defined, 
undercoded, or discursively dependent on more established forms" (de 
Lauretis 1991b, p. iii). This formulation was topical in Chapter Two in 
relation to queer identity. From this point of departure, the authors of the 
essays contributed in some way to the overall aims of the conference: 
[1. ] to articulate the terms in which lesbian and gay sexualities 
may be understood and imaged as forms of resistance to cultural 
homogenization, counteracting dominant discourses with other 
constructions of the subject in culture. It was also my hope that 
the conference would also [2. ] problematise some of the discursive 
constructions and constructed silences in the emergent field of 
'gay and lesbian studies, ' and would further [3] explore questions 
that have as yet been barely broached, such as the respective 
and/or common grounding of current discourses and practices of 
homo-sexualities in relation to gender and to race, with their 
attendant differences of class or ethnic culture, generational, 
geographical, and socio-political location.... from there, we could 
then go on [4. ] to recast or reinvent the terms of our sexualities, to 
construct another discursive horizon, another way of thinking the 
sexual (de Lauretis 1991 b, pp. iii-iv). 
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The essays' subjects/objects of study are diverse. Some of them 
include: queer subjectivity and the trope of the vampire (Case 1991); 
street talk/straight talk as the 'twin rhetorical modes' of discourse on the 
sexual body and AIDS (Delany 1991); the reappropriation and 
rearticulation of some of psychoanalysis' concepts for the forging of a 
lesbian theory (Grosz 1991); Chicano homosexual identity and behaviour 
(Almaguer 1991); gay male narrative and its relation to the phallocentric 
libidinal economy (Jackson, Jr. 1991); and the relation between feminism 
and lesbian sadomasochism (Creet 1991). 
de Lauretis claims that the essays' authors come from a wide range of 
disciplines (1991b, p. xvi). However, their disciplines are mainly 
humanities-based, for example: performance, film studies, the history of 
consciousness, and English literature. Only one author is a sociologist: 
Thomas Almaguer (1991). de Lauretis further claims that a wide range of 
methodologies are employed. However, they are mainly textual in nature: 
queer subjectivity and the trope of the vampire are investigated by 
performing a discursive analysis of the mystical imagery created in the 
work of St. John of the Cross (1959,1962), the queer poetry of Arthur 
Rimbaud (1957,1976), and Oscar Wilde's queer kiss in Salome (1967); 
street talk/straight talk as the 'twin rhetorical modes' of discourse on the 
sexual body and AIDS is investigated by performing a discursive and 
rhetorical analysis of public (dis)information on the subject, particularly 
newspaper and medical journal articles (for example, the New York Times 
and the New England Journal of Medicine); the reappropriation and 
rearticulation of psychoanalysis for the forging of a lesbian theory is 
investigated by performing a psychoanalytic critique of Freud's (1955) and 
Lacan's (1977) fetishism; the relation between gay male narrative and the 
phallocentric libidinal economy is investigated by performing a 
psychoanalytic analysis of Robert Glück's fiction and critical writings (for 
example, 1982,1985a, 1985b); and the relation between feminism and 
lesbian sadomasochism is investigated by performing a psychoanalytic 
analysis of Pat Califia's Macho Sluts (1988) and feminist discourses on 
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sexuality (for example, Chodorow 1989; Cole 1989; Rich 1986; Rubin 
1981,1984). Having said this, Chicano homosexual identity and 
behaviour are investigated by incorporating the ethnographic work of 
Joseph M. Carrier (1976a, 1976b, 1989), Roger N. Lancaster (1987), 
Richard Parker (1989), and Clark L. Taylor (1989), which examined the 
lived experiences of Mexican and South American gay men and youth 
through interviews and observation. Here, methodology is based in social 
life. Not surprisingly, the author who produced this essay is the only 
sociologist who is publicised. Thus, taking into consideration the 
disciplinary locations of the participants and the methodologies that they 
employ, the methodological landscape of de Lauretis' "Queer Theory" 
(1991a) is a textual fetish. Sociological ways of investigating 
subjects/objects of study are very much at the margins of queer theory's 
methodological programme. 
Diana Fuss' Inside/Out (1991 b) is a collection of 17 essays that were 
presented either at the second annual Lesbian and Gay Studies 
Conference held at Yale University, New Haven in October 1989 or at 
other various professional association' conferences across the United 
States (Fuss 1991a, p. v). Some essays were also specifically 
commissioned for her anthology. In a similar vein to de Lauretis et al., 
Fuss and her contributors work from the premise that the relationship 
between heterosexuality and homosexuality can no longer be understood 
as a simple inside/outside dialectic, whereby a stable and oppositional 
symmetry (albeit an asymmetrical one) is understood to exist between the 
two for setting 'borders, ' 'boundaries, ' 'limits, ' and 'margins' (Fuss 1991c, 
p. 1). Rather, they are simultaneously external and internal to one 
another: "the denotation of any term is always dependent on what is 
exterior to it (heterosexuality, for example, typically defines itself in critical 
opposition to that which it is not: homosexuality)" (Fuss 1991c, p. 1). 
Some subjects/objects of study where this inside/outside dialectical figure 
is examined include: gender and sexuality in relation to subjectivity and 
identity politics (Butler 1991); the politics of gay male drag and its 
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complicity with phallocentric narcissism (Tyler 1991); representation, 
surveillance, and the spectacle of gay male sex (Edelman 1991); the 
representation of lesbianism in classical Hollywood cinema and feminist 
film theory (White 1991); the production, circulation, and consumption of 
lesbian narratives within heterosexist culture (Barale 1991); and 
representations of Rock Hudson's pre- and post-AIDS bodies 
(before/after, well/ill, 1950s/1980s, and heterosexuality/homosexuality) 
(Meyer 1991). 
In a similar fashion to de Lauretis of al., Fuss and her contributors 
come from a wide range disciplines. However, they are all humanities- 
based, for example: English literature, film studies, French, art history, 
textual studies, and the history of consciousness. None of the contributors 
come from the social sciences. There are no sociologists. Further, Fuss 
claims that the contributors employ a 'spectrum' of methodological 
approaches (1991 a, p. v). However, they are all textual in nature: gender 
and sexuality are investigated by performing a deconstructive critique of 
subjectivity and identity politics; gay male drag and its phallocentric 
narcissism is investigated in light of psychoanalytic theory by turning to 
Leo Bersani's (1987) dense theoretical essay on camp and George 
Alpert's photographic essay The Queens (1975); representation, 
surveillance, and the spectacle of gay male sex are examined by 
performing a discursive and psychoanalytic analysis of John Cleland's 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (1985), Tobias Smollett's Adventures of 
Peregrine Pickle (1964), and Jacques Derrida's The Post Card (1987); 
lesbian representation in classical Hollywood cinema and feminist film 
theory is investigated by performing a discursive and psychoanalytic 
analysis of Robert Wise's horror classic film The Haunting (1963) and the 
work of feminist film theorists (for example, Doane 1987; Mulvey 1981); 
the production, circulation, and consumption of lesbian narratives within 
heterosexist culture are examined by performing a discursive analysis of 
the illustrative and photographic front covers of Radclyffe Hall's The Well 
of Loneliness (1928,1951,1964,1981); and Rock Hudson's two bodies 
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are investigated by performing a discursive analysis of articles and images 
in popular magazines (for example, Maclean's, Photoplay, and People 
Magazine). Thus, taking into consideration the disciplinary locations of the 
contributors and the methodologies that they employ, the methodological 
landscape of Inside/Out (Fuss 1991b) can also be characterised as a 
textual fetish. However, unlike "Queer Theory" (de Lauretis 1991a), there 
is not even one sociologist who is invited to contribute to the debate. 
Sociological ways of investigating subjects/objects of study are totally 
excluded from queer theory's methodological programme. There is indeed 
a difference between being included within the margins of queer theory's 
methodological programme and, on the other hand, not being included in it 
at all. In the former instance, at least sociological ways of investigating 
subjects/objects of study have a place within queer theory discourse from 
which they can possibly shape its methodological programme. In the latter 
instance, the complete exclusion of sociology eclipses its potential to 
shape the contours of queer theory's methodological programme from the 
very beginning. 
Taking into consideration the context within which Butler's 
methodological framing of drag is located, it indeed appears to be 
constitutive of sociology's reservation with queer theory: its methodological 
preoccupation with textualism. Having said this, queer theory's investment 
in textualism goes hand in hand with the exclusion of sociological ways of 
investigating subjects/objects of study. In a similar fashion to the 
conflation of Foucault with social-historical constructionism, I would 
suggest that this exclusion acts as a fulcrum to preclude engagement with 
sociological inquiry in general and to constitute and demarcate queer 
disciplinary terms and practices. Indeed, as de Lauretis' (1991a) and 
Fuss' (1991b) collections demonstrate: sociologists do not partially 
represent queer theory; sociology does not fuel queer theory's 
methodological approach, theoretical toolkit, and subjects/objects of study; 
and queer discussions do not show an interest in taking place in 
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sociological domains. In short, there is no disciplinary cross-fertilisation 
between queer theory and sociology. 
In this light, if we want to move towards producing more developed 
social analyses within queer theory, as well as facilitating a more 
productive place for sociology within queer theory, then I suggest that we 
develop and establish discursive spaces within which there is an 
integration of queer and sociological methods, which I previously 
suggested in relation to Butler's analysis of drag. Having said this, I do not 
know and cannot predict what will constitute these discursive spaces, that 
is, their precise methods, their subjects/objects of study, where they will 
occur, who will contribute, and so on. Furthermore, I do not know and 
cannot predict where and how integration will be possible or a stumbling- 
block. They will be contingent upon their disciplinary locations, 
subject/object matter, theoretical toolkits, and methodologies. Here and 
now I can only gesture that we move towards methodologically-integrated 
discursive spaces. Perhaps we will be able to draw some general 
observations once we have developed and established them. It is also my 
hope that they will eventually begin to blur the distinction between queer 
and sociological methods. In this spirit, then, I offer the following 
methodologically-integrated discursive space as but only one possibility of 
how this might begin to occur. It should therefore be read as descriptive 
rather than prescriptive, as well as understood as part of a process rather 
than a product in and of itself. 
Section II. -Some More Disciplinäry Cress -fertilisation 
i. Fieldnotes and Methods 
I indicated in the introduction of the thesis that my fieldwork on gay male 
male-to-female drag (herein referred to as 'drag' unless otherwise noted) 
emerged out of a self-designed independent study course at Lewis and 
Clark College during the later part of the summer in 1995. During the 
second week of the course, my instructor and I met up to discuss my 
recent reading assignment: Newton's (1972) ethnography on drag 
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alongside Butler's doctrine of gender performativity, as set out in Gender 
Trouble (1990). Without conflating the two, Newton's ethnographic work 
provided a context for me to think more practically about Butler's 
examination of the relation between anatomical sex, gender identity, and 
gender performance and her argument that drag reveals the imitative 
structure of gender. It became apparent throughout our exchange that 
although Newton's ethnography was an invaluable resource that enabled 
me to better understand Butler's doctrine of gender performativity, it raised 
more questions for me than it resolved. On a purely theoretical level, her 
formulation made sense to me, even worked for me. However, when 
considered it in a specific social context, questions arose, and the 
methodological framing of her formulation did not facilitate answers for me. 
I already highlighted some questions in this chapter. Sensing my 
frustration throughout our exchange, Diane suggested that I sublimate my 
penchant for putting on my dancing shoes by doing some ethnographic 
work at The Embers Avenue, where drag acts were performed. Maybe, 
just maybe, then, according to Diane, I would settle some of my questions 
and feel as though I had made some sort of reconciliation with Butler or, at 
the very least, movement towards reconciliation. When I returned home 
later that night, I contemplated Diane's suggestion and later found myself 
at The Embers Avenue thoroughly engrossed in the drag acts that were 
being performed. From that night onwards, until the summer of 1997, 
those dancing shoes never did make it back into the wardrobe. 
My ethnographic work began in September 1995 and ended in June 
1997, with a brief revisit in February 1999. At the time of my fieldwork, 
Portland was Oregon's largest metropolitan city, with a population of 
approximately 500,000 people. Its political structures and policies at both 
the state and local levels were generally liberal in nature, with most 
politicians aligning themselves with the Democratic Party. Although the 
Oregon Citizens Alliance (OCA) sought to introduce and pass right-wing 
legislation and policies across Oregon that protected and promoted the 
sanctity of compulsory heterosexuality, the main legislative and policy 
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concerns of the day for Portland included environmental issues, same-sex 
issues (particularly in relation to housing), equal opportunity issues 
(particularly in relation to sex and race), and the legalisation of cannabis. 
Also, Portland was and continues to be the home of a visible and 
supported lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. 6 
Gay and bisexual men primarily lived in the northwest pocket of the city 
centre, whereas lesbians, bisexual women, and transgenders primarily 
lived in the southeast pocket, giving each area a distinctive cultural flair. 
Furthermore, a host of social structures facilitating and supporting the 
LGBT community existed, many of which continue to exist today (2005): 
approximately 15 LGBT-exclusive bars and clubs; approximately 15 
restaurants and cafes predominantly catering to the LGBT community 
(The Montage was a favourite); three LGBT-exclusive hotels/guest 
houses; three LGBT-exclusive leather and/or sex shops; one sauna 
exclusively catering to gay and bisexual men; approximately 35 LGBT 
groups and organisations (for example, Gay Dads, Parents and Families 
of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG), HIV/AIDS voluntary organisations, 
university organisations, rambler groups, reading and writing groups, 
dating agencies, and leather and fetish groups); a handful of LGBT annual 
events (for example, Gay Pride); two LGBT publications (a monthly 
newspaper and an annual 'yellow pages' listing LGBT bars, clubs, shops, 
and resources); and cruising areas for chance sexual encounters (for 
example, shopping malls, cafes, points of interest, parks, and beaches). 
My fieldwork primarily took place in The Embers Avenue, a bar/dance 
nightclub that showcased drag acts. The nightclub was located centrally 
in the city centre. It opened its doors in the mid-1980s and continues to 
trade today seven days a week. Although it was owned and managed by 
a White male aged in his late 40s who identified as 'heterosexual, ' it 
primarily catered and traded to the LGBT community. It marketed itself as 
'Portland's Longest Running Gay Nightclub. ' While I conducted my 
fieldwork, people who identified as 'gay, ' 'lesbian, ' or 'bisexual' (both male 
and female) primarily dominated The Embers Avenue scene on any given 
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night.? The nightclub had a capacity of approximately 200 people, and I 
approximated that 90% of the people who frequented the nightclub during 
the weekend (Friday, Saturday, and Sunday) identified as either 'gay, ' 
'lesbian, ' or 'bisexual. ' The remainder of patrons identified as either 
'heterosexual' or 'transgender. ' I was only aware of approximately 10 
transgenders who frequented the nightclub at least once a fortnight. 
Furthermore, there was the very rare occasion when people who identified 
as 'transvestite' patronised the nightclub. I only encountered three 
transvestites during the course of my fieldwork, and each of them usually 
went to the nightclub between one and two times a year. Most people 
who frequented The Embers Avenue were 'White. ' Approximately 5% 
were either 'African-American', 'Chicano, ' or of a 'mixed background' (for 
example, 'White' and 'African-American'). Most people were also aged in 
their 20s or 30s, approximately 75%. In addition to the owner, the 
nightclub was exclusively staffed by White gay males aged in their 20s, 
30s, and 40s: one assistant manager, eight bar staff, two cooks, one 
resident disc jockey, one sound and light technician, three door people, 
and one cleaner. The nightclub was separated into two main areas. One 
area was a dance floor that mainly played 1970s and '80s disco and pop 
music, and the other one showcased drag. Both had bars. The two areas 
were fully separated by a wall, and there was a double set of doors that 
provided easy access between them. The drag shows were showcased 
from Thursday to Sunday evenings, hosted by a different drag emcee 
each night. At the time of my fieldwork, there were 25 resident drag artists 
who performed on stage on a regular basis (usually at least once a week), 
with approximately 10 drag artists performing each night. The Embers 
Avenue also provided 'open-ended' performance slots within their Friday 
and Saturday night shows, which were for people who either performed 
drag on a regular basis in the past or eventually wanted to perform on a 
regular basis (aspiring drag artists). There were usually four 10-minute 
slots each night, and they were reserved on the night with the drag emcee 
prior to the show beginning. There were around a further 15 people who 
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appeared in drag during the weekend, but they did not perform. They 
usually circulated in the drag area of the nightclub, socialising with either 
one another or the drag artists who performed on stage. Their motivation 
for doing drag varied. Some did drag because they wanted to 'get into the 
spirit of the night, ' whereas some did it because they wanted to be women. 
In the latter case, most of them were pre-operative transsexuals. Nearly 
all of the resident drag artists were male and identified as 'gay. ' They 
were also aged in their 30s or 40s and predominantly 'White. ' Three of 
them were 'African-American' and one was 'Chicano. ' There was only one 
female-to-male resident drag artist. She identified as a 'lesbian, ' and she 
was aged in her 30s and 'White. ' She performed approximately once a 
fortnight, which was usually on a Sunday night. From Mondays to 
Wednesdays, when drag was not being performed on stage, the nightclub 
hosted theme nights (for example, karaoke and quizzes). 
Out of my 23 months in the field, I spent approximately six of them in 
Darcelle XV as well, which was located several blocks south of The 
Embers Avenue. It opened its doors in 1967 and continues to trade today 
four days a week. During the course of my fieldwork, Darcelle XV 
marketed itself as an entertainment nightclub that put on drag shows. One 
show was performed on Wednesdays and Thursdays, beginning at 
8: 30p. m., and there was a double bill on Fridays and Saturdays, beginning 
at 8: 30p. m. and 10: 30p. m. The nightclub offered sit-down dinners, and 
dinner was prior to the first show. Although it was owned and managed by 
a White male aged in his mid-60s who identified as 'gay, ' it primarily 
catered and traded to patrons who identified as 'heterosexual. '8 The 
nightclub had a capacity of approximately 75 people, and I approximated 
that 95% of the audience identified as 'heterosexual, ' was 'White, ' and was 
aged between their 30s and 50s. An equal mix of males and females 
usually visited in groups of four or six at the time of my fieldwork. No-one 
patronised Darcelle XV in drag. There were 10 drag artists who performed 
in the show. All of the drag artists were male, identified as 'gay, ' and were 
aged in their 30s or 40s. Nine of them were 'White, ' and one drag artist 
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was 'African-American. ' The owner of Darcelle XV also did drag and 
usually hosted the shows. The nightclub was staffed by people who 
identified as 'gay, ' 'lesbian, ' 'bisexual' (male and female), or'heterosexual'; 
were all 'White'; and were all aged in their 30s or 40s: one assistant 
manager, three bar staff, two cooks, four food/drinks servers, one 
director/stage manager, one choreographer, one sound and light 
technician, four door people, and one cleaner. 
The drag that was performed at Darcelle XV was different than that of 
The Embers Avenue. The drag artists at Darcelle XV put on Vegas-style 
cabaret shows, which comprised of a mixture of singing, dancing, and 
comedy. They were referred to as 'the cast. ' Drag artists performed 
together and performed songs from a number of musicals. Drag artists 
also sung solo or did stand-up comedy. Songs were either sung live or lip- 
synced. There were regular performances of "Boots are Made for 
Walking" and "Rhinestone Cowboy. " In the main, the drag artists did not 
attempt to impersonate and pass as a particular female iconic persona in 
their performances. They exaggerated their femaleness in a 'Dame Edna' 
kind of way in order to come across as eccentric, flamboyant women. The 
emphasis was on artifice. The drag artists were also employees of 
Darcelle XV. They had a contract, received a wage, and had a costume 
allowance. They were further provided with a large dressing room that 
they shared. On the other hand, The Embers Avenue mainly showcased 
a string of gay male drag artists who performed female iconic personas 
and their songs (16 of the 25 resident drag artists). The drag artists 
attempted to pass as that persona. The emphasis was not on 
exaggeration and artifice but on reality. Most drag artists performed solo, 
and they mainly lip-synced. Some iconic personas and their songs 
included: Whitney Houston ("I Wanna Dance with Somebody"); Chaka 
Khan ("I'm Every Woman"); and Dolly Parton ("9 to 5"). There were also 
gay male drag artists who performed on stage like the drag artists at 
Darcelle XV (8 of the 25 resident drag artists). They previously performed 
female iconic personas and had established themselves as their own 
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persona. Some people who appeared in 'open-ended' performance slots 
also impersonated the aforementioned iconic personas, as well as 
Donatella Versace, Bette Midler, Cher, and Madonna. However, some 
exaggerated their femaleness like the drag artists at Darcelle XV. 
Obviously, they were not their own established persona. Between 
performances, some drag artists performed stand-up comedy or magic (for 
example, pulling a rabbit out of a hat or making birds appear/disappear 
in/from a cage). They performed for no more than 10 minutes. Their 
performances filled in the stop gap between solo performances. Phyllis 
Diller and Joan Rivers usually made appearances. The single female-to- 
male resident drag artist also performed iconic personas. George Michael 
and Elton John were favourites of hers. Drag artists were not employees 
of The Embers Avenue. They performed drag as a hobby/interest. They 
did however receive tips from the audience during their performances, and 
the owner/manager provided a dressing room for them to share. 
The audience of each establishment was also different. Darcelle XV's 
audience was mostly, if not exclusively, transitory. Patrons did not 
regularly attend its drag shows. Going to Darcelle XV was like going to 
see a stage production at the theatre: it was something that people 
generally did from time to time. On the other hand, The Embers Avenue 
had patrons who regularly attended the nightclub. During the course of 
my fieldwork, I encountered quite a few of the same faces on the 
weekends. There were also approximately 10 patrons who were more or 
less permanent fixtures during the week and weekend. Also, Darcelle XV 
charged patrons an admission fee for all shows, whereas The Embers 
Avenue only charged patrons on certain days and times. A patron paid an 
eight dollar admission fee for Darcelle XV and between two and five 
dollars (depending on day and time) for The Embers Avenue at the time of 
my fieldwork. 
After several initial visits, prior to formally commencing my fieldwork, I 
had a strong premonition that each establishment housed, sustained, and 
protected its very own tightly-knit drag culture. Some clues gave it away: 
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some drag artists did not interact with other people who were in drag but 
did not perform; costumes/dresses ranged from something my mother 
would wear to something that came off a Hollywood stage set; some drag 
artists looked like a particular iconic persona, whereas some looked like 
hyper-effeminate women; and the stage performances were highly 
polished running to a timetable. Realising the exclusivity of each drag 
culture, I did not know how best to begin my fieldwork, how best to gain 
access. The same questions continually went through my mind: would 
these drag artists take kindly to me invading their space during their 
performances to ask them to participate in my research? would these 
drag artists take kindly to me posting a notice about my proposed study of 
drag next to their billposter? would these drag artists take kindly to me 
turning up in drag to solicit interlocutors? Luckily, one evening, when I 
was just beginning to acquaint myself with the drag scene at The Embers 
Avenue, I met someone who performed drag. This person became my 
key interlocutor (herein referred to as 'Ray'). 
I was sitting at the bar with a Cosmo and cigarette, as one does, when 
a Chicano gay male aged in his late 30s began a conversation with me. 
We started with usual small talk (for example, our names, who we were 
with at the nightclub, our occupations, where we lived, where we were 
from, and the current weather conditions), which then gradually developed 
into an exchange about our interests, and which then finally lead into me 
discussing my ethnographic work. I explained that I had just started to 
hang out at The Embers Avenue in order to study drag culture in relation 
to sex, gender, and sexuality. While my description was being verbally 
expressed, a thought was running through my mind: Ray was misreading 
my intentions for being at the nightclub, and he was only chatting to me 
because he fancied me. However, to my surprise, he suddenly seemed 
more interested in my description. Ray quickly interrupted with a question 
that went something like: 'I know how drag is a 'gender-fuck, ' but what 
does sexuality got to do with it? ' Caught off guard, I replied with 
something along the lines of: 'Let me buy you the next drink; it's on me. ' I 
A Question of Methodology 167 
went on to answer Ray's question, which then led him to ask further 
questions and instigate further discussions. During the course of our 
discussions, Ray told me that he actively took part in the drag scene at 
The Embers Avenue. He regularly watched the drag acts three nights a 
week and performed on stage usually once a week on either Friday or 
Saturday night. Ray had been doing drag on-and-off for about 15 years, 
of which 10 he usually performed at least once a week. He was also 
actively involved in Portland's 'Imperial Sovereign Rose Court, ' which was 
Oregon's oldest LGBT non-profit organisation that raised money for 
charities and put on annual drag competitions in order to crown 'monarchs' 
who then acted as a board of directors for the organisation. By the end of 
our conversation, Ray casually, yet genuinely offered to support my 
fieldwork. Without hesitation, I took him up on his offer. Ray proved to be 
an invaluable, fruitful interlocutor throughout different aspects of my 
fieldwork. At the very minimum, Ray introduced me to and immersed me 
into the Portland drag scene-its social structures, its discursive practices, 
its history, its performative rituals, its norms, its lexicon, its key performers, 
its audiences, its social relations, and so on. He also helped me devise 
and revise questions for face-to-face interviews and postal questionnaires, 
as well as set up face-to-face interviews, particularly with drag artists who 
had been a part of Portland's drag scene for more than 15 years. He 
further enabled me to participate in my fieldwork by using his talents to 
help me perform drag on stage at The Embers Avenue. In short, the 
success of my fieldwork, including the self-satisfaction that it produced, 
was contingent upon Ray. It is indebted to him. In return, I helped him 
prepare for his own drag performances and remunerated him with gift 
vouchers at the completion of my fieldwork. I also reimbursed him for any 
out-of-pocket expenses that related to my fieldwork. 
Appendix A outlines the interlocutors who formally participated in my 
fieldwork. 'Formally participated' designates those interlocutors who 
participated through research methods that were more formal (for 
example, face-to-face interviews and postal questionnaires) than informal 
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(for example, informal conversations) in nature. The tables in Appendix A 
are subdivided into the two establishments where my fieldwork took place. 
They are further broken down by categories of people who participated in 
the fieldwork and their sex, sexual identity, age band, and race. A total of 
48 people participated in my fieldwork. Most of them were from The 
Embers Avenue, 37 (77.1%). Twenty-four (50%) interlocutors were 
associated with drag in some way or another (for example, performance or 
non-performance). Eleven (22.9%) interlocutors were members of staff 
(including owners/managers), and 14 (29.2%) interlocutors were general 
patrons of The Embers Avenue. Unfortunately, patrons of Darcelle XV did 
not participate in my fieldwork. As I previously explained, Darcelle XV's 
patrons were transitory, and there was not an identifiable sample group 
that I could solicit to interview. Most interlocutors were male, 39 (81.3%), 
and most interlocutors identified as 'gay, ' 29 (60.4%). Equal proportions of 
interlocutors identified as either 'lesbian' or 'transgender' (including pre- 
and post-operative transsexuals), 6 (12.5%). Thirty-seven (77.1 %) 
interlocutors were aged in their 30s or 40s, and 45 (93.8%) interlocutors 
were 'White. ' Two interlocutors were 'African-American' and one was 
'Chicano. ' 
I used a range of methods to solicit the views and experiences of the 
interlocutors. They were primarily qualitative in nature. I conducted semi- 
structured face-to-face interviews with each of the interlocutors outlined in 
Appendix A. Appendix B outlines the questions used in the interviews. In 
addition to Ray arranging interviews for me, interviews were solicited by 
distributing leaflets and posting calling notices in the nightclubs. After I 
had been in the field for several months and completed a handful of 
interviews, there was no need to solicit further ones. People who did drag 
(whether for performance or non-performance), staff, and patrons (of The 
Embers Avenue) quickly became aware of my fieldwork and solicited me 
for an interview without any prompting on my part. Interviews lasted 
approximately two hours for people who did drag (performance and non- 
performance), and they were mainly conducted over a cup of coffee 
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(usually more) at a local cafe. Interviews with owners/managers, staff, and 
patrons lasted approximately between 30 minutes and one hour. In 
addition to set questions, I made room for questions that sought 
clarification or were in response to answers that led to further, although 
pertinent discussions. Once themes were established through the 
interviews, I sent out a postal questionnaire to each of the interlocutors. 
Appendix C outlines the questions that were included in the postal 
questionnaire. I employed a postal questionnaire because it was 
anonymous and enabled the interlocutors to express their views and 
experiences more openly, which may have been tempered in the 
interviews because of my status as a researcher. I also collected data 
through regular observation at the nightclubs. I usually observed the drag 
scene at The Embers Avenue twice a week at night, although this was 
reduced to one night when I spent time in Darcelle XV. Observation was 
both formal (recording notes) and informal (simply soaking up the 
atmosphere). During the time that I spent at Darcelle XV, I usually 
observed the drag performances once a week at night. Again, observation 
was also both formal and informal. In both nightclubs, I did not simply 
observe the drag performances in and of themselves. I also observed the 
interaction between people in drag performing, people in drag but not 
performing (at The Embers Avenue), and the audience. The data that I 
gathered through observation was simultaneously supplemented by 
unplanned, informal conversations with people who did drag (both for 
performance/non-performance), regular patrons (of The Embers Avenue), 
and staff. An increased awareness of my fieldwork made it difficult for me, 
from time to time, to observe my field sites in action without being 
disturbed. While I made observations, people in drag, regular patrons, 
and staff would engage in conversation with me and subsequently make 
unsolicited commentaries. Instead of viewing their engagement as 
nuisance, I saw it as a valuable means to collect additional data from 
additional interlocutors who did not formally participate in my fieldwork. 
Lastly, which I previously mentioned, I participated in my fieldwork by 
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performing drag at The Embers Avenue with the support of Ray. I 
performed on stage three times during my fieldwork. My participation 
informs the analysis that will soon follow. 
A combination of recording methods was used to document data. In 
relation to the face-to-face interview, interlocutors chose whether I used a 
tape recorder or notebook to record data. After recording the data, I 
formally wrote up notes and later presented them to their respective 
interlocutor for verification. Amendments were subsequently made if 
necessary. Most interlocutors preferred me to record their face-to-face 
interview by taking notes rather than using a tape recorder, 40 (83.3%). In 
the following analysis, I indicate when I cite an interlocutor who agreed to 
have his/her face-to-face interview recorded by means of a tape recorder. 
I recorded data collected through observation by writing notes in a 
notebook. This took place while I made observations or later on from 
memory after I left my field sites. I used the same recording method for 
informal conversations that I had with people in drag, regular patrons, and 
staff, as well as for my participation in my fieldwork. Conversations that I 
had with Ray during my participation in my fieldwork were recorded by 
means of a tape recorder or a notebook. 
Prior to conducting face-to-face interviews and deploying the postal 
questionnaire, I outlined the purpose of each with my interlocutors and 
gained their permission to participate in my fieldwork. Similarly, if I 
obtained data from interlocutors through informal conversations, I gained 
their permission to include the data in my fieldwork. In addition, if an 
interlocutor did not want to answer a particular question in his/her 
interview or postal questionnaire, then he/she had the opportunity to either 
decline and continue with the next one or abort the interview/questionnaire 
altogether. No-one aborted his/her interview or questionnaire. Permission 
to analyse and present data collected through my fieldwork was granted 
by each interlocutor, with the stipulation that it was solely used for the 
purpose of academic pursuits. I have also used pseudonyms for each 
interlocutor in order to guarantee that the data is anonymous (each 
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interlocutor had the opportunity to choose his/her own pseudonym). 
Because each establishment had only one owner/manager and assistant 
manager, I gained their consent to use their real name. I also gained the 
same consent from my only interlocutor who performed lesbian female-to- 
male drag. 
Lastly, I want to clarify the following inquiry that takes place. I briefly 
discussed this in the introduction of the chapter. Its main purpose is to 
demonstrate how the widening and deepening of Butler's methodological 
framing of drag can lead to a more developed social analysis. With this in 
mind, I had to choose an area to explore that both Butler and I examined. 
This was compounded by the fact that Butler's chapter is not a study of 
drag. Her examination of drag supports a larger argument on subjectivity. 
As a result, I realised that my choice had to consider the substance and 
scope of her analysis as well. I was not able to reach a decision quickly. I 
came up with a handful of ideas, ones that I initially thought might be 
productive to examine. However, when I thought about them further, they 
went far beyond what Butler was trying to do in her chapter, and I had to 
abandon them. For example, Butler examines how a heterosexual norm 
structures Venus' identity. I thought that it might be interesting to examine 
the role of this norm in respect to the drag artists' sexual identities and 
further investigate it in light of Richard Troiden's (1988) models of gay 
identity formation. However, when I thought about this further, I realised 
that Butler was not attempting to consider different models and processes 
of identity formation. She was interested in how the norm both secured 
and threatened Venus' subjectivity, and how this tension led to her death. 
As a result, I had to go back to the drawing board. It took about a week for 
the drawing board to produce something worthwhile and realistic: the 
centrality of a 'morphological ideal. ' In light of drag, a 'morphological ideal' 
is central to Butler's analysis of subjectivity and the production of dominant 
subject positions. Drag reveals that a dominant subject position is the 
product of miming, embodying, and repeating a bodily norm. I found this 
to be the case in my ethnographic work, but there was more than just this 
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'morphological ideal. ' For example, drag artists also had to consider 
demeanour, lexicon, and social interaction in order to be read as a 
particular iconic persona. I considered this line of inquiry to be within the 
bounds of Butler's analysis, and I thought that her formulation would best 
be explored by bringing to the forefront my participation in the field by 
impersonating/performing an iconic persona. 
Of course, the inquiry's purpose and focus come with considerable 
costs. They constrain what is included and examined within its 
parameters, with the consequence that a considerable amount of my 
fieldwork is excluded. No doubt this will raise many questions and cause 
frustration for you, the reader. For example, I do not discuss or elaborate 
on: different drag subject positions (for example, the 'fairy' and the 'grand 
empress'); rites of passage that come with each subject position; people 
who arrive in drag at The Embers Avenue but do not perform on stage; 
social interaction between drag artists and the audience, as well as 
between themselves; and performative rituals of drag (for example, the 
grand entrance of the drag emcee). My fieldwork that took place in 
Darcelle XV also does not qualify within the inquiry's parameters. As I 
previously discussed, the drag performed at Darcelle XV was 'cabaret- 
style, ' and, in the main, its drag artists did not attempt to impersonate and 
pass as a particular iconic persona. On the other hand, being a particular 
iconic persona was central to drag performances at The Embers Avenue, 
and this sits more nicely with the type of drag that was performed in Paris 
is Burning (1991), which I outlined in the first section of the chapter. 
Furthermore, since the drag at Darcelle XV was different than that of The 
Embers Avenue, incorporating them both would have made the chapter 
unwieldy. 
I also had to further constrain the ethnographic data that informs the 
inquiry. If I had not, then I would have had to diverge and examine some 
of the aforementioned subject areas that do not fit within the inquiry's 
parameters. For example, the stages/processes I went through to do drag 
on stage inform the inquiry. The ethnographic data that I draw upon 
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details how 'good drag, real drag' was done by gay male male-to-female 
resident drag artists who impersonated/performed a female iconic persona 
for the stage. Therefore, in order to stay on track and remain within the 
bounds of the inquiry (as best as possible), I focus on what internally 
constituted good drag, real drag for them. In the main, I do not incorporate 
data that details how it was not done. If I had incorporated this data, then I 
would have had to discuss and elaborate on different drag subject 
positions. The two go hand in hand. This would have then easily led into 
a further discussion on rites of passage. As a result, I would have 
diverged from the purpose of the inquiry. Having said this, in order to 
create a degree of compromise, I do incorporate some data on how good 
drag, real drag was not done for them, but I do this within reason as not to 
diverge. In this light, the following inquiry generally reflects the 
experiences of gay male male-to-female resident drag artists who 
impersonated/performed or had previously impersonated/performed a 
female iconic persona on stage at The Embers Avenue and what they 
considered to constitute 'good drag, real drag. ' A total of nine of my 
interlocutors performed this drag or had performed it in the past. Two of 
the nine interlocutors had performed a female iconic persona in the past 
and had become their own persona. They reflected on their past 
experiences in their interview and questionnaire. All of them were resident 
drag artists, and most of them usually performed at least once a week. 
They were all male, identified as 'gay, ' and were in their 30s and 40s. The 
majority was 'White. ' One of the interlocutors was 'African-American' and 
one was 'Chicano. ' 
I therefore ask that the previous points are kept in mind when reading 
the following inquiry, particularly that it seeks to broaden and deepen 
Butler's methodology in order to produce a more developed social analysis 
(within reason). It is indeed not an ethnography on drag in and of itself. It 
only scrapes the surface of my fieldwork. 
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ii. The Centrality of a Morphological Ideal 
When the drag emcee introduced the drag shows at The Embers Avenue, 
Ray often commented on the quality drag that was about to appear from 
behind the curtain. He would say something along the lines of: 
'Tinseltown has nothing on us, girl. It's pale in comparison to the glam and 
glitter, the fabulousness that we specially put on show for our very own 
guests. ' Ray was, to say the very least, always right. 
The drag shows showcased were, figuratively and literally from time to 
time, a red carpet affair-from the very moment when the red carpet 
leading to the entrance of The Embers Avenue was unrolled to right 
through to the end of the night when the cleaners rolled it back up for the 
next drag show. The overall show delivered was a 'red carpet' affair 
insofar as it had a 'Hollywood' edge to it and it was always well- 
engineered and finely-tuned, calculable and nearly seamless in its 
structure (for example, the arrival of patrons and drag artists; the entrance 
of the drag emcee; the mingling of drag artists with the audience during 
intermission; the announcement of special occasions in the audience by 
the drag emcee; and the exit of drag artists to post-event parties). Take 
for instance the arrival of the 'paparazzi' and drag artists when The 
Embers Avenue held drag pageants. In a similar vein to the Oscars, 
devout patrons and tourists would attentively arrive an hour before the 
curtain went up. They would stand to the side of the red carpet outside 
the nightclub, and the drag artists would arrive one after the other in full 
costume to make a pre-entrance appearance before making their way to 
the dressing room to finally prepare for the pageant. A handful of stars 
would regularly grace the red carpet and commanded patrons' and 
tourists' attention, for example: Joan Rivers, Elizabeth Taylor, Marilyn 
Monroe, Whitney Houston, and Diana Ross (known as Ms. Ross to most 
patrons). Patrons and tourists would not only catch a first glimpse of the 
stars who were performing but also get a flavour of the latest fashion 
trends to come off of the catwalk, the accessories that were draping on 
their bodies, and, likewise, the escorts who were draping around their arm. 
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Autographs would also exchange hands, and the drag artists/Hollywood 
stars would pose with their fans for the camera (The drag artists were 
never camera shy, to say the very least. ). According to Carla Jane, who 
usually performed as a singer, 9 there was no question that their drag 
shows had to conform to a red carpet standard: 
CJ: Our fans expect a lot from us girls [herein referring to the gay 
male resident drag artists who performed a female iconic 
persona on stage]. They expect a first rate, well-planned 
show from start to finish. 
JM: What do you mean by 'first-rate' and 'well-planned'; can you 
please explain further? 
CJ: Well, you know, we wouldn't get away with putting on a 
mediocre show. Simply turning up in women's clothes and 
last night's lacquer and strutting our stuff on stage to any old 
music just wouldn't do.... We have to carefully plan each 
show so that they run smoothly, and the girls have to make a 
real effort with their costumes and make the audience feel 
like Hollywood has invaded Portland. This makes our drag a 
quality product in the eyes of our fans. For example, our 
shows revolve around carefully planned entrances and exits: 
the arrival of the girls, the grand entrance of Patty La Belle [a 
drag emcee], mingling with our fans during intermission, etc., 
etc., etc. And this is really stepped up and magnified when 
The Embers puts on drag pageants. They're so Hollywood, 
especially the regular girls. If we didn't live up to such a 
reputation and give back to our fans they wouldn't bother to 
come see us. Who would blame them? And where would 
we be without them, our fans, the audience? The show 
simply couldn't go on. (recorded) 
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Indeed, most of the gay male resident drag artists did not simply 
perform by morphologically changing their bodies to female and dressing 
up in women's clothes with the aim of compelling the belief that a woman 
was performing on stage. For them, quality drag involved performing a 
female iconic persona: 
Why just turn up in women's clothes to try and convince someone 
that it's a woman performing on stage? Where's the creativity in 
that? Anyone can do that. It's a lot more tricky to convince 
someone that you are someone. So why not get into the theatre 
of it all and be someone for the night? I mean, like Ms. Ross or 
Marilyn or Whitney. And if you have any bit of talent in your little 
pinky, then you'll pull it off, and then you'll be doing good drag, real 
drag (Dita, a drag artist who usually performed as an 
actress/singer). (recorded) 
In addition to the iconic personas who I previously mentioned, the gay 
male resident drag artists also performed the likes of Patsy (from 
Absolutely Fabulous), Annie Lennox, Dolly Parton, Judy Garland, and Liza 
Minnelli. The majority of gay male resident drag artists who participated in 
my fieldwork performed or had performed their persona at least once a 
week (8). On average, the same drag artists had approximately two iconic 
personas in their current or past-current repertoire. Resident drag artists 
usually did not perform more than one persona at any given time. I was 
only aware of four resident drag artists during my time in the field who 
sometimes performed two personas in one evening. 
As Dita suggested, though, a gay male resident drag artist doing 'good 
drag, real drag' was not a question of approximating a particular female 
iconic persona. It was about being a female iconic persona and being 
read as such by other people in drag and the audience ("It's a lot more 
tricky to convince someone that you are someone. So why not get into the 
theatre of it all and be someone for the night? "). In a similar vein to 
Butler's analysis of drag in Paris is Burning (1991), then, I would suggest 
that 'realness' and being a female iconic persona went hand in hand for 
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the gay male resident drag artists who performed good drag, real drag. As 
I previously outlined in the first section of the chapter, the drag artists in 
Paris is Burning (1991) compete against each other in a number of 
categories, which are marked by gender, race, and class norms. Again, 
some of them include: 'executive wear, ' 'evening wear, ' the 'Ivy League 
student, ' and the 'butch queen. ' Butler correctly points out that 'realness' 
is central to each category (1993, pp. 128-29,131). Each category has a 
standard that a drag artist attempts to effect in order to become and be 
read as 'the' subject of a particular category. Success in effecting 
realness is contingent upon the drag artist's ability to produce the 
semblance that he/she embodies realness. Butler argues that this is 
attempted by reiterating a 'morphological ideal. ' For Butler, a 
'morphological ideal' designates the bodily norms that bring into being, 
constitute, and regulate the subject and his/her body. It is at once 'a figure 
of a body' and 'no particular body. ' It is 'a figure of a body' insofar as it is 
represented within and through the subject/body that it brings into being, 
constitutes, and regulates. It is 'no particular body' insofar as no 
subject/body can be the essential bearer or full, ideal representative of it. 
The stages/process I went through to do good drag, real drag reveal how 
a morphological ideal was central to subjectivity for the gay male resident 
drag artists who performed a female iconic persona. Ray was my mentor 
throughout each stage/process. 1° 
iii. The StagesiProcesses of Doing 'Good Drag, Real Drag' 
During one of our weekly meet-ups at The Embers Avenue, after having 
been in the field for approximately six months, Ray suggested to me that I 
participate in my fieldwork by doing drag for the stage with his assistance. 
Ray persuasively argued that impersonating/performing an iconic persona 
would give me firsthand experience of the practicalities and technicalities 
of doing good drag, real drag. That is, the type of drag that the gay male 
resident drag artists were accustomed to doing. Further, on a more 
general level, doing drag would enable me to critically explore and analyse 
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my field site through a different lens, and, as a consequence, it might 
introduce twists and turns into my fieldwork that would produce results 
different than those of not having done drag. Without hesitation, I took 
Ray up on his offer, especially since I had no idea of where or how to 
begin. The following night, I embarked on a couple of the first 
stages/processes of doing good drag, real drag. For the gay male 
resident drag artists who performed/had performed a female iconic 
persona on stage, doing good drag, real drag involved four distinct, yet 
interconnected stages/processes. They included: (1) 'scoping'11 who to 
impersonate/perform; (2) designing and making the costume; (3) 
rehearsing the iconic persona's onstage and offstage performance; and 
(4) morphing into the iconic persona. 
Scoping who to impersonate/perform. After having agreed to do drag, 
Ray asked me to go away and come back to him the following night with a 
shortlist of five iconic personas who I was interested in 
impersonating/performing. He also asked me to outline my reasons for 
choosing them. According to Ray, we were beginning the first 
stage/process of doing drag: "Before we can even think about your 
costume or makeup or practice your performance, we need to think about 
who you want to be and why. We need a starting point from which we can 
move forward. I mean, we need to 'scope' your impersonation. This is 
important and it can make or break you, girl" (recorded). Ray left this task 
open-ended and did not steer me in a particular direction: he neither 
suggested who I might impersonate/perform nor did he suggest what the 
nature of my reasons for choosing a particular iconic persona might be. 
By the time I actually put pen to paper, I already had a good idea of who I 
wanted to be and why. I presented my shortlist to Ray the following night, 
along with my to-the-point reasons (in descending order of preference): 
1. Madonna. I've always been a fan of Madonna and I know all 
her songs very well, including their dance moves. Also, she 
has many images to choose from. I would probably do either 
"Vogue" or "Express Yourself' because their dance moves are 
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calculable and technical and I can perform them from start to 
finish. Further, Madonna is the 'Queen of Pop. ' Do I need a 
better reason?; 
2. Patsy (from Absolutely Fabulous). Patsy is the very definition 
of fabulousness. She is a gay icon, has a good wit about her, 
can command the audience's attention in the snap of a finger, 
and dresses in the latest designer gear. She also has the best 
props: a cigarette in one hand and a bottle of vodka in the 
other; 
3. Whitney Houston. Whitney has good material from the 1980s 
and '90s and has a very strong voice. Her music is also very 
energetic and recognisable. She also has quite a few ballads, 
which could soften the atmosphere of the nightclub. I 
particularly want to perform her because I think she would be a 
challenge to impersonate, morphologically and vocally; 
4. Dolly Parton. Dolly has a good sense of humour, has a lot of 
material to draw from, and would probably enable me to 
interact with the audience quite well between songs. Dolly 
would create an instant rapport. She is also dramatic in 
appearance, that is, has a big bust and big hair, which would 
blend in well with the other drag artists (or, in Dolly's case, stick 
out); or 
5. Chaka Khan. Chaka Khan is a legend in and of herself, and 
her presence would command the audience's attention and 
respect from the very beginning. I would sing "I'm Every 
Woman, " which would be instantly recognisable among the 
audience, especially since it is one of those 'gay anthem' 
songs. 
According to Ray, I hit the nail on the head, and yet, at the same time, 
I could not be more further from hitting it. On the one hand, Ray thought 
that I was best suited to impersonate/perform Madonna. On the other 
hand, he thought that my additional choices were unsuitable and my 
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supporting arguments were inconsistent, premature, and in a vacuum. 
Ray noted: 
There's no guiding structure and depth to your decision making 
process. You're all over the place, girl. If you want to do drag, 
especially good drag, then you have to think more about things 
like how suited you are to impersonate a certain Hollywood star, 
what kind of drag you want to do, if you want to perform on the 
stage, and the audience's likes, dislikes, and expectations. I 
mean, there are important things to consider when scoping who 
you want to impersonate, and you need to take them very 
seriously. This isn't simply a case of choosing someone who you 
like or you've always wanted to be. (recorded) 
Ray indicated that the resident drag artists usually considered five 
areas when they chose an iconic persona to impersonate/perform: (1) the 
compatibility of impersonating/performing a particular persona; (2) the type 
of drag that was being performed; (3) the context within which the 
impersonation/performance was taking place; (4) the personas who were 
currently being impersonated/performed by other drag artists; and (5) 
resources. Resident drag artists referred to these five principal areas as 
'the secret's in the sauce. ' According to Ce-Ce, who usually performed as 
an actress/singer, "[t]he more you take on board these five principals, then 
the more your impersonation will be saucy [read: successful]. You want to 
be at your sauciest. Secret's in the sauce! " 
The compatibility of impersonating/performing an iconic persona 
designated how suited a drag artist was to impersonate/perform a 
particular persona. Drag artists took into consideration: morphology (for 
example, height, weight, body frame, bone structure, skin colour, and skin 
texture); voice (for example, accent, range, depth, and strength); 
personality (for example, an extravert, introvert, or a combination of both); 
and demeanour. For example, drag artists usually 
impersonated/performed a persona of the same race/ethnicity. They 
mainly did not cross racial/ethnic boundaries: "When I started doing drag, I 
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wanted to be one of those Black divas. You know, like Diana Ross or 
Chaka Khan. But a White girl trying to pass as a Black girl? It just isn't 
possible. I have very fair skin, so I'm better off with someone like [X]" (Ce- 
Ce). 12 
As I outlined in my field notes, drag performances included: singing 
(including lip-syncing), dancing, a combination of the two, comedy, and 
magic. Drag artists generally considered the compatibility between the 
iconic persona and the type of drag that was being performed. For 
example, Ray indicated to me that if a drag artist wanted to 
impersonate/perform Shirley Bassey, he/she would not perform magic: If 
you're going to do magic, you surely wouldn't pick Shirley Bassey. You'd 
be out of your mind. Could you imagine her pulling a rabbit out of a hat? 
She's a diva who belongs on stage, singing" (recorded). 
The context within which the impersonation/performance was taking 
place designated the social conditions of the impersonation/performance. 
They included: the audience (for example, likes/dislikes; expectations; 
characteristics such as gender, age, and sexuality; and size); the physical 
layout of the drag space (for example, the position of the stage, dressing 
room, audience, and bar in relation to each other); time allotment for the 
performance; and theme nights (for example, a drag beauty pageant night, 
'Let's go to the Oscars' night, and 'Everything Absolutely Fabulous! ' night). 
Likes/dislikes of the audience particularly influenced the iconic persona a 
drag artist chose to impersonate/perform. This was a deciding factor for 
some of the drag artists: 
It came down to [X] or [Y]. I couldn't decide. They're both good in 
their own way. But it was the audience that helped me decide. 
They like singing and dancing, and [X] fit the bill. They loved her, 
and I didn't regret my choice (Penny, who performed as 
actresses/singers and comedians). (recorded) 
I do comedy drag, and I always wanted to do [X]. But another 
drag artist did her years ago. She didn't go down well with the 
A Question of Methodology 182 
crowd. They like someone who's eccentric, so I went for [Y] (Eva, 
who usually performed as a comedian). (recorded) 
At times I couldn't choose. There were so many that I wanted to 
be. When I didn't know, I asked the regulars [regular patrons] 
what they thought (Donna, who had performed as 
actresses/singers). 
I wanted to perform [X] for years, but it wasn't the right time. 
Maybe it just wasn't the right place. The audience really wasn't 
into country music (Alexis, who had performed as 
actresses/singers). 
Ray further indicated that drag artists chose a persona in light of those 
who were currently being performed by other resident drag artists: 
It's crucial and imperative that you don't replicate or even do a 
variation of them [current personas being performed by other 
resident drag artists]. This would be a grave mistake. First, you'd 
be copying someone else's creativity and stealing their ideas. 
Also, the other drag artists would think you don't have any creative 
flair yourself, and your status as an artiste would go down the 
drain. Anyway, if you want to do good drag and 'be' someone, 
then how can you 'be' someone when there's another one of you 
standing next to you? So, be someone, girl; go for it (italics Ray's 
emphasis). (recorded) 
Drag artists only impersonated/performed another drag artist's iconic 
persona when the drag artist ceased being his/her persona. According to 
Liza, a drag artist who usually performed as a singer, they were expected 
to change their iconic personas approximately once a year: 
L: She's really good at performing [X]. But after awhile, the 
glitter and glam wears off. Look at those boots! She's run 
them right into the ground. You'd also think she's got nothing 
left in that closet of hers. She needs to move on. 
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JM: What do you mean 'move on'? 
L: Well, after awhile, about a year, people are tired of the same 
old act-no matter how many different ways you do it. 
Especially after you've cooked chicken one thousand and 
one ways! So, put her to rest and move on. Be someone 
else. 
JM: When should you move on? 
L: Probably around a year's time. If you don't do this, you'll 
lose respect as a drag artist. (recorded) 
Once a drag artist ceased being an iconic persona, there was usually a 
lead in time of six to eight months before another drag artist performed the 
same persona. The drag artist then changed the iconic persona's image 
and performance in order to minimise replication and maintain his/her 
status as a drag artist. Some drag artists also reincarnated iconic 
personas who they had performed in the past. They too changed the 
persona's image and performance for the same reasons. They usually did 
not reincarnate their iconic persona until several years had lapsed. 
Lastly, resources designated the discursive, economic, and material 
means required to support the fruition of the impersonation/performance. 
They included, for example: time (that is, the amount of time required to 
plan, organise, and rehearse the impersonation/performance); specialist 
knowledge and skills (that is, the knowledge base and skills set required to 
do drag, which were usually linked to experience); capital (that is, money 
required to fund dresses, wigs, accessories, and make-up); and 
equipment (that is, props required to support the 
impersonation/performance, which included backdrops, music, video, and 
lighting effects). The amount of money drag artists spent on their 
impersonation/performance varied, but it generally ranged from 100 to 300 
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dollars (approximately 55 to 165 pounds-sterling). It was dependent upon 
the iconic persona who was being impersonated/performed, as well as the 
type of drag that was being performed. For example, it was usually more 
expensive to perform magic than sing because additional specialist props 
had to be purchased (for example, a bird cage or a magic top hat). Drag 
artists also reduced costs by recycling wigs and accessories that they 
used in prior performances. 
Within this framework, Ray outlined why I was best suited to 
perform/impersonate Madonna: 
First, there's a strong degree of compatibility between you and 
Madonna. Your morphology is not too dissimilar to Madonna's. 
You're both of medium height for your sexes. You're both fit, and 
you both have toned and defined bodies. Also, you both have 
angular features to your bone structure, and both of you have 
healthy looking skin that's well maintained and youthful. As for 
personalities, you're both in between being extraverts and 
introverts. You're neither over-the-top nor quiet and insular. 
However, you're both a magnet for a crowd, and you're always the 
centre of attention. Plus, your voice isn't deep and dark, so you 
shouldn't stick out like a sore thumb. Although, this doesn't matter 
as much because you'll probably be lip-syncing on the stage. 
Then there's your demeanour. Well, let's just say that you couldn't 
be a more perfect match, 'Little Princess. ' You both definitely 
have attitude! 
Now, there's the type of drag to be performed. Since you're 
inexperienced, I don't think we'll be doing anything technical, like 
comedy or magic. You definitely don't have enough wit and 
experience to do comedy drag. Anyway, you have to have an 
established rapport with the audience to do this type of drag, and 
it's learned through experience over time.... I think it might be 
best that you lip-sync your performance. Madonna's rendition of 
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"Vogue" performed at the 1990 Music Video Awards would be a 
perfect match for you, especially since she performed the song by 
lip-syncing and you know how to vogue. 
Then there's the context and the personas that are already 
impersonated. She's a good match because no-one else regularly 
does Madonna, only now and again. And it's usually someone 
who hasn't been on the regular drag circuit. So, if someone turned 
up as Madonna on the night, then the other drag artists and the 
audience would probably think that she was a fan who came to 
see you perform and nothing more. She's also a good match 
because most of the gay audience would have grown up with her. 
... "Vogue" will also be ideal for you to perform because of 
the 
position of the stage. It's 't-shaped' and cuts right through the 
audience. "Vogue" needs adequate stage space so that you can 
strut your stuff, particularly through the crowd. You'll also probably 
only get a five-minute spot [five minutes to perform; ten minutes in 
total in order to erect/dismantle any props] since you're a 
newcomer, so "Vogue" will neatly fit into that time allotment. 
Now, there's resources to think about. Well, we really don't have 
to worry here. I've performed Madonna before, and you'll have me 
to design and make your costume, as well as any necessary 
props. I'll also provide support for your make-up, rehearsals, wig, 
etc., etc., etc. We have about a month and half to two months to 
prepare, so this should be enough time to get things ready. I 
reckon we can do Madonna for about a hundred dollars, which you 
previously indicated is within your budget [our budget ran over by 
50 dollars]. So, let's go to workl Where's that credit card, girl? 
(recorded) 
Designing and making the costume. 13 After we decided to 
impersonate Madonna and perform her rendition of "Vogue" for the 1990 
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MTV Music Video Awards, I asked Ray how we would design and make 
the dress that she wore (Madonna modelled herself after Marie Antoinette 
and wore an eighteenth-century styled dress. ). However, Ray correctly 
pointed out that the next stage/process of doing good drag, real drag was 
not simply that of designing/making a dress but a costume 'in its broadest 
sense': 
No, no, no, my dear. The next task isn't just about making a 
dress. Remember, drag isn't just about getting into women's 
clothes. It can't be reduced to a single garment. It's about 
creating a persona, being someone for the night.... the task is to 
design and make a costume, my dear. When I say 'costume, ' I 
mean it in its broadest sense. I mean, the whole imagery we'll be 
impersonating, performing, and bringing to life. This won't just 
include the outfit, but everything else that comes with it: the 
accessories, the wig, the make-up, the props. We also have to 
think about their styles, periods, and origins. You're a walking 
stage set. (recorded) 
Other gay male resident drag artists who performed an iconic persona 
responded in the same fashion as Ray when I asked them what dresses 
they wore for their performances. They neither reduced drag to the act of 
wearing a dress nor did they refer to their dresses as 'dresses. ' They wore 
costumes: 
Well, we really don't call them 'dresses' or'outfits. ' We, I mean us 
regular girls, we call them 'costumes. ' You see, to be [X] isn't just 
about putting on a dress. It's about the whole package, the 
artistry, the mystique: the wig, the make-up, the jewellery, the 
props, you know (Carla Jane). (recorded) 
When you say dresses, do you mean 'costumes'? if so, there's 
been many, and the wigs and jewellery that went with them, well, 
they were timeless classics. You know, drag is about getting 
'dressed up to the nines' and creating the whole image, from the 
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actual dress to the wig to the jewellery to the make-up. It's about 
the whole costume (Eva). (recorded) 
Dresses are for trannies [transsexuals and transvestites]. I wear a 
'costume' because drag is about theatre. To be a Hollywood star 
is to put on theatre. It isn't about a dress or being a woman... . 
The dress or outfit is only part of the overall theatrical production. 
You have other things that go with the dress: the shoes, the make- 
up, the wig, the jewellery, the handbag, the backdrop, etc. So, 
what I'm saying is that I wear a costume, and the costume is more 
than just a dress (Penny). (recorded) 
Although there was no set prescription for designing and making a 
costume, especially since a costume was contingent upon who was being 
impersonated and what type of drag was being performed, knowledge, 
skills, and experience were required to create one. Ray explained why: 
"Most of the girls who regularly do drag don't buy or rent their costumes 
from some costume shop. Good drag doesn't come ready-made. It's 
about cooking from scratch. We design and make our own costumes. Of 
course, this doesn't mean we don't look out for the odd accessory" 
(recorded). Indeed, all of the nine gay male resident drag artists who 
performed/had performed an iconic persona and participated in my 
fieldwork designed and made their costumes, which included the 
costume/dress and supporting props. Wigs were bought in a store, but 
they styled their wigs themselves. As for accessories, such as shoes, 
handbags, and jewellery, they bought them in a store as well, but they 
usually adapted them to suit their needs. My experience of designing and 
making my costume with Ray demonstrates the process that they 
generally went through to create a costume, as well as some of the 
knowledge, skills, and experience that supported the process. 
Ray and I began designing my costume by watching and re-watching 
a video of Madonna's performance of "Vogue" for the 1990 MTV Music 
Video Awards. While viewing her performance, I was assigned the task of 
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taking note of the wigs, accessories, and props. This was not a case of 
simply providing a physical description of what was being worn or used. I 
also had to describe their styles, periods, and origins, how they were being 
used, and how each element linked with the other. In a similar fashion, 
Ray concentrated on taking note of the dresses/costumes and make-up 
that Madonna and her supporting dancers wore. We then compared notes 
and drew conceptual models, with descriptions, of the costume/dress (for 
example, style, materials, and colours); the wig (for example, style, colour, 
and hair accessories); the make-up (for example, style and colours); the 
accessories (for example, jewellery and shoes and their materials and 
colours); and the props (for example, the backdrop for the stage). The 
conceptual models served as a plan to make the costume. They were not 
exact replicas of what was being impersonated/performed. Drag artists 
generally allowed some room for improvisation so that they could make 
the iconic persona a degree of their own, particularly if the persona had 
previously been performed by another drag artist. A drag artist might 
change the colour, material, or detailing of the costume or accessorise it 
differently. However, improvisation was mostly in keeping with the 
persona. Once we planned the costume, we constructed patterns for the 
actual costume/dress and trekked in and out of department stores and 
material, craft, vintage, and charity shops to buy materials, accessories, 
and make-up for the costume. In order to cut costs, we decided to use 
one of Ray's wigs, which we coifed nearer to the time of my performance. 
Ray constructed the pattern for the costume/dress by studying Madonna's 
dress and drawing and cutting patterns on newspaper sheets according to 
my measurements. Ray changed some of the design and detailing of the 
costume/dress according to our conceptual models (for example, its 
different layers, cut, cuffs, and colours). Once material was bought for the 
costume/dress, Ray used the patterns to sew it. This happened alongside 
us continuing to trek in and out of stores for accessories, make-up, and 
materials for a backdrop. The costume/dress took Ray approximately four 
weeks to complete, during which time I had the responsibility of 
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completing the backdrop for my performance. The backdrop was a 
painted mural depicting an elaborate drawing room. It was painted onto a 
white flat sheet so that it could be easily erected and readily removed 
before and after my performance. 
While Ray and I went through these processes to create the costume, 
he explained some of the knowledge and skills that were required to 
produce a costume similar to mine. According to Ray, a drag artist would 
have needed a background in or some knowledge of fashion design, 
music, art (specific medium not required), art history, architecture, or 
theatre. Also, a drag artist would have needed to possess an artistic skill 
(for example, drawing, painting, make-up design, or stage 
design/production) or, at the very least, an artistic eye. Ray explained why 
these requirements were needed: 
You just aren't making a dress with some stage props. Such a 
costume is steeped in history and has cultural and social 
meanings, and you really need to know what you're doing in order 
to reproduce that. But then it's not just about what you know or a 
skill you have. You also need an artistic eye, girl (Ray). 
(recorded) 
All of the nine gay male resident drag artists who participated in my 
fieldwork had either a degree in or some knowledge of one or more of the 
aforementioned disciplines. Each of them also possessed one or more of 
the aforementioned artistic skills. However, Ray stressed that sewing was 
one of the main skills required to create a costume: "You know, you can 
have a sound knowledge base or a broad skills set to make a fantastic 
costume. You can also have creative flair to make it fabulous. But, in the 
end of the day, you need to know how to sew" (recorded). From time to 
time, drag artists helped each other out in sewing their costumes, 
particularly if there was a tricky bit of sewing to be done. They also shared 
their knowledge base among each other through informal conversations 
and critiquing other drag artists' performances. They more formally shared 
it in the next stage/process of doing drag: rehearsals. However, 
A Question of Methodology 190 
knowledge and skills were not simply disciplinary. According to Carla 
Jane, drag artists had "an encyclopaedic knowledge of the yellow pages" 
(recorded). They knew where to shop for each detail of their costume. In 
line with my experience of shopping around for my costume, resident drag 
artists regularly shopped in department stores and material, craft, vintage, 
and charity shops. They also had a network of contacts in these shops so 
that they would get first shout on items before they hit the shelf. This was 
particularly the case in vintage and charity shops because items were one- 
offs. Carla Jane explained how her relationship with a local vintage shop 
owner worked to her benefit: 
JM: Where do you shop for your costume? 
CJ: You see, [X], the owner of the vintage shop around the 
corner, [X], well, she takes good care of me. 
JM: What do you mean by '[X] takes good care of you'; can you 
explain further? 
CJ: Well, I've known [X] for ages. She knows the type of acts 
that I do down at The Embers, and she usually knows what I 
like and I don't like and what works and what doesn't. So, I 
usually go into her shop on a Thursday when she gets new 
stock in, and she takes me into the back room to look at 
some gear she thinks I might be interested in. She usually 
gets it right. This saves me a lot of bother because I get the 
chance to look at her gear before it goes on the shelf and get 
to purchase it before the other bitches [the gay male resident 
drag artists who performed as female iconic personas] get 
their greedy little hands on them. I mean, her gear is 
priceless; they're one-offs. You only get one chance to get 
the best of her gear. I really don't know what I'd do without 
[X]. I guess I would just be a jealous old bitch towards the 
other regular girls, always thinking that their latest accessory 
would have looked better on me. (recorded) 
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Ray also explained that a drag artist producing a costume similar to 
mine would have needed extensive experience of using his/her knowledge 
base and skills set. On average, the nine gay male resident drag artists 
who participated in my fieldwork had been using their knowledge and skills 
to create costumes for approximately 10 years. However, experience was 
not simply reduced to number of years or creating costumes for drag only. 
Experience was broader for them. It also designated how they had put 
and continued to put their knowledge base and skills set into practice off of 
the drag stage, which took place within and across a range of disciplines 
and mediums. While I was conducting my fieldwork, seven of the nine gay 
male resident drag artists were additionally putting their knowledge and 
skills into practice for reasons other than drag. This was highlighted by 
some of the drag artists' responses to the question "How long have you 
had experience of using your knowledge and skills to create 
dresses/costumes for drag? ": 
Well, I've been making drag costumes and my own stage sets for 
so long that I've stopped counting the years. I think it's been 
around 12 years or so. But, you see, it's really been longer than 
that. I have a college degree in theatre, and I picked up a lot of 
skills in costume and make-up design and stage production. I've 
used these skills for reasons other than drag. I've been 
extensively involved in the local youth theatre for quite some time, 
and I've done the costumes and make-up for the actors. I'm 
currently involved in one right now, Annie. I'm making all the 
costumes (Ce-Ce). 
Oh, I guess I would say that I have 14 years experience. But it's 
been longer when you consider that I've been using my fashion 
design degree to make and sell my own label locally. My new 
season will be showcased in a fashion show for charity in a couple 
of weeks (Eva). (recorded) 
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It's been 11 years. Although, I've used my knowledge and skills 
longer when you consider that it hasn't always been for drag. I 
went to college and studied theatre. I specialised in costume 
design. Since then, I've been involved in making costumes for 
different productions across the city. Right now I'm involved in 
making the costumes for Sweeney Todd (Penny). (recorded) 
Rehearsing the iconic persona's onstage and offstage performance. 
After Ray and I designed and made my costume, we began the next 
stage/process of doing drag: rehearsals. According to Ray, there were 
two performances to rehearse: the iconic persona's onstage and offstage 
performance. The gay male resident drag artists who participated in my 
fieldwork also did not have a restrictive understanding of performance. 
They did not restrict performance to a physical stage. It also designated 
the performance of their iconic persona off the stage: 
You see, when that curtain drops, most people [the audience] 
think that the show is over for me, that I can just take off my Jimmy 
Choo shoes and rest my little ole' feet with a nightcap at the bar. 
But they're wrong. If I want them to continue to think that I'm 
someone, then I have to continue to be that special someone 
when I'm off stage. The show must go on (Carla Jane). 
(recorded) 
Well, when I do my performance, I have to think about how she 
would perform on stage and how she would perform off stage. 
You see, it's not just about being on an actual stage. You aren't 
on a physical stage the whole night while you're doing drag. You'll 
have breaks while the other drag artists are performing. Although, 
it's not as though these are real breaks. You'll be interacting with 
the other drag artists and the audience while you're on your break, 
and you'll have to continue your performance if you want to pass 
as someone (Ce-Ce). 
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Even though the same drag artists literally differentiated their 
performance, based on the presence/absence of a physical stage, they 
simultaneously pointed out that such a differentiation was a misnomer 
figuratively. Their impersonations were always performed on a stage: 
[T]hinking about my performance more, am I really ever off the 
stage? I have my performance on and off a physical stage, but 
am I strictly off a stage? The answer to that, my dear, is 'no. ' You 
see, when I literally get off the stage, I'm still performing and trying 
to be someone as I just said. The audience is still there, and I'm 
still trying to convince them that I'm someone. So, really, I'm still 
on a stage performing. I guess I'm kind of always on a stage 
(Carla Jane). (recorded) 
I might separate my performance by talking about what I do on 
stage and what I do off stage. But I don't think there's a difference 
because you're always on a stage. I mean, when I'm off a 
physical stage, I'm still in the spotlight and trying to be someone, 
and the audience is still there watching my every move. All the 
elements of the stage are still there-the script, the lights, the 
camera, the action, the audience (Ce-Ce). 
There were three broad, basic phases to rehearsals for the nine gay 
male resident drag artists who performed/had performed an iconic person 
and participated in my fieldwork. Ray provided a good summary: 
We're going to rehearse your stage performance in three phases, 
which most of the drag artists who do good drag do. First, we'll sit 
down and plan the performance. We'll then run through several 
dry runs of it. After that, we'll do a couple dress rehearsals. You'll 
then be more or less ready to get up there and do your thing. 
(recorded) 
According to Ray, planning the performance designated planning the 
mechanics of the performance and its elements, for example: the 
timeframe; the entrance and exit; who would participate in the 
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performance and how; how props of the performance would work together 
(for example, the backdrop, music, and lighting); how the drag artist 
performing would interact with the audience; and the actual performance 
itself (for example, dance moves, tone of the voice, and demeanour). The 
'dry run' phase of rehearsals designated the phase when elements of the 
planned performance were practised either separately or together. There 
was no set prescription to where the dry run phase took place, and a drag 
artist could choose whether he/she wanted to rehearse certain elements in 
front of a select audience. They usually either took place in the drag 
artist's home or during the day at The Embers Avenue. Audience 
members usually included no more than a handful of friends or other drag 
artists. They provided constructive feedback on elements of the 
performance and made suggestions. Drag artists usually did not wear 
their costume during a dry run rehearsal. The length of time of the dry run 
phase varied, and it was mainly dependent upon the scale of the 
performance. The dry runs of the nine gay male resident drag artists who 
performed/had performed an iconic persona and participated in my 
fieldwork ranged from a minimum of four days to a maximum of a fortnight. 
The 'dress rehearsal' phase also designated when elements of the 
planned performance were practiced, but they were practised together 
from start to finish in sequence as they would be in real time. Dress 
rehearsals were usually scheduled within a week of the dry run phase 
ending. On average, the nine gay male resident drag artists who 
performed an iconic persona and participated in my fieldwork had two 
dress rehearsals per new performance. A dress rehearsal did not need to 
take place if the iconic persona had been previously performed by the 
drag artist and he/she was comfortable with his/her new performance. It 
included the costume, and it usually took place in the presence of a select 
audience during the day at The Embers Avenue. Again, audience 
members usually included no more than a handful of friends or other drag 
artists, and they provided constructive feedback and made suggestions. 
There was also an element of drag artists sharing trade secrets (for 
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example, on the mechanics of the performance or make-up hints). The 
sound/light technician was also present to provide support. He was paid 
by the nightclub to provide dress rehearsal slots during the week. My 
onstage rehearsal demonstrates these three phases. My experience was 
similar to that of the other nine gay male resident drag artists who 
performed/had performed an iconic persona and participated in my 
fieldwork. 
Ray and I began rehearsals by mapping out and agreeing the basic 
mechanics/elements of the performance: the performance would last for 
the duration of "Vogue" (approximately five minutes); I would enter by 
popping out from behind the stage curtain and exit by doing a final dance 
move; and no-one would participate in my performance, except Ray and 
the sound/light technician who would each provide behind-the-scenes 
technical support. We then considered how props of the performance 
would work together. Ray agreed to erect the backdrop before I entered 
onto the stage, and indicated that he would have the drag emcee stall my 
entrance until it was ready. Once it was ready, the drag emcee would 
introduce me over the microphone. This would be the signal for the 
sound/light technician to play "Vogue" over the sound system and shine 
the spotlight towards the middle of the stage, when and where I would pop 
out from behind the stage curtain and perform my first dance move while 
lip-syncing "Vogue. " Ray would then ensure the stage curtain was fully 
drawn in order to reveal the backdrop to the audience, and the sound/light 
technician would ensure the spotlight was angled towards me throughout 
my performance. Once I completed my final dance move, the stage lights 
would go off and Ray would ensure the curtain was dropped with me 
behind it. Ray agreed to dismantle the backdrop once the performance 
was completed. Ray and I also agreed that I would not interact with the 
audience by voguing in the audience because I did not have extensive 
experience of creating a rapport with an audience. Ray indicated that this 
would not detract from my performance since it only involved lip-syncing 
and dancing. We then lastly planned and agreed how I would actually 
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perform. Since we had a limited amount of time to rehearse and I had 
Madonna's performance of "Vogue" on videotape, Ray suggested that I 
mimic Madonna's dance moves from start to finish. We also agreed that 
my demeanour throughout the performance should reflect that of 
Madonna's performance: exude confidence and reflect the airs and graces 
of the bourgeoisie, with a little 'naughty playfulness' mixed into some of 
the dance moves. Ray and I took one full evening to plan the 
performance. 
Once Ray and I completed planning the performance, I began to 
rehearse elements of the performance separately. I then steadily pieced 
them together by performing them in sequence over a period of two and a 
half weeks. This included rehearsing the grand entrance, particular dance 
moves throughout the performance, lip-syncing particular parts of the 
song, and the final dance move and exit. This mainly took place in front of 
the mirrored wardrobe in my bedroom. Once I was confident enough to 
perform some of the elements of the performance in sequence, I subjected 
Ray and my flatmate to several renditions. They provided me with 
invaluable feedback on my dance moves and demeanour, and made 
suggestions on how I could improve. They also provided encouragement, 
and I became more confident in my performance by rehearsing in their 
company. Ray then organised three two-hour dress rehearsals that took 
place in the afternoon over a one-week period at The Embers Avenue, 
and I invited a handful of friends to each of them so that I could perform in 
front of a larger audience and receive additional feedback on my 
performance. Ray and the sound/light technician supported each dress 
rehearsal as we had initially planned, and Ray helped me get into my 
costume. I ran through my performance four times from start to finish on 
each occasion. The dress rehearsals enabled us to rectify technical 
difficulties with sound and lighting and improve the co-ordination and 
timing of each element of the performance (for example, 
erecting/dismantling the backdrop and my entrance and exit). I also 
became more familiar with performing on an actual stage, especially since 
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I had no prior experience. My friends provided constructive feedback on 
my performance and made some suggestions. For example, contrary to 
what Ray and I had planned, they thought that my performance would be 
enhanced by me dismounting the stage and voguing within the audience. 
While I rehearsed my onstage performance, I simultaneously 
rehearsed my offstage one. Ray also supported my offstage rehearsals. 
According to Carla Jane, the resident drag artists who performed an iconic 
persona placed a lot of importance on rehearsals for the offstage 
performance: 
Us regular girls, well we know the importance of rehearsing for the 
offstage performance. You see, it's a lot more difficult to perform 
your impersonation offstage because you have less control over 
your performance, your environment. ... Anything can happen. 
You're more vulnerable. So, you need to be on the ball and make 
sure that you can perform your offstage impersonation under any 
conditions. ... This means that rehearsing for your offstage 
performance can be more important and time consuming than 
your onstage one, and you'll really need to be prepared. 
(recorded) 
Rehearsals for the offstage performance usually took place over an 
intense three week period, and all of the nine gay male resident drag 
artists who performed/had performed an iconic persona and participated in 
my fieldwork used every possible moment of their three weeks to 
rehearse. They rehearsed their offstage performance in tandem with their 
onstage one. However, rehearsals for the offstage performance were less 
in number and intensity if the impersonation had been previously 
performed and a drag artist was comfortable with his/her performance. 
According to Ray, rehearsals for the offstage performance focused on 
impersonating how the iconic persona physically interacted with people; 
the lexicon that the persona drew upon; the demeanour the persona 
adopted; and the type of conversations that the persona had with people. 
Offstage rehearsals for the resident drag artists who performed an iconic 
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persona initially took place in isolation in some way or another (for 
example, in front of a mirror or to the sound of music while in the shower) 
and then gradually took place in informal settings with friends or other drag 
artists (for example, in a drag artist's home). 
Rehearsals for my offstage performance took longer than first 
anticipated. Ray and I had hoped that I would have been prepared for my 
offstage performance at the same time as my onstage one, but I had not 
fully mastered it, and I lacked some confidence. We agreed that an 
underperformance would threaten me being read as Madonna by the 
audience and, more importantly, by the resident drag artists. We therefore 
agreed to rehearse for an additional two weeks so that we could finely 
tune my performance and produce one that we were very satisfied with. 
Rehearsals for the offstage performance took place over approximately 
five weeks. We used Madonna's documentary of her 1991 "Blonde 
Ambition Tour, " Truth or Dare (1991), to inform my offstage performance. 
According to the rear jacket of the documentary, the documentary 
reveals her beauty as she really is, on stage and off-mother 
figure to her family of dancers, sex goddess to her millions of fans, 
businesswoman, singer, dancer. .. the biggest star in the world of 
music. Join her and experience an intimate backstage look at her 
"Blonde Ambition" tour. 
From her hotel room to her dressing room, from her stage show to 
her boudoir, here is Madonna-outrageous, hilarious, uninhibited. 
Putting aside the philosophical debate about whether a documentary can 
uncover and represent some truth ("reveals her beauty as she really is, on 
stage and off'), it provided insight into: the different accents and lexicons 
she adopted when she spoke to different people in different settings; how 
she physically interacted with people; the type of conversations that she 
tended to have; and the demeanours that she adopted in the presence of 
other Hollywood stars. In short, Madonna fluctuated between two accents: 
a west coast accent and a midwest one. She did not draw upon a 
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sophisticated or technical lexicon. Her lexicon came across as ordinary. 
Madonna also tended to affectionately touch people when she interacted, 
and her conversations revolved around gossip and herself, particularly 
how other people perceived her. However, her egocentric conversations 
were balanced with ones in which she assumed a caring role and offered 
motherly advice to family members and her supporting dancers. 
Madonna's demeanour was consistent throughout the documentary. She 
came across as calculating, business-driven, and confident, and she was 
well aware that she was a diva who set trends and knew how to press 
peoples' buttons. I initially rehearsed different aspects of this repertoire 
behind closed doors for a week and a half, usually in front of the mirrored 
wardrobe. I then gradually adopted and performed Madonna's persona 
when I went out clubbing with Ray and my friends. Ray provided regular 
feedback on my performance. 
Morphing into the iconic persona. The last stage/process of 
performing an ionic persona involved a drag artist transforming him/herself 
into the persona who he/she was impersonating. The emphasis was on 
morphology in the sense of morphing: 
Okay, it's time to get ready. We have already done some 
practicing so that people think you act like Madonna. You know, 
the stage performance and demeanour and all. This is fine, but 
now you need to look like Madonna. You see, you can act like her 
very well and have everyone convinced by your onstage and 
offstage performance that you are her. But being Madonna isn't 
all about your performance. You also have to look like her, and if 
you don't look like her, then forget about people thinking you're 
Madonna. So we need to transform you into Madonna and get 
you into your costume (Ray). (recorded) 
For the gay male resident drag artists who performed an iconic persona, 
morphing involved (1) transforming their sexed body into the sexed body 
of the persona so that there was a congruence between sex and the 
gender that they were presenting and (2) shaping the finer details of their 
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newly-morphed sexed/gendered body so that it mirrored the persona as 
closely as possible. Finer details included, for example: bone structure; 
bodily features such as beauty marks; lip shape and size; skin tone; and 
eyebrow shape and colour. This involved using a range of techniques with 
the help of make-up, garments, and various tools (for example, clippers 
and electrical tape). The transformation was finally complete when the 
drag artist put on his/her costume. Resident drag artists morphologically 
transformed themselves on two occasions: dress rehearsals and the live 
performance. The nine gay male resident drag artists who performed/had 
performed an iconic persona and participated in my fieldwork usually 
spent two hours morphing themselves. This normally occurred several 
hours before the dress rehearsal or the live performance and in their own 
home. Most of them chose to morph themselves at home rather than at 
The Embers Avenue because they did not have to transport all of the gear 
they used to morph themselves (for example, make-up, clippers, hair blow 
dryer, and electrical tape). They also morphed at home because arriving 
as themselves spoiled them being read as their iconic persona by others. 
They considered their performance to begin once they set foot onto the 
pavement leading to The Embers Avenue: 
I generally don't turn up as myself and use the dressing room to 
get changed. What would my fans think? They're here to see [X], 
not me. They'd think: 'There's [Y] going to get ready to be [X]. ' It 
would spoil it all [the performance]. My performance begins as I 
walk up that street (Liza). (recorded) 
However, when drag artists were pushed for time, they transformed 
themselves backstage in the dressing room. They also used the dressing 
room to refresh their transformation in between their performances. My 
transformation into Madonna for my onstage debut highlights the 
techniques generally used by the gay male resident drag artists to morph 
themselves into their iconic persona. 
Ray and I began my morphological transformation two and a half 
hours before our planned 8: 30p. m. arrival at The Embers Avenue. The 
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transformation took place in my flat, and it took the full time we set aside 
for it. First, we transformed my sexed body into the sexed body of 
Madonna in order to create a congruence between sex and the gender 
that I was presenting. We then concentrated on shaping the finer details 
of my newly-transformed sexed/gendered body so that it closely 
resembled Madonna's. 
Transforming my sexed body required three areas to be attended to: 
removing my body hair, concealing my penis, and creating the illusion of 
boasting breasts. We began the first phase by shaving off the hair on my 
body that the costume did not cover or could potentially be revealed if the 
costume was tampered with. This included my legs and arms, the top of 
my feet and toes, the back of my hands, under my arms, my torso, my 
front and back neck, my shoulders, and my face. We used an electric 
shaver as opposed to a razor and blade so that we did not risk irritating my 
skin. The gay male resident drag artists usually removed their hair by 
waxing, since it removed hair at the root and resulted in a more natural 
appearance. We also used hair clippers to cut my hair short at the sides 
and the back of my head in case the wig did not completely hide my hair. 
Drag artists who had long hair usually did not sacrifice it, and they hid their 
hair by pulling it back with hairpins and a hairnet. Ray and I decided to 
lastly pluck my eyebrows since Madonna had very thin ones at the time of 
her performance and mine were slightly thicker (Ouch! ). Some drag 
waxed their eyebrows off rather than pluck them. It was simply a matter of 
personal preference. Once we removed my body hair, we concealed my 
penis. Ray advised me to relieve my bladder before we began, since 
concealing my penis would inhibit me from going to the toilet at free will. 
This was why some of the gay male resident drag artists did not drink in 
between their performances: 
Have you ever noticed that some of the girls don't drink in between 
their performances? They even refuse drinks from their fans! This 
is because their penis is tightly concealed and they just can't whip 
it out. And if they need to go to the toilet, then they have the 
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whole bother of having to undo it, and then they have the whole 
bother of having to tightly conceal it again. This will be a sobering 
experience for you (Ray). (recorded) 
'Tightly concealed' was an understatement, to say the very least. Ray had 
me put on a tight pair of flesh coloured high-cut briefs with my penis and 
testicles stretched backwards between my legs. He then used electrical 
tape to tape from the front to the back of the briefs, passing between my 
legs. This ensured that my penis and testicles stayed in place and that 
their bulge was not visible. He lastly masked the electrical tape by having 
me put on another tight pair of high-cut briefs, followed by tights. 
According to Ray, some drag artists went a step further and used tape to 
tuck their testicles up into their abdomen. We lastly created the illusion of 
breasts. Drag artists used one of two methods to create breasts. If a drag 
artist had enough body fat or muscle, he/she used strong adhesive tape or 
a corset to press the pecks together. Otherwise, he/she wore a bra with 
'falsies' (fake breasts) or socks in it. We opted for the latter, since I did not 
have enough body fat or muscle to create the illusion of breasts. 
Once we had a clean slate on which to work, we began to shape the 
finer details. Again, these techniques generally reflected the ones used by 
the gay male resident drag artists to morph themselves into their iconic 
persona. First, Ray applied a heavy layer of liquid foundation to my skin in 
order to create a uniform colour, from my forehead down to my torso and 
from the back of my ears and neck down to my shoulders. We chose a 
very pale flesh colour since Madonna's skin tone for "Vogue" was 
bordering on pasty white. Once the foundation was completely applied 
and adapted to my skin temperature for five minutes, Ray told me to close 
my eyes and hold my breath for 10 seconds. Taken off guard, he quickly 
sprayed hairspray over the areas where he applied foundation. Ray 
explained that the hairspray was used to set the foundation and ensure 
that it did not thin and run due to the high temperature of the nightclub. 
We then began to transform my lips and eyes. Again, we used pale 
colours since Madonna used pale ones: flesh-coloured lipstick with a hint 
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of pink and cream-coloured eye shadow with gold highlights. Since my 
lips were not as pronounced as Madonna's, Ray transformed them by 
drawing thicker lips on my face with a lip pencil. He then filled them in with 
lipstick, had me blot them with a tissue, repeated the same process again, 
and then finally finished them with a hint of lip gloss. The eyes required 
three areas to be attended to: the eyelids, eyebrows, and eyelashes. He 
transformed the eyelids by applying eye shadow across the eyelid and 
using gold eyeliner to draw a line from the inner corner of the eyelid to the 
crow's feet. He then used a brown-coloured eyebrow pencil to create 
long, thin eyebrows and used a gold-coloured one to add highlights to 
them. Madonna's eyelashes were very pronounced, so we applied two 
sets of eyelashes. Ray added volume and definition to them by applying a 
thick layer of mascara. We then applied some rose-coloured loose 
powder foundation to my cheeks in order to create the illusion of a strong 
bone structure, since Madonna's cheekbones were prominent in her 
performance of "Vogue. " In order to set the newly-applied make-up and 
reset the foundation previously applied to my face, torso, neck, and 
shoulders, Ray applied another layer of hairspray. While the hairspray 
dried, Ray attached French-manicured nails to my non-existent fingernails, 
and he then painted both my fingernails and toenails. We chose to paint 
them light pink in order to bring out the pink in my lipstick more. Ray 
completed the make-up regime by lightly dusting white talcum powder 
over the areas where he applied foundation, so that my skin tone matched 
Madonna's more closely. Talcum powder was also used because it would 
soak up the excess sebum produced by my skin during the performance 
and maintain a matte appearance. 
Ray finally completed my morphological transformation by assisting 
me to put on the costume. Ray first assisted me into the costume before 
affixing the wig because I had to put my head through the costume in 
order to get it on. Once the costume was on and properly ruffled, Ray 
complimented it with additional parts of the costume: he affixed a band of 
faux pearls to my neck (similar to a choker, although broader); he attached 
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a faux pearl bracelet to my wrist; he attached dangling clip-on faux pearl 
earrings to my ears; he slipped my fingers through fake diamond rings with 
gold bands; he pinned a broach to my dress, with an ostrich feather 
protruding from it; he slipped my feet into brown leather high heels; and he 
had me carry a tiny velvet purse, which held my money, lipstick, and 
mirror. Ray completed the costume by affixing the wig he coiffed to my 
head. All of the nine gay male resident drag artists who performed/had 
performed an iconic persona and participated in my fieldwork always 
affixed their wig after they had their costume on so that it did not get de- 
coiffed. He used approximately eight pins to hold it in place, tidied it up, 
and then finally set it with an additional layer of hairspray. The wig was 
coiffed an hour before he arrived at my house to morphologically transform 
me. It arrived on a mannequin head. Drag artists usually coiffed their wig 
on a mannequin head immediately before they morphologically 
transformed themselves. Their wig would loose its hold and style if they 
coiffed it any sooner. Ray used an auburn-coloured wig, since Madonna's 
wig was of a similar colour, and he styled it as a 'beehive' with curls 
dangling from it. He also attached pearls and ostrich feathers to the wig in 
order to make it more dramatic. 
Drag artists also transformed themselves psychologically while 
transforming themselves physically. It was not enough that they physically 
looked like their iconic persona on stage. They had to feel that they were 
their persona: 
Performing someone is not just about looking like them. It's also a 
state of mind. You have to mentally feel that you're that person. If 
you don't, it'll show in your performance (Donna). 
When I went up there and I had my costume on with all my 
jewellery, I'd tell myself that I was [X], that they [the audience] 
were here to see [X]. I had to give off that vibe, they could sense it 
(Alexis). 
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I gotta make sure I feel like [X] on the stage. If I don't, they [the 
audience] surely won't think so (Carla Jane). (recorded) 
The nine gay male resident drag artists who performed/had performed an 
iconic persona and participated in my fieldwork psychologically 
transformed themselves in a number of ways, by either: singing along to 
the music of the persona who was being performed; doing some of the 
dance moves of their performance; looking into the mirror and telling 
themselves that they were the very definition of their persona; talking and 
interacting like their persona would; or a combination of any of the 
aforementioned. I psychologically transformed myself into Madonna for 
both my dress rehearsals and live debut performance by singing 'Vogue' 
along with Madonna in the background and doing some dance moves. 
After approximately ten weeks, I was now ready for my performance. I 
was now Madonna. Strike-a-pose, vogue! 
iv. Postscript: Lights, Camera, Actions 
Prior to my debut performance, a handful of people were aware of what 
Ray and I were planning: my course instructor, a few of my friends, and 
the sound/light technician. No-one else was aware, or, at the very least, 
we had the premonition that no-one else was aware. Ray and I believed 
that if my performance was disclosed to the resident drag artists and 
regular patrons, then they would read me as a 'researcher' in the first 
instance and not potentially as 'Madonna. ' In other words, my status as a 
researcher would overshadow my performance, that is, my effecting of 
Madonna. It would be read and rated through that lens. As a result, I 
would not be able to appraise my performance in its own right. We 
therefore decided not to disclose my performance to others. The flexibility 
of The Embers Avenue's weekend shows facilitated anonymity, and we 
believed that our approach was ethically sound because anonymity was 
built into the shows. As I discussed in my field notes, The Embers Avenue 
provided a number of 'open-ended' performance slots within their Friday 
and Saturday night shows, whereby aspiring drag artists or people who 
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had previously performed drag could perform on stage. No-one knew in 
advance of the night who would perform in these slots. Securing a slot 
simply required a performer to appear in drag with music in hand and 
reserve one with the drag emcee at least half an hour before the show 
began. Some performers were regulars of The Embers Avenue drag 
scene and therefore known when they reserved a slot, whilst others were 
external to the drag scene and therefore unknown. 
Ray and I arrived approximately half an hour before the Saturday night 
show began, and he reserved a slot for me. In order to maintain my 
anonymity, I only socialised with Ray and my friends until Ray and I went 
back stage to prepare for my performance. However, while we were 
socialising with one another, we sensed that the resident drag artists knew 
or at least suspected I was performing Madonna. They were repeatedly 
glancing at us and then engaging in a flurry of conversation between 
themselves. Of course, we may have been misinterpreting and assigning 
the wrong meaning to their interaction, but our premonition was not simply 
based on observation. It was also spawn by a general feeling in the air, 
one of those feelings that escape description and require a person to be 
present to understand and appreciate. Our premonition was indeed later 
confirmed, but not that evening. A cold had got the better of me, and I left 
immediately after my onstage performance. It was confirmed about a 
week later. While I was perusing the shops on 21st street within the 
northwest pocket of the city centre, I bumped into a couple of the resident 
drag artists who saw my performance (Portland felt like a small city more 
often than not. ). They were only too pleased to have bumped into me. 
Whilst they were quick to praise my performance, they were very quick to 
tell me that they knew it was me as Madonna before I hit the stage. What 
confirmed their suspicion? Ray was often seen with me in my field site. 
As a result, the resident drag artists viewed my performance through the 
lens of my status as a researcher. The degree of its success, then, was 
contingent upon the lens that it was read and rated through, which was 
further compounded by the fact that I only performed my onstage 
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performance of Madonna due to my cold. My observational notes and 
feedback that I received from some resident drag artists in their interview 
provide some insight into the success (or otherwise) of my performance. 
Following my performance, I documented my experience. My 
observational notes detailed perceptions, as well as feelings. I reflected 
on: the mechanics and elements of my performance (for example, the 
entrance/exit, dance moves, erecting the backdrop, and lip-syncing); how I 
felt immediately before, during, and after my performance; the degree to 
which I read myself as Madonna; and how I perceived the audience to 
read and rate me as Madonna. Although they are presented in abridged 
form (excerpts are omitted where there are ellipses), they are generally 
reflective of what I perceived and felt at the time. In general: the 
mechanics/elements of my performance ran according to plan, although I 
slightly tripped while emerging from behind the curtain and my dance 
moves were not as strong when I descended into the crowd (which was 
unplanned); I felt like and read myself as Madonna once I began to 
perform, but not to the same degree towards the end of my performance; 
and, although I had suspicions that the resident drag artists knew that I 
was performing Madonna, the audience as a whole read and rated me as 
'Madonna, ' particularly when I descended into the audience and 
'Madonna' was repeatedly chanted at the end of my performance. My 
notes read: 
I'm in the thick of this cold, and it couldn't have happened at a 
worse time. I don't think it affected my performance on stage 
because I had a lot of adrenaline running through my body like 
nobody's business at the time. It caught up with me, though, when 
I finished my performance. I was too exhausted afterwards. I had 
to go home. It's a shame because I practiced all those weeks for 
my offstage performance, and I wanted to see if I could pull it off. 
But then I have to remind myself that I pulled off a great deal. I've 
never been on stage before, and I haven't done drag before. 
shouldn't be hard on myself. I need to keep everything in 
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perspective. ... I think my performance went really well, and 
think the drag artists and audience read me as Madonna. 
Although I have a sneaky suspicion that they may have known it 
was me.... 
When Ray and I went back stage, I didn't really have time to think 
whether I was Madonna. Well, at least at first. We were too busy 
getting ready for the show. Things seemed to be going to plan. 
The last performance finished and there was someone on doing 
comedy. The curtain was closed, so Ray was erecting the 
backdrop. It didn't take much time. He knew what he was doing. 
We had already run through this. But once it was up, I began 
focusing on what was happening on the other side of the curtain. I 
could hear the comedian and the audience laughing. I then got 
thinking about my performance and got nervous. What did we 
plan to do first? Was I going to pop out from behind the curtain or 
was the curtain going to be raised? ... I thought: 
'Oh, Jason, 
what shit did you get yourself into? ' ... But I couldn't escape now. 
I heard the audience clapping. It was too late now. Luckily, right 
before "Vogue" started playing, Ray smiled and reminded me to 
pop out from behind the curtain. 
And you know what? When I popped out and performed my first 
dance move while lip-syncing, I felt different. Don't get me wrong, 
I was a little off balance when I popped out. I slightly tripped over 
my costume, but then I don't think it was noticeable. I forgot that I 
always felt different when "Vogue" was on. It was euphoria, and 
when I sung "when all else fails, and you long to be something 
better than you are today, I know a place where you can get away, 
it's called a dance floor and here's what it's for, " I felt I was fully 
Madonna. There was no nervousness. There were no inhibitions. 
was Madonna and I was performing her dance moves spot on. 
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My twists and turns were so perfect, Madonna would have been 
proud... . 
We decided that I wouldn't go into the audience, but I think 
because I got into it so much and some of the audience and drag 
artists were doing some voguing themselves, I went off the stage. 
I did some vogue moves in the audience, and they did some along 
with me. I went wild and they went wild! They were also touching 
my costume as I swept by them, through the audience. One 
person even kissed me on my bosoms! But my dance moves 
started to get a little sloppy because they depended on how the 
other person was voguing, and I remember telling myself to get 
back on stage.... 
I think I started to become more conscious of what I was and was 
not doing when I got back on stage because I felt my performance 
was a little sloppy in the audience. The nerves started kicking in a 
little, and I was gaining consciousness as Jason again. But I 
remember telling myself to snap back into Madonna, and luckily 
one of my favourite parts of the song was kicking in: "Greta Garbo 
and Monroe, Deitrch and DiMaggio. .. ." And I felt more 
like 
Madonna, but not in the way that I did in the beginning or when I 
first went into the audience. But the audience was still into my 
performance, singing and dancing, so I must have been giving off 
the Madonna vibes. They still must have thought I was her.... 
Before I knew it, the curtain was down and I was out of breath. 
was shattered. Ray was there, and all I can remember is him 
continually telling me how well I did and hearing the crowd 
chanting 'Madonna, Madonna, Madonna... " in the background. 
The rest is just a big blur. I was still coming off a high, kind of like 
when you've run a mile and are still out of breath. You feel 
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disorientated. But I felt tired, and I needed to get home. .. 
(Sunday, 5 May 1996). 
During some of the regular drag artists' face-to-face interviews, I asked 
them for feedback on my performance. Their feedback was twofold. In 
the first instance, they remarked on my identity/status. Although they 
acknowledged and valued my approach to my research by participating in 
my fieldwork, they reminded me that I was a researcher and not a drag 
artist. I had not earned the status of drag artist by learning drag over time 
and 'moving up the ranks' so to speak-of my own accord. I relied on Ray 
to hold my hand to perform drag. Nonetheless, they were impressed with 
the overall quality of my performance, considering my status and the fact 
that I had no previous experience of performing on stage. In the second 
instance, they remarked on my performance: its mechanics and elements 
and the degree to which they read and rated me as Madonna. They more 
or less confirmed my perception of the performance. In general, they 
believed that the mechanics of the elements of my performance ran 
smoothly and connected very well, from the entrance to the actual 
performance (lip-syncing and dancing) to my interaction with the audience 
to the exit. One drag artist noticed that I had tripped over my costume 
when I emerged from behind the curtain, whereas the other three drag 
artists did not take notice. He/she did however comment that he/she only 
saw me trip because of where he/she was positioned in relation to the 
stage. They thought that my lip-syncing was in timing with Madonna and 
that my dance moves replicated Madonna's performance of "Vogue. " Two 
of the drag artists inquired if I had had any formal dance training in the 
past. They were all pleased with my interaction with the audience by 
descending the stage and dancing with audience members. In doing so, 
they believed that I created an instant rapport with the audience and 
commanded its utmost attention. Whereas I thought that my dance moves 
were slightly sloppy while I was interacting with the audience, they made 
no mention of them as such. They generally read and rated me as 
Madonna in three respects. In the first instance, they believed that I 
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succeeded in morphing myself into Madonna. According to them, I was 
successful in (1) creating a congruence between sex and the gender that I 
was presenting and (2) shaping the finer details of my newly- 
sexed/gendered body so that it mirrored Madonna. In particular, they 
commented that: my body hair was well-removed in order to produce the 
appearance of soft, supple skin; my penis was well-concealed; my breasts 
were 'busty'; and my skin tone, bone structure, lips, and eyes matched 
that of Madonna's. In the second instance, they generally believed that 
my performance gave the impression that I believed that I was Madonna. 
According to them, I did not come across as nervous or conscious of who I 
was performing. I exuded Madonna naturally. I came across as a diva 
who was confident in her performance and knew that all eyes were on her 
because she was a trend setter. In the third instance, they lastly believed 
that audience members confirmed I was Madonna by: voguing along with 
me, touching me as I swept past, kissing me on the bosoms like one of 
Madonna's dancers in her performance, and chanting 'Madonna' at the 
end of my performance. 
V. Just a Morphological Ideal? 
In line with Butler's formulation, my methodological framing of drag 
demonstrates how a morphological ideal was central to realness and 
subjectivity. More specifically, the stages/processes I went through to 
effect, to be Madonna involved miming, embodying, and repeating a 
morphological ideal particular to Madonna. This morphological ideal was 
present in each stage/process in some way or another. Take for instance 
the first stage/process of doing drag: scoping who to impersonate. One of 
the principal areas that I had to take account of when choosing which 
iconic persona to impersonate/perform was how compatible my 
morphology was to the persona I might impersonate/perform. I had to 
take into consideration, for example: height, weight, body frame, bone 
structure, and skin texture. Again, Ray outlined why I was best suited to 
impersonate/perform Madonna: "You're both of medium height for your 
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sexes. You're both fit and you both have toned and defined bodies. Also, 
you both have angular features to your bone structure, and you both have 
healthy looking skin that's well maintained and youthful" (recorded). Take 
for instance the second stage/process of doing drag as another example: 
designing and making the costume. The bodily figure of Madonna 
dressed as Marie Antoinette in an eighteenth-century stylish dress for her 
performance of "Vogue" for the 1990 MTV Music Video Awards was 
central to Ray and I designing and making my costume-from studying the 
costume to constructing patterns to buying materials, accessories, and 
make-up. Take for instance the fourth stage/process of doing drag as one 
last example: morphing into the iconic persona. In order to produce the 
notion that I was Madonna, Ray and I morphed my sexed body into the 
sexed body of Madonna and shaped the finer details of my new sexed 
body so that it closely mirrored that of Madonna's. For example, we used 
electrical tape to stretch and conceal my penis and testicles between my 
legs. We also plucked my eyebrows and created long, thin ones with an 
eyebrow pencil since Madonna had very thin ones. We further applied 
rose-coloured loose powder foundation to my cheeks in order to create the 
illusion of a strong cheekbone structure similar to Madonna's. 
It is important to make a note here, though. Miming, embodying, and 
repeating a morphological ideal particular to Madonna was not simply an 
issue of repeating Madonna's morphology in the metaphysical sense. For 
Butler, a 'morphological ideal' designates the bodily norms that bring into 
being, constitute, and regulate the subject across the lines of gender, race, 
and class. Take for instance the fourth stage/process of doing drag as an 
example. Concealing my penis and testicles between my legs with 
electrical tape, plucking my eyebrows and creating new ones with an 
eyebrow pencil, and creating a strong cheekbone structure with rose- 
coloured loose powder foundation were not an issue of miming, 
embodying, and repeating Madonna's morphology devoid of any social 
significance. Rather, they were a means to create a congruence between 
sex and gender according to compulsory heterosexuality's binary gender 
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economy, whereby my new sexed body (female) mimicked the culturally 
constructed gender that I was presenting (woman/feminine). In this sense, 
then, concealing my penis and testicles, plucking my eyebrows, and 
creating a strong cheekbone structure was also an issue of miming, 
embodying, and repeating Madonna's morphology within compulsory 
heterosexuality's binary gender economy. 14 Take for instance the second 
stage/process of doing drag as another example. Using the bodily figure 
of Madonna dressed as Marie Antoinette to design and make my 
costume/dress was not an issue of miming, embodying, and repeating that 
bodily figure within a vacuum. It was also the reiteration of a class norm. 
Her bodily figure was that of a bourgeois female particular to eighteenth- 
century France. Ray subtly suggested this when he explained why a 
particular knowledge base and skills set was required to produce a 
costume similar to Madonna's: 
You just aren't making a dress with some stage props. Such a 
costume is steeped in history and has cultural and social 
meanings, and you really need to know what you're doing in order 
to reproduce that. But then it's not just about what you know or a 
skill you have. You also need an artistic eye, girl (italics my 
emphasis). (recorded) 
Within these terms, then, it might not be accurate to state that being 
Madonna simply involved miming, embodying, and repeating a 
morphological ideal particular to Madonna. Her body is the nexus of a 
morphological ideal's articulation and materialisation. Being Madonna 
also involved miming, embodying, and repeating a morphological ideal 
constituted within and through Madonna, which, in the words of Butler, is 
at once 'a figure of a body' and 'no particular body. ' 
On the one hand, my methodological framing of drag does indeed 
demonstrate Butler's suggestion that a morphological ideal is central to 
realness and subjectivity. And yet, on the other hand, my participation in 
the field questions Butler's formulation and methodological framing. As I 
outlined in the previous broad section of the chapter, Paris is Burning 
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(1991) mainly underscores the centrality of a bodily norm. Because 
Butler's examination of realness and subjectivity is solely predicated on 
Paris is Burning (1991) and Paris is Burning is limited in its content and 
form, her formulation is restricted to and by a bodily norm. If she had 
broadened and deepened her methodological framework by employing or 
incorporating a sociological methodological programme that is based in 
social life and actively incorporates the lived experiences of social actors, 
then a morphological ideal may not have been just as central to her 
formulation. 
Take for instance the stage/process of scoping who to impersonate. 
To effect realness, to be Madonna, compatibility also had to take into 
consideration, for example: voice (for example, accent, range, depth, and 
strength); personality (for example, an extravert, introvert, or a 
combination of both); and demeanour. Again, Ray outlined why Madonna 
and I were compatible: 
As for personalities, you're both in between being extraverts and 
introverts. You're neither over-the-top nor quiet and insular. 
However, you're both a magnet for a crowd and you're always the 
centre of attention. Plus, your voice isn't deep and dark, so you 
shouldn't stick out like a sore thumb. Although, this doesn't matter 
as much because you'll probably be lip-syncing on the stage. 
Then, there's your demeanour. Well, let's just say that you 
couldn't be a more perfect match, 'Little Princess. ' You both 
definitely have attitude! (recorded) 
Take for instance the third stage/process of doing drag as another 
example, rehearsing the persona's onstage and offstage performance. 
While the bodily figure of Madonna dressed as Marie Antoinette was 
pivotal to the onstage performance, I also had to mime, embody, and 
repeat how Madonna socially interacted with an audience and how she 
actually performed "Vogue" in order to be read and rated as her. The 
same can be said for the offstage performance. Although I did not perform 
my offstage performance for my debut, I had to be able to reiterate, for 
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example: the accent that she adopted, which was a mixture of a west 
coast accent and a midwest one; the lexicon that she drew upon, which 
was not sophisticated or technical but ordinary; the way she physically 
interacted with people, which involved affectionately touching people; the 
demeanour that she adopted, which was calculated, business-driven, and 
confident; and the type of conversations that she had with people, which 
were egocentric and balanced with ones in which she assumed a caring 
role and offered motherly advice. 
In this light, my methodological framing of drag reveals that although a 
morphological ideal was central to realness and subjectivity for the drag 
artists, effecting realness, being an iconic persona was not simply an issue 
of miming, embodying, and repeating a bodily norm. Having said this, 
Butler's analysis is not explicitly making the claim that a bodily norm is 
central to drag. Her analysis inadvertently makes this claim. As I 
previously discussed, Butler's analysis of drag is not a study of drag. It 
supports a larger argument on subjectivity. Butler is using the leverage of 
drag to demonstrate that dominant subject positions are the result of the 
miming, embodiment, and repetition of a bodily norm, and drag reveals 
how a bodily norm is not natural and original but imitative. Indeed, in 
attempting to be read and rated as 'the' subject of a category by miming, 
embodying, and repeating a morphological ideal particular to a category, 
the drag artists in Paris is Burning (1991) rearticulate that ideal as 
imitative. This is the main thrust behind Butler's doctrine of gender 
performativity, which was touched upon earlier in the chapter: 
To claim that all gender is like drag, or is drag, is to suggest that 
'imitation' is at the heart of the heterosexual project and its gender 
binarisms, that drag is not a secondary imitation that presupposes 
a prior and original gender, but that hegemonic heterosexuality is 
itself a constant and repeated effort to imitate its own idealizations. 
... In this sense, then, drag is subversive to the extent that it 
reflects on the imitative structure by which hegemonic gender is 
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itself produced and disputes heterosexuality's claim on 
naturalness and originality (1993, p. 125). 
However, what my fieldwork on drag does suggest is that the production of 
dominant subject positions will not simply be a question of miming, 
embodying, and repeating a bodily norm. It suggests that it will also be a 
question of reiterating gestures, demeanours, behaviours, and language. 
My fieldwork also suggests that they will not be reiterated in isolation from 
one another. The production of a dominant subject position will be the 
nexus of their interplay with one another. 
Although not the purpose of my ethnographic work and not necessarily 
that of Butler's project, what I would suggest, for further investigation, is 
that Butler's formulation on subjectivity be widened and deepened by 
turning to symbolic interactionist theory. The work of Gagnon and Simon 
(1 967a, 1973b, 1986) and Plummer (1975,1982) in particular would prove 
useful. I think that their insights on human social interaction and meaning 
would be useful to consider how the production of dominant sexual subject 
positions is the interplay of both bodily norms and normative gestures, 
demeanours, behaviours, and language. Of course, for Plummer, as I 
outlined in the previous chapter, the production of dominant sexual subject 
positions would not simply be the product of the social actor. It would 
reflect the dialectical relationship between 'objective, global realities' and 
'micro intersubjective realities. ' The task, then, would be to examine this 
dialectical relationship, and to consider how it forms, constitutes, and 
regulates dominant sexual subject positions. 
Coda 
Moving in the Direction of Disciplinary Cross-fertilisation 
Black women's position in the political economy, particularly 
ghettoization in domestic work, comprised another 
contradictory location where economic and political 
subordination created the conditions for Black women's 
resistance. ... The result was a curious outsider-within 
stance, a peculiar marginality that stimulated a special Black 
women's perspective. 
-Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought 
(1990, p. 12) 
The `Outsider-within Perspective' 
My relation to my fieldwork on gay male male-to-female drag was an 
ambivalent one. I touched on most of the following points in the previous 
chapter. 
On the one hand, I was not a full outsider. From the very beginning 
and throughout the course of my fieldwork, I was methodologically 
immersed in it. I was in direct interaction and dialogue with interlocutors 
through face-to-face interviews, regular observation, and informal 
conversations. This level of immersion and commitment quickly proved 
fruitful. Within several months of being in the field, there was common 
knowledge of my research among drag artists, staff, and patrons (of The 
Embers Avenue). This resulted in me not having to solicit interviews or 
instigate conversations. Interlocutors approached me of their own accord, 
eager to share their experiences and views, as well as to voice their 
support for my research. This familiarity and active participation instilled a 
sense of belonging as a group member in both field sites, and I even 
developed friendships with a couple interlocutors (previous patrons) that 
still hold strong today. A sense of belonging was further strengthened by 
my participation in the field. By doing drag, I got an insider's view on how 
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to do good drag, real drag for the stage. Ray selflessly supported me 
through the different stages/processes to do drag and, along the way, he 
shared his top tips and secrets that were usually only known to the drag 
artists. 
The research methods that facilitated my insiderness were 
unequivocally influenced and shaped by my feminist upbringing. Without 
totally rejecting positivist research methods, my feminist mentors at Lewis 
and Clark College trained me to balance them by breaking down the 
barrier that they erected between the researcher and the researched. 
That is, in a feminist spirit (for example, Cook and Fonow 1986; Harding 
1987; Oakley 1981; Reinharz 1983; Smith 1987; Stanley and Wise 1983), 
was trained to bring to centre stage the lived experiences of interlocutors 
and to challenge positivist methods that instituted and maintained a strict 
separation between the researcher and the researched in the name of 
impartiality, objectivity, and analytic rigour. 1 The view was that there was 
no strict separation between the 'objective' and the 'subjective' in the 
production of knowledge, that all knowledge was 'situated' and 'partial' 
(Haraway 1988), and that employing methods that actively engaged with 
the lived experiences of interlocutors would strengthen rather than weaken 
the research process and product. 
Although the research methods that I employed promoted interlocutors 
to voluntarily participate in my fieldwork, I had to ask myself why they were 
so willing to cooperate with me. In an essay on and titled "The Politics of 
Feminist Research" (1982), Angela McRobbie poses (and to a certain 
degree answers) the same question to/for Ann Oakley (1981) and her 
research on women giving childbirth. McRobbie remarks: 
But what I think Oakley fails to recognise is the way as a 
researcher she had everything going for her. At no time does she 
dwell on the question of their co-operation. She doesn't concern 
herself with the fact that pregnant, in hospital, often cut-off from 
family and relatives, its no surprise that the women were delighted 
to find a friendly, articulate, clever and knowledgeable women to 
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talk to about their experiences. Surrounded by distant and aloof 
doctors and over-worked nurses, their extreme involvement in the 
research could also be interpreted as yet another index of their 
powerlessness (1982, p. 57). 
McRobbie brings to the surface for me my uneasiness with the relationship 
between me and my interlocutors, particularly the drag artists. Portland 
may have had some strong liberal leanings, but the drag artists in my 
research lived within a sexual reality dominated by the discursive terms 
and material conditions of heterosexism and homophobia. In order to 
attempt to survive the all-too-often damaging effects of heterosexism and 
homophobia, they had to negotiate their sexuality along the lines of 
gender, class, race, and ethnicity on a daily basis. This took place with a 
range of social actors, for example: partners, family members, friends, 
employers, course instructors, religious folk, and `democratic' 
representatives within political domains. In the face of their 
powerlessness outside of The Embers Avenue and Darcelle XV, drag was 
a means for them to feel good about themselves and their sexuality within 
a supportive environment. Although drag artists indicated that they 
solicited me to participate in my fieldwork because they were curious 
about what I was up to, many times I got the impression that their 
willingness to share information was a means to legitimate not only their 
interest in drag but also their sexuality. To a certain degree, then, my 
research rode on the back of their powerlessness. In some instances, this 
may have had the effect of them disclosing information on drag and/or 
their lived experiences as sexual minorities that they later regretted 
disclosing upon reflection. Unfortunately, I will never fully know the degree 
to which this was the case. Having said this, their vulnerability reminded 
me that there could never strictly be an equal relationship between us. 
More importantly, it reminded me that although I was employing particular 
methods in order to generate 'better' data that reflected the complexities of 
their lives, my status as a researcher and the research process itself could 
potentially be exploitative. After all, as the researcher, I was the person in 
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charge. I had the power to devise, arrange, conduct, edit, analyse, and 
eventually benefit academically from the research. I had the power to 
appropriate and give voice to largely muted and disempowered subjects. 
In order to address and level out the imbalance of power between me 
and my interlocutors, I negotiated (or at least attempted to negotiate) our 
relationship in three main respects. The overall thrust was to treat 
interlocutors as 'people' and not as, in the words of Kim L. V. England, 
"mere mines of information to be exploited by the researcher as the 
neutral collector of 'facts"' (1994, p. 82). In the first instance, I adopted a 
'supplicant' role, shifting a lot of power over to my interlocutors. I was the 
one who was ignorant or lacked in-depth knowledge of drag (at least 
initially). My interlocutors were the ones who had greater knowledge. 
They were the ones who had insight into its social structures, discursive 
practices, performative rituals, norms, lexicon, rights of passage, different 
subject positions, and so on. In engaging with interlocutors, I 
acknowledged and exposed my lack of in-depth knowledge and 
emphasised my reliance on their knowledge, views, and experiences to 
inform my research. In the second instance, I actively involved 
interlocutors in the research process, enabling them to perform the role of 
researcher. Ray supported me to devise and revise questions for face-to- 
face interviews and questionnaires, and he organised some interviews 
with interlocutors for me. I also verified data obtained through interviews 
with their respective interlocutor, and interlocutors had the opportunity to 
edit their data, whether deleting or adding information. Lastly, there was a 
reciprocal relationship between me and my interlocutors. I was of the view 
that if interlocutors were taking time out from their often-hectic lives to 
support my research, then I should reciprocate. This happened in three 
ways. While conducting interviews or engaging in informal conversations, 
interlocutors were generally curious about my research and my personal 
biography. They asked specific questions about my personal life ('Where 
do you study? '; 'Where do you live? '; 'Do you have a partner? '; or'Do you 
parents know you are gay? ') and the motivation and objectives of my 
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research ('What are you studying? '; 'Why are you studying drag? '; 'Are 
you interested in becoming a drag artist? '; or'What do you hope to get out 
of your research? '). For the most part, I answered their questions, and I 
got the impression that my responses were sufficient to fuel their curiosity. 
However, on some occasions, questions were either inappropriate ('Are 
you a 'top' or a 'bottom'? ') or very personal ('What did your parents say 
when you told them that you were gay? '), and I extended the same ground 
rules for answering questions in interviews to me. In these instances, I 
politely did not respond or disclosed only partial information. I also 
reciprocated by supporting Ray and his drag performances. I shopped 
with him for costumes, make-up, and accessories, participated in his 'dry 
run' and dress rehearsals, and assisted in his actual performance by 
erecting/dismantling stage props. I further supported theme nights (for 
example, drag beauty pageants and 'Let's go to the Oscars' nights). 
When time permitted, I sold tickets, erected billposters, and helped to 
decorate each establishment. 
On the other hand, I was not a full insider to my fieldwork, which my 
'supplicant' role signals. Despite firmly planting myself within my field 
sites, doing the 'local thing, ' and being supported and generally accepted 
by my interlocutors, I was not a full member of either drag culture. Drag 
certainly was not 'free play' at The Embers Avenue and Darcelle XV. After 
several 'recky' visits of my field sites, I knew or, at the very least, had a 
strong premonition that it was not an activity that someone could simply 
participate in by walking off the street directly onto the drag stage, donning 
a persona as and when he/she pleased. The conversations, the familiar 
(body) language, the larger-than-life personas; the fabulous fashion, the 
high-energy music, the first-class performances, and the intimate 
interaction between different drag artists, staff, and patrons were very 
suggestive. Each establishment had its very own exclusive drag culture, 
and, over time, I came to appreciate what this meant and entailed. I 
realised or experienced my marginality in three main respects throughout 
the course of my fieldwork. 
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In the first instance, my fieldwork heavily relied on the support of Ray. 
I was disorientated when I initially planned and devised my fieldwork prior 
to getting my hands dirty in the field. I did not know who my interlocutors 
should be, how I could best gain access to them, and what questions I 
should be asking. Ray gave me direction. In addition to supporting me to 
do drag, helping me to construct questions for interviews, and arranging 
some interviews, which I previously mentioned, Ray provided me with a 
sound knowledge base of the Portland drag scene, introduced me to some 
of Portland's oldest drag dearies, and enabled me to have access to those 
who had an influential stake in the drag scene. My research would not 
have been as full and rich without his 'full-insider' knowledge and 
experience. In the second instance, my status as a researcher had, to a 
certain degree, an inhibiting effect on information some interlocutors 
shared with me in their face-to-face interviews. Although interlocutors 
were generally willing to participate in my fieldwork and share information 
with me, some interlocutors were guarded, at least initially, about both the 
quality and quantity of information they shared in interviews. This 
observation emerged because some information shared in the interviews 
varied in both quality and quantity from one interlocutor to the next. 
Further, some information was richer in quality and greater in quantity in 
the anonymous postal questionnaires than in the interviews. In the third 
instance, my participation in the field hit home hard that I really was not a 
drag artist. Although my debut drag performance was generally well- 
received by both drag artists and patrons, some resident drag artists who 
regularly performed on stage at The Embers Avenue reminded me that I 
was a researcher and not a drag artist. Carla Jane summarised their view: 
JM: Did you see my performance of Madonna down at The 
Embers the other night, with me voguing up and down the 
stage? 
CJ: Yes I did, girl. I was with the other regular girls. 
JM: What did you think? Be honest. 
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CJ: Well, I couldn't fault your costume and makeup. Your 
performance was spot-on. The entrance, your voguing, the 
lip-syncing, the music, the backdrop, the exit all worked well 
together. The crowd seemed to really get into it. Sometimes 
it's hard to get them going. Everything seemed to go 
smoothly. It all connected, but [hesitation] I don't know. Who 
am I to know? What does anyone know? [pause] 
JM: Go on, tell me what you really thought. I won't take offence. 
CJ: Are you sure? 
JM: Go on. 
CJ: Don't take offence, but who gave you permission to go up on 
stage like that? You jumped the queue, girl. It takes years of 
experience to become a drag artiste, and you've got to earn 
the respect of the regular girls. We all know that Ray helped 
you, so don't get hot-headed and think you're one of us. We 
see you as a researcher first. (recorded) 
Taken together, then, I was neither a full outsider nor a full insider to 
my fieldwork. I did not have a full sense of belonging in some totalising 
way. Did I lament this ambivalence, this precarious relation to my 
fieldwork? Did it prove to be a stumbling-block? I think Patricia Hill 
Collins' (1990) thoughts on the 'outsider-within perspective' are useful at 
this juncture. They are useful for reflecting on: (1) my position as a 
fieldworker, a position shared by other who may put as much emphasis on 
participation as on observation in the positivist sense and (2) the relation 
between queer theory and sociology and my movements around/between 
them. 
For Collins, Black (read: African-American) women's position in the 
wider political economy, which she understands to be largely the product 
of White patriarchy, is unstable and ambivalent (1990, pp. 10-13). On the 
one hand, the wider political economy institutes and maintains Black 
women's subordination. On the other hand, it is a catalyst for the 
formation of a 'Black women's culture of resistance. ' Collins maintains that 
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this culture is grounded within traditional African(-American) culture and 
constitutes a unique perspective, which she terms the 'outsider-within 
perspective. ' 
According to Collins, before World War II in the United States, the 
ghettoisation of Blacks by first slavery and then segregation on both sides 
of the North-South divide acted as a contradictory location for the 
emergence of a Black women's culture of resistance (1990, pp. 10-11). 
Although the main aim of ghettoising Blacks was political and economic 
control and exploitation, their confinement as a separate and distinct 
community also enabled them to craft and express an independent and 
alternative worldview. For Collins, a 'worldview' broadly designates a 
framework that a culture "uses to order and evaluate its own experiences" 
(1990, p. 10). Collins maintains that African-Americans' worldview is 
based in traditional West African culture: 
By retaining significant elements of West African culture, 
communities of enslaved Africans offered their members 
alternative explanations for slavery than those advanced by 
slaveowners.... Confining African-Americans to all-Black areas 
in the rural South and northern urban ghettos fostered the 
continuation of certain dimensions of this Afrocentric worldview 
(1990, p. 10). 
According to Collins, Black women were integral to maintaining and 
transforming an Afrocentric worldview. From a number of identity 
positions (for example, mother, othermother, teacher, and sister), Black 
women drew upon an Afrocentric worldview to develop formulations on 
Black womanhood. What emerged was an Afrocentric women's culture of 
resistance. Collins writes: 
Within African-American extended families and communities, 
Black women fashioned an independent standpoint about the 
meaning of Black womanhood. These self-definitions enabled 
Black women to use African-derived conceptions of self and 
community to resist negative evaluations of Black womanhood 
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advanced by dominant groups. In all, Black women's grounding in 
traditional African-American culture fostered the development of a 
distinctive Afrocentric women's culture (1990, p. 11). 
Black women's marginality through their ghettoisation in paid domestic 
work marks another contradictory location for Collins (1990, p. 11). Like 
the general ghettoisation of Blacks, their ghettoisation did not simply 
institute and maintain political and economic subordination by White 
patriarchy. It also fostered the conditions for a Black women's culture of 
resistance. Collins maintains that paid domestic work enabled African- 
American women to view White elites (both 'actual' and 'aspiring') from 
perspectives that were illegible or unknown to Black men and White elites 
themselves. According to Collins, through their work, Black women did not 
simply perform domestic duties for their White families. They also formed 
strong connections with their employers and their children. This relation to 
their work was an ambivalent one. Collins writes: 
On one level this insider relationship was satisfying to all 
concerned. Accounts of Black domestic workers stress the sense 
of self-affirmation the women experienced at seeing [W]hite power 
demystified. But on another level these Black women knew that 
they could never belong to their [W]hite 'families, ' that they were 
economically exploited workers and thus would remain outsiders 
(1990, p. 11). 
Collins maintains that their relation to their work as neither full insiders nor 
full outsiders resulted in generating a distinctive angle of vision, which she 
terms the 'outsider-within perspective. ' 
Collins proposes that Black women's outsider-within perspective and 
grounding within traditional African(-American) culture "provide the 
material backdrop for a unique Black women's standpoint on self and 
society" (1990, p. 11). Collins provides an example for the reader (1990, 
pp. 11-12). She turns to an observation made by Nancy White (a Black 
domestic labourer and inner-city resident) on a contradiction between the 
actions and ideologies of a dominant group. White remarks: 
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Now, I understand all these things from living. But you can't lay up 
on these flowery beds of ease and think that you are running your 
life, too. Some women, [W]hite women, can run their husband's 
lives for a while, but most of them have to ... see what 
he tells 
them there is to see. If he tells them that they ain't seeing what 
they know they are seeing, then they have to just go on like it 
wasn't there (quoted in Collins 1990, p. 11, italics included in 
original)! 
For Collins, White's observation not only illustrates the suppression of a 
knowledge of a subordinate group by a dominant one but also highlights 
how White's position as an outsider-within generated a distinctive 
perspective on this process. According to Collins, White's Blackness did 
not allow her to be a full insider to the dominant group. It ensured that she 
was an outsider. As Collins correctly points out, "[s]he can never be a 
[W]hite middle-class woman lying on a 'flowery bed of ease'" (1990, p. 12). 
However, she was not a complete outsider. Her domestic work gave her 
access to the dominant group and enabled her to formulate "an insider's 
view of some of the contradictions between [W]hite women thinking that 
they are running their lives and the actual source of power and authority in 
[W]hite patriarchal households" (Collins 1990, p. 12). According to Collins 
(1990, p. 12), African-American women have generally questioned the 
contradictions between White patriarchy's ideologies of womanhood and 
Black women's status: "If women are allegedly passive and fragile, then 
why are Black women treated as 'mules' and assigned heavy cleaning 
chores? " However, she acknowledges that the distinctive perspective 
generated by being a 'devalued worker' can result in internalising 
oppression. African(-American) and Black women's culture then become 
critical re(sources), and indeed have, for alternative explanations. 
In line with Collins' thoughts on Black women's contradictory location 
in paid domestic work, my ambivalent relation to my fieldwork as neither a 
full outsider nor a full insider did not prove to be a stumbling-block to my 
research. It had quite the opposite effect. I alluded to this in the previous 
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chapter on my discussion about my participation in the field by doing drag. 
It enabled me to generate an outsider-within perspective, that Is, a 
distinctive angle of vision. It is distinctive insofar as I was able to view 
drag from a perspective that was largely obscured from those who were 
either external to or thoroughly entrenched within it. An example readily 
comes to mind. 2 
After I went through the different stages/processes to do drag, I made 
some observational notes on the subjects the drag artists were miming: 
Doing drag definitely confirmed to me that I'm not cut out for it. I 
found it thoroughly exhausting, and I've found it very difficult to 
shake off this cold ever since I went through the different stages 
and processes to do it. But it has confirmed something else for 
me, something I think that even the regular girls don't think about 
or haven't thought about, unless of course you probe them further. 
Those who do drag might think they're miming Marilyn or Ms. 
Ross or Elizabeth Taylor, but, in effect, they are also miming a 
number of normative drag subject positions: the fairy, the drag 
queen, the grand empress, and so on. Each one has its own set 
of prescriptions and conventions, and the stages/processes I went 
through to do good drag, real drag outlined those of the drag 
queen. Of course, I violated some of the prescriptions and 
conventions of the drag queen subject position. As one of the 
regulars told me, I skipped the queue. I didn't go through the 
different rites of passages to do the drag I was doing, and a drag 
queen certainly wouldn't have relied on the help of another person 
to do drag, like I did with Ray. These kinds of 
prescriptions/conventions are always there, that is, they underlie 
performances, but they're never really spoken about explicitly. 
They're mainly unspoken, as well as the drag subject positions 
that they make up (Wednesday, 15 May 1996). 
As I previously iterated, my status as a researcher did not allow me full 
membership of either drag culture. It ensured that I was an outsider. My 
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observations reflect this outsiderness: "Doing drag definitely confirmed to 
me that I'm not cut out for it, ... I didn't go through 
the different rites of 
passages to do the drag I was doing, and a drag queen certainly wouldn't 
have relied on the help of another person to do drag, like I did with Ray. " 
However, I was not a complete outsider. Doing drag gave access to The 
Embers Avenue's drag culture, and It enabled me to formulate a distinctive 
insider's view for which the drag artists had no explicit realisation: "[I]t 
[drag] has confirmed something else for me, something I think that even 
the regular girls don't think about or haven't thought about.... Those who 
do drag might think they're miming Marilyn or Ms. Ross or Elizabeth 
Taylor, but, in effect, they are also miming a number of normative drag 
subject positions: the fairy, the drag queen, the grand empress, and so 
on. " 
The `Outsider -within Perspective' äsä Way Fcrwärd 
I propose that Collins' (1990) notion of the 'outsider-within perspective' 
serve as a basis for future conversations and work between queer theory 
and sociology. What this essentially entails is both queer theory and 
sociology facilitating and promoting queer and sociological perspectives 
that are neither full outsiders nor full insiders to their disciplinary domain. 
These are perspectives whose precarious disciplinary location enables 
them to view a subject/object of study from an angle that would largely be 
obscured from perspectives that were thoroughly entrenched within either 
queer theory or sociology. It is my strong belief that it would make 
conditions ripe for good, productive disciplinary cross-fertilisation and the 
generation of new perspectives. 
To a large degree, it is from and through this perspective that I 
examined, problematised, and reworked the unproductive relationship 
between queer theory and sociology throughout the thesis. In the first two 
chapters, from a queer perspective, I considered the failure of social 
critiques of queer theory to read the multidisciplinary project carefully and 
critically by conflating it primarily with one queer thinker or a number of 
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misinterpreted theoretical formulations. In the following two chapters, from 
a sociological perspective, I considered queer theory's failure to 
acknowledge and actively engage with sociology both theoretically and 
methodologically. Taken these chapters together, I was neither a full 
outsider nor a full insider to either disciplinary location. Rather, I was an 
outsider-within. This enabled me to generate a distinctive perspective on 
the current relationship between queer theory and sociology and to begin 
to move them in the direction of disciplinary cross-fertilisation. To a certain 
degree, this did occur, particularly in the third and fourth chapters. In 
Chapter Three, I created a theoretical discursive space within which both 
queer theory and sociology could simultaneously inhabit and productively 
converse so that I could highlight similarities and reconsider some 
shortcomings. In Chapter Four, I created a discursive space within which I 
integrated both queer and sociological methodological approaches in 
order to demonstrate how the broadening and deepening of a 
methodological approach could lead to a more developed social analysis 
of a subject/object of study. 
In proposing that an outsider-within perspective serve as a basis for 
moving forward, I am not suggesting that queer theory and sociology 
abandon perspectives that are thoroughly entrenched within their own 
disciplinary location. Similarly, I am not suggesting that queer theorists 
and sociologists abandon their own disciplinary location and become 
thoroughly versed in the other. Queer and sociological perspectives that 
are well-embedded within their own disciplinary location have their own 
distinctive perspective, and they are much-needed in order to bring 
different angles of vision to the discussion table. I do however take issue 
with them when they sideline alternative perspectives and erect 
disciplinary walls and boundaries, stalling movement towards some good, 
productive disciplinary cross-fertilisation. Current engagement (or lack of 
engagement) between queer theory and sociology needs to be balanced 
with outsider-within perspectives. This cannot and should not take place 
within the margins. They need to be central to engagement. If they do not 
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become central, then queer theory's and sociology's current relationship 
will remain an unproductive one, a question of deciding either for or 
against queer theory, for or against sociology. I therefore present this as a 
challenge to queer theory and sociology. 
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Appendix-Ai Interlocutors 
Table One. Interlocutors who formally participated In fieldwork by establishemt and sex (1) 
Establishment/Interlocutors Number Sex (4) 
Male Female 
The Embers Avenue 
M ale-to-female resident drag artists (2) 9 9 0 
Female-to-male resident drag artists (2) 1 0 1 
Interlocutors who did male-to-female drag on stage In'open-ended'slot 3 3 0 
Interlocutors who did female-to-male drag on stage In'open-ended'slot 1 0 1 
Interlocutors who appeared in male-to-female drag but did not perform on stage 2 2 0 
Interlocutors who appeared in female-to-male drag but did not perform on stage 1 0 1 
Owner/manager 1 1 0 
Managerial staff I 1 0 
Staff (3) 4 4 0 
General patrons 14 9 5 
Total 37 29 8 
as percentage of total number 78.4% 
21.6% 
Darcelte XV 
M ale-to-female resident drag artists 660 
Owner/manager 110 
M anagerial staff j10 
Staff (3) 321 
Total 11 10 1 
as percentage of total number 90.9% 
9.1% 
Total 48 39 9 
as percentage of total number 81.3"% 
18.8% 
Notes 
(p Data presented is as at 15 June 1D97. 
(2) Resident drag artists usually performed at least once a week. 
(3) Staff included bar staff, door people, so und and light technicians, and cooks. 
(4)'Se)' designates legally-registered sex status at birth, 
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Table Two. Intorloowtorb who formally partlolpatod In fieldwork by. olobliohomt and ttotusI identity (1) 
EstablIahmanlllnterlo41 utors Number G*xwal Identity 14) 
0 I. B (5/ H 
The Embers Avenue 
M ale-to-female resident drag artists (2) f 0 0 0 0 0 
Female-lo. mals resident drag artlats (2) 1 0 / 0 0 0 
Interlocutors who did male-to-female drag an stag. In'open-ended' Slot 2 3 0 0 0 0 
Interlocutors who did female"to-maledrag OM stage ln'open-anded'slot 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Interlocutors who appeared In male-to-female drag but did not perform on Stage 2 0 0 0 2 0 
Interlocutors who appeared infernale-to-male drag bud did not perform on stage 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Owner/manager 1 0 0 0 0 1 
M anagerial staff 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Staff (3) 4 4 0 0 0 0 
General patrons 14 3 2 3 4 2 
Total 31 20 0 2 0 3 
as percentage of total number 04.1% 13.1% a. 1% M. 2% 5.1% 
Darcelle XV 
M ale-to-female resident drag artiste 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Owner/manager 1 1 0 0 0 0 
M anagenal staff 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Staff (3) 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Total 11 t 1 1 0 0 
as percentage of total number "1. $% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 45 20 " 4 0 3 
as percentage of total number 40.4% 12.0% 0.7% 12.0% 0.3% 
Notes 
(A Data presented is as at ß June 4197, 
(2) Resident drag artists usually performed at least once a weak, 
(3) Staff Included bar staff, door people, sound and light technicians, and cooks. 
(4)'Sesualidentity' designates thesexuality Interlocutors Identified as gey met* (G). lostmen (L), bisexual (B), lronsgiiinder (T). at heterosexual (H) 
(5)'Transpender includes trampenden, pro-operative transsexuals, and postoperative transsexuals. 
Table Three. Interlocutors who formally participated In fieldwork by astabllshamt and age band (t) 
Est&blishmentlInto rloauto re Number Ape band 
2129 30-39 40-49 50-59 60* 
The Embers Avenue 
M ale-to-female resident drag artists (2) 9 0 4 5 0 0 
Female-to-male resident drag artists (2) 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Interlocutors who did male-to-female drag on stage In'open-ended' slot 3 3 0 0 0 0 
Interlocutors who did female-to-male drag on stage In'open-ended' slot 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Interlocutors who appeared in male-to-female drag but did not perform on stage 2 0 2 0 0 0 
Interlocutors who appeared In female-to-male drag but did not perform on stage 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Owner/manager 1 0 0 1 0 0 
M anagenal staff 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Staff (3) 4 0 2 2 0 0 
General patrons 14 5 3 4 2 0 
Total $7 e 15 12 20 
es poroantapa of total number 21.5% 40.1% 32.4% 5.4% 0.0% 
Daroelle XV 
M ale-to-female resident drag artists /03300 
Ownedmanager 100001 
Managerial staff 100100 
Staff (3) 302100 
Total 11 0{$01 
as percentage of total number 0.0% 41. $% 41.1% 0.0% 9.1% 
Total 4$ a 20 17 21 
AS percentage of total number IS. 7% 41.7% 31.4% 4.2% 2.1% 
Notes 
(A Data presented is as at b June V97. 
(2) Resident drag artists usually performed at least once a week. 
(3) Staff included bar staff, door people, sound and light technicians, and cooks. 
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Tabu Four. Interlocutors who formally psrtlclpitod In fieldwork byes tablis he mi and rseslsthnlsity 
(1) 
Este blishmentlInto rloautoto Number 
Raoel[thnlolty 
Mile African-American Ghlcano 
The Embers Avenue 
Male-to-female resident drag artists (2) 1 7 1 
1 
Female-to-male resident drag artists (2) 1 1 0 
0 
Interlocutors who did male-to-female drag on stage In'open-ended' slot 3 3 0 
0 
Interlocutors who did female-to-male drag on stage In'open-ended' slot 1 1 0 
0 
Interlocutors who appeared In male-to-female drag but did not perform on stage 2 2 0 
0 
Interlocutors who appeared In female-to-male drag but did not perform on stage 1 1 0 
0 
Owner/manager 1 1 0 0 
Managerial staff 1 1 0 
0 
Staff (3) 4 4 0 0 
General patrons 14 14 0 
0 
Total 37 3S 1t 
as percentage of total number $4.6% 2.7% 
2.7% 
Daresli. XV 
M ale-to-female resident drag artists "510 
Owner/manager 1100 
Managerial staff 1100 
Staff (3) 3300 
Total 11 10 10 
as percentage of total number 10.1% 9.1% 
0.0% 
Total 4$ 45 21 
as percentage of total number $3.8% 4.2% 
2.1% 
Notes 
(1) Data presented is as at 15 June V97. 
(2) Resident drag artists usually performed at least once a week. 
. (3) Staff Included bar staff, door people, sound and light technicians, and Cooks 
Appendix B Face-to-face Interview Questions 
General Questions 
1. What is your date of birth? 
2. What is your sex on your birth certificate? 
Male 
Female 
3. What sexuality do you identify with? 
Gay 
Lesbian 
Bisexual 
Transgender 
Pre-operative transsexual 
Post-operative transsexual 
Heterosexual 
Other (please specify) 
I wish not to disclose my sexuality 
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4. What is your race/ethnicity? 
White 
African-American 
Chicano 
Mixed 
Other (please specify) 
5. Which establishment are you mainly associated with? 
The Embers Avenue 
Darcelle XV 
6. Which category best describes you? 
Male-to-female drag artist who regularly performs on stage 
(usually at least once a week) 
Female-to-male drag artist who regularly performs on stage 
(usually at least once a week) 
Do male-to-female drag on stage in an'open-ended' slot 
Do female-to-male drag on stage in an 'open-ended' slot 
Appear in male-to-female drag but do not perform on stage 
Appear in female-to-male drag but do not perform on sage 
Owner/manager 
Managerial staff 
Staff 
General patron 
Questions for interlocutors who performed drag on stage 
1. How long have you done drag, whether for performance (for the stage) 
or non-performance (not for the stage)? 
2. How long have you done drag for performance? 
3. What type of drag have you performed? (e. g., singing, dancing, or 
comedy) 
4. Who have you impersonated/performed as? 
5. What kind of costumes/dresses have you worn on stage while 
impersonating/performing as someone? Please describe some of 
them. 
What do you think patrons expect when they come to see a drag show 
at The Embers Avenue/Darcelle XV? 
7. Currently, how often do you usually perform on stage per week? 
8. Who do you currently perform on stage as? 
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9. Please run me through the processes you go through to do drag, from 
selecting who you want to be/perform as to the actual performance? 
10. Where do you shop for your costumes/dresses, including accessories, 
stage props, etc.? 
11. How much do you normally spend on a new performance, including 
the costume/dress, accessories, stage props, etc.? 
12. Have you been enrolled in any further/higher education, including night 
classes? Please explain. 
13. What qualifications did you obtain? 
14. How long have you had experience of using your knowledge and skills 
to create costumes/dresses for drag? 
Questions for interlocutors who appeared in drag at The Embers 
Avenue but did not perform on stage 
1. How long have you done drag for non-performance (not for the stage)? 
2. Currently, how often do you go to The Embers Avenue in drag per 
week? 
3. Please describe the drag that you do. 
4. Have you ever impersonated a particular person? Please explain. 
5. What kind of costumes/dresses have you worn when you have done 
drag? Please describe some of them. 
6. How often do you appear differently in drag at The Embers Avenue? 
7. Have you ever performed drag on stage? Please explain. 
8. Do you have intentions to perform drag on stage on a regular basis in 
the future? 
9. Please describe the drag that people do at The Embers Avenue for non- 
performance. 
10. Please describe the drag that people do at The Embers Avenue for 
performance (for the stage). 
11. What do you think patrons expect when they come to see a drag show 
at The Embers Avenue? 
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12. Please run me through the processes you go through to do drag, from 
deciding how you want to do drag to actually turning up at The Embers 
Avenue in drag. 
13. Where do you shop for your costumes/dresses, including accessories? 
14. How much do you normally spend on a costume/dress, including 
accessories? 
Questions for owners/managers, assistant managers, and staff 
1. When did your establishment open to trading? 
2. What does your establishment market itself as? 
3. Who does your establishment primarily cater to? 
4. What is the capacity of your establishment? 
5. What is the admission fee to your establishment? 
6. Please describe the drag that people do at your establishment for 
performance (for the stage). 
7. Who has been impersonated/performed on stage at your 
establishment? 
8. What songs have been performed on stage at your establishment? 
9. What productions have been performed on stage at your 
establishment? (e. g., musicals) 
10. Do drag artists generally perform solo, jointly, or a combination of 
both? 
11. Are the drag artists who regularly perform on stage employees of your 
establishment? (i. e., those who usually perform at least once a week) 
12. Does your establishment provide support for the drag artists who 
regularly perform on stage? (e. g., costume allowance, 
facilities for costume changes, rehearsals) 
13. Please describe the drag that people do at your establishment for non- 
performance (not for the stage). [A question for 
the owner/manager, assistant manager, and staff at The Embers 
Avenue. ] 
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14. What special events and/or theme nights does your establishment 
showcase? They can relate to drag or otherwise. 
15. Have you been involved in Portland's drag scene in any way, whether 
at your establishment or elsewhere? Please explain your involvement. 
Questions for general patrons (The Embers Avenue) 
1. When did you start patronising The Embers Avenue? 
2. On average, during the past three months, how often did you patronise 
The Embers Avenue per week? 
3. During the past three months, what days of the week did you tend to 
patronise The Embers Avenue? 
4. Do you generally patronise The Embers Avenue by yourself or with 
friends? Please explain. 
5. When you patronise The Embers Avenue, how do you usually spend 
your time there? 
6. On average, during the past three months, how often did you watch the 
drag acts that are showcased at The Embers Avenue per week? 
7. Please describe the drag that people do at The Embers Avenue for 
performance (for the stage). 
8. Please describe the drag that people do at The Embers Avenue for non- 
performance (not for the stage). 
9. Do you 'tip' the drag artists who perform at The Embers Avenue, either 
with money or drinks? Please explain. 
10. Have you patronised or participated in any special events and/or 
theme nights that The Embers Avenue showcases? They can relate 
to drag or otherwise. Please explain. 
11. Have you been involved in Portland's drag scene in any way, whether 
at The Embers Avenue or elsewhere? Please explain your 
involvement. 
Appendix 'C: Postal Qüestiönnäire Questions 
General Questions 
1. What is your date of birth? 
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2. What is your sex on your birth certificate? 
Male 
Female 
3. What sexuality do you identify with? 
Gay 
Lesbian 
Bisexual 
Transgender 
Pre-operative transsexual 
Post-operative transsexual 
Heterosexual 
Other (please specify) 
I wish not to disclose my sexuality 
4. What is your race/ethnicity? 
White 
African-American 
Chicano 
Mixed 
Other (please specify) 
5. Which establishment are you mainly associated with? 
The Embers Avenue 
Darcelle XV 
6. Which category best describes you? 
Male-to-female drag artist who regularly performs on stage 
(usually at least once a week) 
Female-to-male drag artist who regularly performs on stage 
(usually at least once a week) 
Male-to-female drag artist who performs on stage in 'open-ended' slot 
Female-to-male drag artist who performs on stage in 'open-ended' slot 
Do male-to-female drag on stage in an 'open-ended' slot 
Do female-to-male drag on stage in an 'open-ended' slot 
Owner/manager 
Managerial staff 
Staff 
General patron 
Questions for interlocutors who performed drag on stage 
1. Why do you do drag? 
2. How long have you been involved in any way in the Portland drag 
scene? Please explain your involvement. 
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3. Have you participated In any special events and/or theme nights that 
The Embers Avenue/Darcelle XV showcases? They can relate to drag 
or otherwise. Please explain your participation. 
4. What type of drag do you prefer to perform? It can be singing, dancing, 
magic, or comedy for example. Please explain why. 
5. Who/what is your favourite impersonation/performance you have 
performed? Please explain why. 
6. Other than your own, what specific drag acts that have been performed 
at The Embers Avenue/Darcelle XV have been your favourite? Please 
explain why. 
7. How have your knowledge base and skills set helped you to do drag, 
which could have been honed through further/higher education or 
night classes? 
8. How long have you been sewing your own dresses/costumes? 
9. Do drag artists support each other in any way? Please explain. (e. g., 
sharing trade secrets or helping to make costumes) 
10. What do you think makes good drag? 
11. What do you think makes bad drag? 
12. What are your five top tips, trade secrets for doing drag? Please 
explain. 
13. Do you socialise with people who perform drag at The Embers 
Avenue/Darcelle XV in between your performances? Please explain. 
14. Do you socialise with people who appear in drag at The Embers 
Avenue but do not perform? Please explain. [A question for 
interlocutors who performed drag on stage at The Embers Avenue. ] 
15. What similarities do you think exist between people who perform drag 
on stage and people who appear in drag but do not perform on stage? 
16. What differences do you think exist between people who perform drag 
on stage and people who appear in drag but do not perform on stage? 
Questions for interlocutors who appeared in drag at The Embers 
Avenue but did not perform on stage 
1. Why do you do drag? 
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2. How long have you been involved in any way in the Portland drag 
scene? Please explain your involvement. 
3. Have you participated in any special events and/or theme nights that 
The Embers Avenue showcases? They can relate to drag or 
otherwise. Please explain your participation. 
4. What is your favourite drag that you have done? It can be a particular 
person or a specific costume/dress for example. 
5. Other than your own drag, what other drag for non-performance (not for 
the stage) at The Embers Avenue has been your favourite? Please 
explain why. 
6. What specific drag acts that have been performed on stage at The 
Embers Avenue have been your favourite? Please explain why. 
7. Do people who do drag for non-performance (not for the stage) support 
each other in any way? Please explain. (e. g., shopping for 
costumes/dresses or sharing make-up tips) 
8. What do you think makes good drag? 
9. What do you think makes bad drag? 
10. While you are in drag, do you socialise with people who perform drag 
on stage at The Embers Avenue? Please explain. 
11. While you are in drag, do you socialise with people who appear in drag 
at The Embers Avenue but do not perform? Please explain. 
12. What similarities do you think exist between people who perform drag 
on stage and people who appear in drag but do not perform on stage? 
13. What differences do you think exist between people who perform drag 
on stage and people who appear in drag but do not perform on stage? 
Questions for owners/managers, assistant managers, and staff 
1. Who staffs your establishment? (generic occupations and number of 
staff per occupation) 
2. How many drag artists currently perform on stage on a regular basis 
(i. e., usually at least once a week) at your establishment? Please 
exclude 'open-ended' slot performances. 
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3. Approximately how many people appear in drag at your establishment 
during the weekend (i. e., Friday, Saturday, and Sunday) but do not 
perform on stage? 
4. Please give rough estimates of the proportion (in %) of drag artists who 
regularly perform on stage according to their sexual identity, age, and 
race/ethnicity. Please exclude 'open-ended' slot performances. 
Sexual identity 
Gay % 
Lesbian % 
Bisexual % 
Transgender (incl. pre-/post-op transsexuals) % 
Heterosexual % 
Total 100% 
Age 
21-29 % 
30-39 % 
40-49 % 
50-59 % 
60+ % 
Total 100% 
Race/ethnicity 
White % 
African-American % 
Chicano % 
Mixed % 
Other (please specify) % 
Total 100% 
5. Please give rough estimates of the proportion (in %) of patrons who 
patronise your establishment according to their sexual identity, age, 
and race/ethnicity. 
Sexual identity 
Gay, lesbian, or bisexual % 
Transgender (incl. pre-/post-op transsexuals) % 
Heterosexual % 
Total 100% 
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Age 
21-29 % 
30-39 % 
40-49 % 
50-59 % 
60+ % 
Total 100% 
Race/ethnicity 
White % 
African-American % 
Chicano % 
Mixed % 
Other (please specify) % 
Total 100% 
6. Please give rough estimates of the proportion (in %) of staff according 
to their sexual identity, age, and race/ethnicity. 
Sexual identity 
Gay % 
Lesbian % 
Bisexual % 
Transgender (incl. pre-/post-op transsexuals) % 
Heterosexual % 
Total 100% 
Age 
21-29 % 
30-39 % 
40-49 % 
50-59 % 
60+ % 
Total 100% 
Race/ethnicity 
White % 
African-American % 
Chicano % 
Mixed % 
Other (please specify) % 
Total 100% 
7. What type of drag that is performed on stage at your establishment do 
you prefer? It can be singing, dancing, magic, or comedy for example. 
Please explain why. 
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8. What specific drag acts that are performed on stage at your 
establishment are your favourite? Please explain why. 
9. What do you think makes good drag? 
10. What do you think makes bad drag? 
11. What similarities do you think exist between people who perform drag 
on stage and people who appear in drag but do not perform on stage? 
12. What differences do you think exist between people who perform drag 
on stage and people who appear in drag but do not perform on stage? 
Questions for general patrons (The Embers Avenue) 
1. What type of drag that is performed on stage at The Embers Avenue do 
you prefer? It can be singing, dancing, magic, or comedy for example. 
Please explain why. 
2. What specific drag acts that are performed on stage at The Embers 
Avenue are you favourite? Please explain why. 
3. When you go to see a drag act at The Embers Avenue, what do you 
expect? 
4. While you are patronising The Embers Avenue, do you socialise with 
people who perform drag on stage? Please explain. 
5. While you are patronising The Embers Avenue, do you socialise with 
people who appear in drag but do not perform on stage? Please 
explain. 
6. What do you think makes good drag? 
7. What do you think makes bad drag? 
8. What similarities do you think exist between people who perform drag 
on stage and people who appear in drag but do not perform on stage? 
9. What differences do you think exist between people who perform drag 
on stage and people who appear in drag but do not perform on stage? 
10. Have you ever done drag yourself? Please explain your experience. 
Endnotes 
Introduction 
For example, Diane suggested that I supplement the earlier work of 
those who had dipped their toes (or feet) in the labeling approach, 
symbolic interactionist theory, and social-historical constructionism (for 
example, Altman 1971,1982; D'Emilio 1983; Duberman et al. 1989; 
Epstein 1987; Gagnon and Simon 1967b, 1970,1973b, 1986; Murray 
1984; Plummer 1975,1981 b; Stein 1992; Weeks 1977) with the work 
of Judith Butler (1990,1991,1993); Ed Cohen (1991); Teresa de 
Lauretis (1991a, 1991b); Diana Fuss (1989,1991b, 1991c); and Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990). 
2 Please see Endnote 1 for citations on work by White gay male 
historiographers and sociologists and queer theorists. 
3 The following sources provide a good historical overview of the 
emergence and development of queer theory and social perspectives 
on sexuality: Steven Epstein's "A Queer Encounter" (1994), Peter M. 
Nardi's and Beth E. Schneider's edited anthology Social Perspectives 
in Lesbian and Gay Studies (1998), Kenneth Plummer's introduction to 
his edited anthology Modern Homosexualities (1992), and Steven 
Seidman's introduction to his edited anthology Queer 
Theory/Sociology (1996a). 
4 These titles are borrowed from Butler's essay "For a More Careful 
Reading" (1995). 
Chapter One 
I am not suggesting that the conflations that I examine in this chapter 
and the next one are unique to criticisms of queer theory. It is my 
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opinion that the conflation of a thinker or a theoretical formulation with 
a disciplinary location is a general failure of criticism. This has taken 
place in criticisms of Marxism, feminist theory, psychoanalysis, 
postmodernism, and poststructuralism. I also believe that such 
conflations are usually symptomatic of a general (unstated) hostility to 
the particular disciplinary location that is being critiqued. 
2 Judging by the subject matter of Namaste's essay, 'transgender 
subjectivity' includes drag artists, pre-/post-operative transsexuals, 
transgenders, and transvestites. 
3 It is important to note that Butler would disagree with Namaste's 
characterisation of her argument. As I explain in Chapter Four, 
Section I, Sub-section i, Butler does not suggest that transgender 
subjectivity is always transgressive. 
4 For the most part, I do not disagree with Namaste's criticisms of 
Butler. As it will soon become clear, my issue with her criticisms is the 
way in which they are understood as representative of queer theory. 
5 Goldman's critique is resonant of criticisms made by Black 
feminists/feminists of colour of 'White' or 'Imperial' feminism in the 
early 1980s. They broadly contended that feminist frameworks were 
generally products of their Western Whiteness and either ignored 
questions of race and ethnicity or treated them as an afterthought. 
This had the effect of perpetuating racial bias and ethnocentricity. 
Please consult the specially-edited issue of the journal Feminist 
Review, "Many Voices, One Chant" (Amos et al. 1984), for these 
criticisms. Further, Goldman's argument that the examination of race 
should be the responsibility of all queer theorists is resonant of 
arguments between Michele Barrett and Mary McIntosh and Kum-Kum 
Bhavnani and Margaret Coulson in sociological discourse (Littlewood 
2004, pp. 83-87). Although Barrett and McIntosh reviewed some of 
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their work on the family in light of criticisms made by Black 
feminists/feminists of colour, they understood questions of race and 
ethnicity to be the predominant responsibility of Black 
feminists/feminists of colour and not White Western feminists (an 'add 
women' approach). In addition, their struggles against racism and 
ethnocentrism were understood largely as external to feminism. On 
the other hand, Bhavnani and Coulson, in reviewing Barrett's and 
McIntosh's own review of their work, believed that all feminists were 
responsible for examining questions of race and ethnicity. This would 
make race and ethnicity more central to feminism and transform 
feminism from within. 
6 Unfortunately, Butler does not make any particular references. 
7 Please see Endnote 6. 
8 Please refer to Introduction, page 5 for citations of work by lesbians 
and gay men of colour. I am not suggesting that they fall under the 
disciplinary heading of 'queer theory' or that their authors consider(ed) 
themselves queer theorists. Their perspectives on sexuality in relation 
to race, ethnicity, and nationality predated and informed the 
emergence and development of queer theory. 
9 Abelove, Barale, and Halperin and Butler make reference to and 
loosely interchange the terms lesbian and gay studies, queer studies, 
and queer theory. Since they are queer theory contemporaries, we 
can construe lesbian and gay studies and queer studies as queer 
theory. 
10 Please see Endnote 6. 
11 Please see Endnote 6. 
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12 Please see Endnote 6. 
13 As I will discuss in Chapter Three, Sedgwick's analytic separation of 
gender and sexuality is a departure from her earlier project Between 
Men (1985). Between Men (1985) is an integration of gender- and 
sexuality-centred terms of analysis. Sedgwick later returns to an 
integrated analysis in Tendencies (1993b). 
14 Please see Endnote 6. 
Chapter Two 
Vertretung refers to proxies who claim to fully know and represent a 
perceived homogenous constituency. Gayatri Spivak contends that 
"the choice of and the need for 'heroes, ' paternal proxies, agents of 
power-Vertretung" cannot sustain a critical project of representation 
and interpretation (1988, p. 279). The proxy and his/her authoritative 
position are undermined and dislodged once there is an absence or 
incoherence of any stable and/or unified constituency. 
2 This characterisation of queer theory conflates Foucault's use of 
discourse analysis with text linguistics rooted in the Russian formalist 
school of linguistics (Lemon and Reis 1965) and its various 
appropriations within quarters of French structuralism (for example, 
Barthes 1968; Levi-Strauss 1966,1969; Saussure 1959), whereby 
'discourse' is generally understood as a grammatical or linguistic 
system in relation to representation and meaning construction. 
Foucault, though, distances himself from these understandings of 
discourse. For Foucault, discourse is constitutive of the material 
practices of subjects, articulating the possibilities by and through which 
subjects become intelligible, that is, how subjects come to be. 
Foucault elaborates on this in his earlier work (1965,1970,1972, 
1973). 
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3 Please refer to Introduction, Endnote 1 for citations of work by White 
gay male historiographers and sociologists. 
4 Please see Chapter One, Endnote 13. 
5 Feminists within cultural studies, particularly Angela McRobbie and 
bell hooks, have also critiqued the 'subject' and its relation to identity 
politics, particularly feminist politics (Littlewood 2004, pp. 142-45). In a 
similar fashion, they have questioned the necessity of a stable and 
unified subject serving as a basis for identity politics. They too 
understand identity as normative and exclusionary and argue that any 
exclusions that result from the consolidation of identity should be 
central to identity politics. However, their critiques are further 
developed than those of queer theory insofar as they give them a 
material location. Both McRobbie and hooks ask where alternative, 
provisional identities might be formed, and they both suggest 'popular 
culture. ' As only one example, McRobbie locates them in 'girlie' 
culture and young women's magazines and hooks locates them in 
Black rap. 
6 Please refer to Introduction, page 5 for citations of work by lesbians 
and gay men of colour. 
Chapter Three 
Sedgwick does not explicitly define 'antihomophobic terms of analysis. ' 
She only gestures that they are a set of terms for primarily, if not 
exclusively, analysing sexuality. However, her simplistic and elusive 
usage of the broad heading raises more questions than it answers: 
what differentiates antihomophobic terms of analysis from homophobic 
ones? cannot homophobic terms circulate within antihomophobic 
terms of analysis? to what degree must a set of terms for analysing 
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sexuality be exclusive to sexuality in order for it to be considered 
antihomophobic? furthermore, who will decide this and how? 
2 Some of the following points that I make are indebted to Judith Butler's 
"Contingent Foundations" (1992 [1991]), which was outlined in 
Chapter One. 
Edward Stein's edited anthology Forms of Desire (1992) is a good 
cross-section of social-historical construction ism. 
The principal preoccupation of Between Men (1985) is to examine the 
contingency between men's same-sex bonds and male-female bonds 
within nineteenth-century English literature: "Between Men [1985] 
focused on the oppressive effects on women and men of a cultural 
system in which male-male desire became widely intelligible primarily 
by being routed through triangular relations involving a woman" 
(Sedgwick 1990, p. 15). Further, as I previously noted in Chapter 
One, Endnote 13, Sedgwick later returns to an integrated analysis in 
Tendencies (1993b). 
According to Sedgwick, Melville's Billy Budd, Sailor (1984) was written 
the same year that Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray (1949) was first 
published, 1891 (1990, p. 49). 
6 Sedgwick does make a fleeting reference to Jeffrey Weeks' text Sex, 
Politics, and Society (1989 [1981]) in a footnote (1990, p. 33, ftn. 31). 
However, he is simply linked to 'male gay writing and activism' and not 
to any notion of developed antihomophobic terms of analysis. 
Furthermore, there is no substantial discussion of his other projects, 
particularly Coming Out (1977). Therefore, this reference can be read 
in isolation, and it does not signal that she acknowledges the 
existence of developed sociological terms for analysing sexuality. 
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Please see Endnote 2. 
I made a gesture about a paradigm shift by social-historical 
constructionists earlier on in this broad section of the chapter, and I 
will expand upon it in the following one. 
9 Please consult the aforementioned references for a detailed account 
and discussion of homosexual politics of the 1960s and early '70s in 
North America and Great Britain. 
10 McIntosh's essay cannot be branded as social-historical 
constructionist in the strictest sense because it preceded the advent of 
a more formal social-historical constructionist approach. Vance makes 
this point: "[M]any suggestive insights about the historical construction 
of homosexuality in England ... vanished 
like pebbles in a pond until 
they were engaged with by mid-1970s writers clearly motivated by the 
questions of feminism and gay liberation. An identifiably 
constructionist approach dates from this period, not before" (1998 
[1989], p. 163). 
11 Unfortunately, R. W. Connell does not specify who some of sex role 
theory's tenants are. 
Chapter Four 
Some subjects/objects of study that Butler has examined through a 
textualist methodological approach include: feminist and queer identity 
politics; drag and performativity; subject formation and agency; and 
speech acts and the politics of the performative, specifically in relation 
to homosexual speech in the United States military. I cite this work 
later in the paragraph. 
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2 Kinship is a recurrent subject that Butler examines in greater detail In 
Antigone's Claim (2000). The book is a product of three lectures 
delivered for the Wellek Library Lectures at University of California, 
Irvine in May 1998. Antigone is central to Butler's examination of 
kinship. Broadly, it is through Antigone that Butler examines the 
constraints of normative kinship in relation to patriarchial 
heterosexuality and reproduction and opens up its terms to social and 
cultural change. Her examination considers the work of Hegel, Lacan, 
and Irigaray and challenges psychoanalysis. McRobbie (2003) 
provides a good summary reading of Butler's project. Her reading also 
considers how Antigone brings to the surface a 'double entanglement' 
that feminism needs to address: 
the co-existence of neo-liberal with liberal values in relation to 
families and sexuality, and the co-existence of feminism as that 
which is reviled or, as I would put it, 'almost hated, ' and feminism 
as a political force which has achieved the status of Gramscian 
common sense, something that is now 'taken into account' 
(McRobbie 2003, p. 130). 
This has been played out in family life and popular culture according to 
McRobbie. 
Neither Butler nor I would suggest that the familial units of the Houses 
are the only examples of 'alternative living arrangements' that 
challenge the naturalness of Western society's heterosexist nuclear 
family. There are other examples of alternative living arrangements 
that use and rearticulate the rhetoric of families and familial relations, 
although this will take place in different ways and within different 
cultural, social, and historical contexts. Two examples I have in mind 
include: the berdache of North American Indian cultures (Roscoe 
1993; Williams 1992) and the hijras of South Asia (Nanda 1993). 
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In order to avoid repetition, I will not outline Gagnon's and Simon's 
formulations here. Please refer to the previous chapter for a detailed 
outline. A reading of their work illuminates the degree to which 
Butler's methodology constrains her examination of norms. 
5 Although I choose to highlight these texts, they should not be 
understood as the only queer texts. There are additional ones, which 
are not exhaustive of what has been circulated under the queer theory 
sign, for example: Bad Object-Choices (1991); Butler (1990,1993); 
Sedgwick (1990,1993b); and Sedgwick and Parker (1995). 
Furthermore, 'choice' here is not deliberate in any way. I randomly 
selected two queer texts out of a list of 15. As for what designates a 
queer text, I included texts that have been repeatedly highlighted in 
queer debates or debates about queer theory. Having said this, to a 
certain degree, perhaps even to a large degree, my demarcation of 
what constitutes a queer text and setting a cap at 15 will shape the 
foregoing review. 
6 Herein I use the category 'transgenders' in the broad sense, which 
designates transgenders and pre-/post-operative transsexuals. 
The following approximations of resident drag artists who performed 
on stage, people who did drag but did not perform, patrons, and staff 
were arrived at through general observation, informal conversations, 
and responses that I received from the owner/manager, assistant 
manager, and staff of the nightclub in their postal questionnaire. 
1 used the same methodology as in Endnote 7 to approximate Darcelle 
XV's drag artists, patrons, and staff. 
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9' 1 do not disclose the drag artists' personas and their characteristics 
(for example, race) because this could compromise their anonymity. 
10. It becomes clearer in the next sub-section how Ray was my mentor. 
Aspiring drag artists did not have mentors in the formal sense that I 
did: resident drag artists who regularly performed on stage did not take 
them under their wing and show them how to do drag from scratch. 
Most of them learned drag over time by trial and error, observation, 
talking to drag artists, and receiving feedback on their impersonations 
and performances. Resident drag artists usually polished their 
performances by receiving feedback and sharing trade secrets (for 
example, different ways to apply make-up or style a wig) through 
informal conversations with one another. This particularly took place 
in the rehearsal stage of doing 'good drag, real drag, ' which was a 
more formal means to receive feedback and share trade secrets. I 
elaborate on this stage later in the chapter. 
'Scoping' was a term that Ray used to describe the first stage/process 
of doing good drag, real drag. It was generally used among the 
resident drag artists who performed an iconic persona on stage. I 
elaborate on this in the next paragraph. 
12. 'X' (and additionally later 'Y') designates a person or persona who 
cannot be named because it could compromise the drag artist's 
anonymity. 
13. After a resident drag artist ceased being a particular persona, he/she 
either kept his/her costume for 'memories' or possible future uses or 
donated it to an organisation or charity. Some drag artists also gave 
their costumes to aspiring drag artists. 
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14. Of course, I am not suggesting that drag is simply the case of miming, 
embodying, and repeating a gendered norm, Butler would agree. 
There is definitely a difference between performing gender in general 
and a particular gendered person. What I am drawing attention to is 
that a gendered norm was present within my effecting of Madonna, 
which was also a class norm. I explain further in this section how 
Butler is using drag as a leverage to pass social commentary on the 
imitative nature of bodily norms. 
Coda 
I Please refer to Cook and Fonow 1986, Devault 1996, Reinharz 1992, 
and Reinharz of al. 1983 for an overview of feminist critiques of 
positivist social science research methods. 
21 am not suggesting here that my experiences or the basis from which 
my knowledge is generated as a queer researcher are parallel to those 
of African-American women. The histories behind the locations are 
quite different, as well as their issues of power and domination. As I 
previously made clear in the chapter, I generally draw upon Collins' 
notion of the 'outsider-within perspective' in order to consider my 
relation to my fieldwork and the relation between queer theory and 
sociology. 
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